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PREFACE 
'!here are many people whose encouragement in the completion of this thesis I 
need to record. I am greatly indebted to those who gave their assistance at 
various stages of research. Special thanks goes to my supervisor, Peter 
Collins, for his sou.rrl advice, helpful conunents an::l criticisms. His confidence 
in my ability an::l his support made the completion of this work possible. 
Throughout the period of research and writing which took longer than 
anticipated, I have had the constant support of my wife, Ann, who has had to 
adopt an unsociable lifestyle an::l exercise patience with an all too often 
pre-occupied husban:i. I am therefore immensely irrlebted to her an::l other 
members of my family for their support. I am also grateful to Ann for reading 
an::l checking the draft. 
With the upsw:gence in rights has came a revival in the political thought of 
I.ocke. Recently a rn.nnber of excellent texts have been written on John I..ocke's 
doctrine, but despite extensive reading I have fourrl little that directly 
compares I.ocke's religious convictions with his views on rights. 
'!here are always difficulties in writing a text dealing with religion am 
politics. However, John I.ocke was able to show that rights have their 
authority in God, a belief I share despite the m::,re than 280 years that have 
passed since I.ocke penned his thoughts. '!he m::>re I studied the writings of 
this great man, the m::,re I identified with his convictions. I have foun:i the 
writing of this thesis a rewarding exercise. 
Finally, I acknowledge the assistance from Joy Woodward who greatly accelerated 
the process of producing a presentable manuscript. 
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ABSTRACT 
Since 1945 the emphasis on rights has been an ever-increasing phenomenon while 
the influence of the church plays an ever-diminishing role in today's society. 
'Ihe irony of the situation is that rights have their source in religion. It is 
Locke who is credited with having put the question of rights into the 
mainstream of political thinking and it was Locke's faith in God that enabled 
him to put fol:'Wcil"d the political doctrine that will be considered in this 
thesis. 
'Ihe theme of this study is the reconciliation of traditional christianity with 
humanist political theocy' s emphasis on rights in Locke's Political Ihilosophy 
which I have tenned 'Iheopolity. It traces Locke's thoughts, starting with his 
view on the creation of man which ultimately gives rise to natural and human 
rights. 'Ihese rights, when violated by Government, legitimately result in 
revolution. 
Locke has three areas of thought, which when combined, give rise to his 
political doctrine. 'Ihese areas are Epistemology, 'Iheology, and Politics. He 
believed that after creation man was in the State of Nature. 'Ihis state of 
Nature was controlled by the raw of Nature which gave rise to, and preserved, 
Natural Rights. To ensure the protection of these Rights the irxiividual 
entered into a Social Contract and so created a political society. Once 
society had been established, a Government was fonned to ensure the protection 
of the irrlividual by neans of civil laws. These laws extended Natural Rights 
and these extended rights are known as Human Rights. 
'Ihis study concludes that Jahn Locke's political thought is the rrost cogent 
political doctrine that can be adopterl by rational irrlividuals who share a 
stron;r sense of justice and irorality in a Dem:x:ratic Cllristian Society. It 
shows that Locke's pursuit of truth lerl to his basic, c::onuoon-sense politics 
which was the embodiment of the true state of man in a society where the 
irrlividual's God-given rights are respected. 
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1. JOHN LOCK AND THEOPOLITY 
1.1 'lHE cnK:EPl' OF 'IHEDFOLITY' 
The purpose of this thesis is to firstly reconcile traditional 
Olristianity with humanistic political theory's emphasis on rights in the 
writings of John Locke and secondly explore Locke's nonnative paradigm of 
what I call "Theopolity" in an attempt to show that his conceptual model 
is the most cogent political doctrine that can be adopted by rational 
people who share a strong commitment to justice, democracy and a 
monotheistic (especially Anglican) religious faith. 
To describe Locke's Political Theology I have constructed the 'W'Ord 
Theopolity. For Locke, God is the centre of the universe and therefore 
central to all he has created. Locke had a fundamental belief in God as 
portrayed. in the Olristian faith and so based. his reasoning on the Word of 
God. This pivotal position of God in Locke's politics is emphasised. in 
the first part of the word "Theopolity". The word polity is defined. in 
the Oxford English Dictionary vol. 10 as "an organised. society or 
conmrunity of men (and women)". This emphasises a key aspect of I..ocke's 
politics namely the creation of society by means of a social contract 
which mankind entered. into so that their rights which they have in their 
natural state may be preserved.. Locke's view is that the creation of 
mankind gave rise to natural rights and it is these Natural Rights and 
Human Rights that fonn the cornerstone of Locke's Theopolity. Theopolity 
nrust not be confused. with Theocracy which grants virtually no rights to 
citizens. 
In Old Testament times there had always been an interaction between 
politics and theology. The tenn Political Theology itself dates back to 
the time of the Stoics when it was taken to mean those religious practices 
which served. the needs of the state. This Stoic view had been criticized. 
by St. Augustine who claimed that the services of the Church went beyond 
the state. While in days gone by political theology te:rrled. to support the 
status quo, in today's world it is usually critical of the status quo to 
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the point of supporting revolution. Locke writes on political theories 
with their foundation clearly rooted in his concept of theology. Hence he 
looks at politics from a theological perspective. 
When 'Iheopolity is compared with a theocracy, the major differences is in 
the approach to rights. 'Ihe word theocracy was coined by the Jewish 
historian Josephus. It identifies the fonn of Government where civil and 
religious obligations are created by Divine laws. Benedict de Spinoza, 
the seventeenth century rutch :Rrilosopher, saw a theocracy as having all 
its civil obligations as corning from God. 'Ihe ideology of theocracy was 
not only practiced in the ancient world but was the type of Government 
adopted by the Puritan Settlers in America in Locke's time. We still firrl 
'Iheocracies in the states of the Vatican and Iran. 'Ihe co~cept of 
theocracy is not limited to Christian Countries as witnessed by the 
Islamic State of Iran or the Jewish state of Israel. 
A theocracy is seen to have sole authority in God with a spiritual 
aristocracy acting as his representatives here on earth. In practice, 
however, all power resides in these ecclesiastical authorities. In such a 
State, the rights of the individual are not recognised as it is claimed 
that the individual has no rights · against God or other people. While 
rights may be God-given, the all-powerful representatives effectively 
block any claim that the individual may have had. Locke describes a 
theocracy as follows: 
For the COI!UTk)nwealth of the Jews, different in that 
from all others, was an absolute theocracy; nor was 
there, or could there be, any difference between 
that commonweal th and the Church. The laws 
established there concerning the worship of One 
Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people 
and a part of their political government in which 
God himself was the legislative. (LT 1959:15) 
In a 'Iheocracy, sovereignty lies with the ecclesiastical authorities and 
there is no way in which the individual is able to claim freedom. It is 
this very concept that Locke's 'Iheopolity rejects. It is the very rights 
that a theocracy suppresses, which in a 'Iheopolity, lead to the system of 
Government proposed by Locke. 
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Another major difference is in the approach to authority. A theocracy is 
dependent on an authoritarian type rule while I.ocke' s writings show a 
dislike of authority, and in a Theopolity power lies with the people. As 
early as the 1400's Nicolas of CUsa, one of the great renaissance 
churchmen, had realised that it was the conmrunity, not any in:iividual 
person which had the di vine right to rule. His main argument was that the 
Pope was only a member of the church like any other member. The Church 
should be governed by a General Council which would be in:iirectly elected 
by the masses. The Pope would be the equivalent of a constitutional 
monarch. Nicholas wanted this fonn of rule to penneate all society. 
Needless to say, there were not many takers, at that ti.me, for this line 
of thought. Thus as we have seen the Pope is in reality an autocratic 
ruler claiming to be Gcx:l' s representative on earth. As in:iicated, the 
Vatican is therefore a theocracy. Although it is largely unacceptable 
now, it is quite understandable that Locke excludes Roman catholics from 
any political office as they owe their allegiance to a foreign power, 
namely the Vatican. 
"It is one of the paradoxes of history that the people of the past speak 
more clearly to us at the present day if we understand them in the context 
of their own ti.me" (Jeffreys 1967:1). 
This thesis will seek to show that Locke's pursuit of truth led to the 
articulation, for the first ti.me, of the claim that the true state of 
mankind in a society where the individual's God-given rights are 
respected, and that confidence in Locke's basic, conunon-sense politics is 
justified. The key to this thesis, however, will be Locke's Christian 
faith and his reliance on the Bible as the ultimate source for his 
Political Theology. In my opinion, I.ockean thinking imbues the core of 
most modern constitutions in Western Democracies. 
Locke was influenced by the milieu of his age. It is therefore important 
to put I.ocke's Theopolity into perspective by outlining his life and times 
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and the resulting influence on his theories. This thesis will examine 
some of the key events in his life, the political and religious background 
to these events and the influence they had on his writings. 
Locke appears to have three clear areas of thought, which when combined, 
give rise to Theopolity. These are Epistemology, Theology, and Politics. 
I..ocke based the first of these three sources on Descartes' intelligent way 
of dealing with philosophical questions. Locke learned that these 
questions could be dealt with by appealing to mankind's intelligence. It 
was widely held in his day that God irrprinted on mankind certain irrlelible 
truths or innate ideas. Natural law was dependent on the idea of innate 
knowledge as it enabled a person to recognise these laws which were laid 
down by God. 
Locke rejected this accepted view and claimed that the starting point of 
knowledge was the mind as a blank piece of paper receiving irrpressions 
from outside. He believed that reason and experience are the creators 
of knowledge. These form the two pillars on which epistemology is 
based. This thesis, however, concentrates only on those aspects of 
epistemology which are relevant to Theopolity. For Locke, the most 
obvious truth that reason uncovers is the existence of God. Locke himself 
considered the study of Christianity to be the m:>st irrportant branch of 
knowledge. He also believed that Christianity was basically reasonable 
and that scripture confirmed rather than contradicted reason. This leads 
to the secorrl source. 
Theology is arguably the m:>st irrportant source of Theopolity. It rests on 
the concept of God and the concept of Man. 
God and mankind that results in theology. 
It is the interaction between 
Besides establishing the basic 
tenets of Locke's beliefs which obviously had an irrpact on his writings in 
general, it is necessary to explore what Locke actually believed and how 
he has been interpreted. However, it is evident that Locke's Christianity 
revolves arourrl the Creation of Mankirrl by God, the fall of mankind with 
the resultant bias toward sin and God's plan of salvation of mankind. 
Also relevant to Theopoli ty are Locke's views on Church and government 
relations. 
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The third source is Poli tics which played a large role in I.ocke' s life 
putting him in the corridors of power only to cause him to flee into exile 
an:i then to return to a favoured position in government. His politics was 
built on the pillars of morality an:i individualism. His views were 
Liberal in that he believed in the rights an:i the freedom of the 
individual. The State places constraints on the individual only where it 
is necessary to protect their rights an:i freedom. Morality is the 
recognition of the rights an:i basic values which are attributable to 
mankind. lDcke believed that morality was a science which could be 
demonstrated. 
lDcke instituted a framework for his Theopolity which establishes rights, 
toleration an:i the purpose an:i limits of government. Within the natural 
order, which lDcke tenned the State of Nature, mankind is created equal 
although this thesis will show that this equality did not apply unifonnly 
throughout mankind. The source of the individual's duty to acknowledge 
the equality an:i rights of others is found in the law of Nature which in 
fact is the Will of Goo.. The law of Nature combined with the state of 
Nature in which God placed mankind, gives rise to Natural Rights which 
lDcke gave as being Life, Liberty an:i Property. 
The state of nature an:i its controlling law of nature were sufficient for 
mankind to preserve the natural rights which it gives rise to. However, 
after the Fall, mankind was biased toward wrong. Individuals could no 
longer guarantee their own safety an:i protection of rights against 
others. To ensure protection the individual entered into a social 
contract thus creating a political society. F.ach individual nrust enter 
society of his own free will. In other words, the i.ndi vidual consents to 
be part of that society. Once society has been established, then a 
Government can be established in a separate action to that of the social 
contract. 
To ensure the protection of the individual, the Government promulgates 
civil laws. These laws, established by the government, expand an:i give a 
higher level of obseJ:vance to the Natural Rights created by Natural laws 
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in the State of Nature. 'Ihese expanded rights are known as Human Rights. 
Natural rights am Government are therefore the sources of human rights. 
'Ihis thesis follows the above line of argument to prove the accuracy and 
relevance of Locke's theory am is graphically represented by a conceptual 
model on the next page. 
One stan:li.ng charge against Locke is that he provided a basis for the 
iro.ict:rnent that liberalism is abstract, am narrowly rationalistic. Yet 
I.ocke' s political teaching has a quality of rational sin'plicity and 
humanism. Locke's political doctrine is therefore more than just the 
ideology of Liberalism or Classical Liberalism. To claim his Political 
'Iheory as being only the ideology of liberalism ignores the critical role 
which Locke's Christian faith plays. Hence Locke's Political theory 
transcends Ideologies am Political fhilosophies. I have therefore viewed 
his writings on politics as Political 'Iheology. 
When analysing Locke's writings it nrust be remembered that he was a writer 
who had an image of mankind as represented in Christian theology. 'Ihis 
image portrays mankind as generally sinful am prone to being swayed by 
passion. I.ocke denied the doctrine of Original Sin which is the 
hereditary tendency to sin in favour of the concept of Original 
Innocence. His rejection of the concept of Original Sin is also found in 
his epistemology. Gcx:l has given us no innate ideas of himself therefore 
man, at birth, has no concept of Gcx:l or sin. Cespite this somewhat narrow 
outlook am the fact that Locke was a moderate, pious am serious nanki.nd, 
his writings reflect a free spirit of enquiry am a dislike of traditional 
authoritarianism. 
'Ille epitaph written by Locke himself was caJ:Ved on a marble tombstone 
above his grave am reads: 
Near this place lies John Locke. If you womer 'What kin::l 
of man he was, the answer is that he was one contented 
with his modest lot. A scholar by training, he devoted 
his studies wholly to the pursuit of truth. Such you may 
learn from his writings, which will also tell you 'Whatever 
there is to be said about him. 
God 
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In my opinion this short self-penned epitaph is the key to und.erstanding 
the thoughts of Locke, in that he attempted to discover truth. In 
attempting to discover truth he considered himself merely doing his duty 
The pursuit of truth is a duty we CMe to God • • • am a 
duty also we owe ourselves. ( as quoted in Cranston 
1957:279) 
This truth that Locke end.eavoured to discover was, he believed, an end. in 
itself as he wrote to his friend. am strong supporter, Sann.iel Bolde: 
Believe it, my good friend., to love truth for truth's sake is the 
principal part of human perfection in this world am the seed plot 
of all other virtues (as quoted in Jeffreys 1967:54). 
Locke also describes himself as a being contented with his lot. I 
therefore disagree with the follCMing passages from John D..mn who gives 
the impression that Locke was disappointed in himself. D..mn writes 
"Locke addressed his intellectual life as a whole to two huge questions. 
HCM is it that human beings can knCM anything? And hCM should they try to ' 
live?" am "By the end. of his life he was confident that he had largely 
answered the question of hCM men can knCM • • • But he was far less 
confident of his ability ..• to shCM men hCM they should try am live. 
D..mn therefore feels that ''We should see Locke as a tragic thinker, who 
saw rather clearly some of the tragedy in our own lives" 
(D..mn 1985:v-vii). HCMever, the l'OC>St appropriate surmnary related to Locke 
as a person comes from the apparent one true love in his life, Iady 
Masham, who wrote "His death was like his life, tnlly pious, yet natural, 
eaSf am unaffected; nor can time, I think, ever produce a rrore eminent 
example of reason am religion than he was, living am dying" (as quoted 
in Jones 1980:154). 
Locke took the two mainstreams of thoughts in the seventeenth century and 
brought them together in his writings. The first of these was the ad hoc 
experiments of Bacon. Bacon had preferred to interpret nature by careful 
attention rather than by metaphysical explanations. Locke followed in the 
footsteps of Sir Francis Bacon whose scientific ideas were introduced to 
him by Robert Boyle. Locke turned to nature am saw human destiny in 
tenns of scientific progress. The second. mainstream of thought was the 
- 8 -
semi-sceptical rationalism of the French Philosopher, Rene Descartes 
(1596-1650), who rather than cry to justify belief through the scholastic 
tradition, appealed to the mind by using logic and reason. 
I.ocke was the first philosopher to consolidate the main concepts of 
liberalism. His writings made a major contribution to the acceptance of 
the doctrines of constitutional government, religious toleration, 
representative institutions and the freedom of the individual's private 
property. It was the ideas of John I.ocke that later fonned the basis for 
the doctrine of classical liberalism although it must be acknowledged that 
much of I.ocke's political theo:cy was based on predecessors such as Richard 
Hooker, Hugo Grotius, and others. John I.ocke was not unique as shown by 
his contemporaries, Samuel Pufen:iorf in Gennany and Benedict de Spinoza in 
Holland, who were both bom in the same year as I.ocke, 1632. All three 
were arguing in favour of limited goverrnnent based on a social contract 
theo:cy. Yet of all the theories put forward, I.ocke' s was historically the 
most influential. 
To my mind the most apt explanation of the reason for I.ocke's success that 
I have read is in the words of Bertrand Russell : "In I.ocke' s theo:cy of 
goverrnnent, I re:i;,eat, there is little that is original. In this Locke 
resembles most of the men who have won fame for their ideas. 'As a rule, 
the man who thinks first of a new idea is so much ahead of his time that 
eve:cyone thinks him silly, so that he remains obscure and soon forgotten. 
'!hen, gradually, the world becomes ready for the idea, and the man who 
proclalll\S it at the fortunate nnnent gets all the credit" (Quoted in 
Ebenstein 1957:308). 
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of innovative cpl.Ill.on we must not 
overlook that I.ocke did have same unique and original ideas. One such 
exairple is that I.ocke proclaimed that goverrnnent existed for the welfare 
of the individual. It is the individual that gives or withholds approval 
of the goverrnnent's action. '!his has become the fundamental basis of the 
English process of civil goverrnnent and is the norm for the western 
world. It could be claimed that I.ocke originated the concept of the 
separation of power between the legislative and the executive al though I 
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think it would be more correct to say that Locke merely alluded to it 
while the French philosopher Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) developed 
the theme. 
Locke had a profound effect on his native England. Kathleen Mclean 
(1962:1) reports that students entering university were encouraged to 
study Locke. Queen caroline had a bust of Locke sculptured in 1734. 
Alexander Pope wrote that it was fashionable for young ladies to read 
Locke and to attract young beaus they would have a heavy tome of Locke in 
hand when their painting was done. 
He managed to put the spotlight on empirical enquiry and change the face 
of politics and philosophy. He exercised a deep influence on the thinkers 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, such as Voltaire, thus putting 
his opinions in the mainstream of English political developments. 'Ihe 
influence of Locke on the American Revolution can hardly be 
overestimated. His influence continued and eventually his ideas returned 
to Europe in a modified fonn to encourage the French Revolution. One of 
the great contributions of Locke is his analysis of the constitutional 
situation at a crucial period of its growth and his ability to see its 
confonnity with rational principles. Not that his thoughts were always 
welcome. On the contrary, they frequently cut across the traditional 
thinking of his day and were received with hostility, and therefore he 
published most of his writings anonymously. 
w. von Leyden fims Locke's doctrines to be, at times, consistent when he 
not only puts forward a view but proceeds to supplement it with further 
reasoning. One such example is his views on law, liberty and 
prerogative. John D.mn, on the other hand, attacks Locke for being 
inconsistent. However, Dante Genn.ino points out that consistency is not 
the greatest virtue in a serious political writer. Jeffreys admits that 
Locke is not consistent but feels that consistency could hardly be 
expected of a man who wrote so nruch and lived so actively. '!his thought 
is also borne by o' Conner who does not see Locke as a systematic or 
consistent thinker which is mainly due to his practical interests as well 
as not being aware of his presuppositions. Emerson has said that a 
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds adored by little 
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statesmen and philosophers and divines. According to Alabaster I many 
modern critics not only consider I..ocke to be inconsistent but also 
confused. C.B. Macpherson considers I..ocke to be the confused man's 
Hobbes. Contemporary interpreters of Locke, however, ignore his 
inconsistencies and are polarised into either liberal-constitutionalists 
and Marxists. 
Alabaster (1984:138) claims that Locke lacks rigor and probing 
thoroughness in his works. Yet Berlin can suggest that I..ocke may alrrost 
be said to have invented the notion of conut¥:>n sense. In my opinion the 
mixed views that greet I..ocke are due to the fact that he does not pretend 
to have all the answers and therefore does not attenpt to explain away 
what he firrls inexplicable. For instance, I..ocke was unable to reconcile 
the concept of free will and an omnipotent God. In a letter dated 
20 January 1693 he wrote to William Molyneux: 
I own freely to you the weakness of my urrlerstanding that though it 
be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God 
our Maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than 
I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with 
omnipotent and omniscience in God, though I am fully persuaded of 
both as of any truths I most finnly assent to. AIXi therefore I 
have long given off the consideration of that question, resolving 
all into this short conclusion, that if it be possible for God to 
make us a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of 
it. (as quoted in Yolton 1969:220). 
In reading both his critics and his admirers I have gained the inpression 
that there seems to be a problem in that I..ocke' s writings have a tendency 
to be too closely intel:woven with his times and he is too influenced by 
his own political convictions. But a writer cannot help taking the 
circumstances of his times and applying it to his writings. This is true 
of Plato as it is true of Marx. These criticisms, no matter how valid, 
should not, in my opinion, overshadow the aspects which have lasting 
value. The principles which are universally valid do not become worthless 
because they were applied differently at a different time. Truth is 
timeless or as the Bible, which was I..ocke' s primary source of reference, 
says " "Truth spoken, stands forever" (Proverbs 12: 19) 
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1.3 '1HE ~ OF 'IHEDIOLITY 
I return to Jeffreys quote with which I carranenced the previous chapter. 
"It is one of the paradoxes of histo:ry that the people of the past speak 
more clearly to us at the present day if we un::ierstan::i them in the context 
of their own tinle" (Jeffreys 1967:1). Following this argument, this 
section is a brief sketch of the context in which I.ocke' s writings took 
place thus giving a certain amount of insight into some of the influences 
on I.ocke's theo:ry of Theopolity. 
Jahn I.ocke was born on 29 August 1632 into a divided Englarrl. Socially, 
Englarrl was divided between town arrl count:ry. This was intensified by the 
economic shift from larrl to indust:ry. Ccmnnerce created a non-confomist 
middle class which opposed the Anglican Gent:ry. Politically Englarrl was 
also divided. Charles the first was on the throne arrl believed that it 
was his di vine right to rule without consulting the people. He ruled 
without convening Parliament for eleven years. 'Ihis was resented by the 
people arrl led to resistance by Parliament which presented the Kings with 
details of their grievances in 1641. 
I.ocke was schooled by his father until 1642, 'When civil war broke out with 
Oliver Cromwell leading his forces against the Kings. I.ocke's father 
involved hllnself with the Parliamenta:ry anny against the King. From 1646 
onwards, I.ocke attended Westminster School which was at the headquarters 
of the Revolution. It was at Westminster that he came un::ier religious 
influences which helped him break free of the unquestioning faith that he 
had been taught at home. 'Ihis was a major step in his development, as his 
philosophy became largely based on questioning arrl reasoning. Despite 
being exposed to these new ideas, I.ocke did not enjoy school as seen in 
his Thoughts Concerning Education in which he criticised the discipline 
arrl studies of schools in his tinle. 
Within three years the war was over and Cromwell ruled. AT first Cromwell 
was an unofficial dictator but later was made lord Protector. In 1652, 
I.ocke became an un::iergraduate at Christ Church, OXford, which had been the 
headquarters of the King's anny until 1646. He graduated as a Bachelor of 
the Arts in 1656 arrl then later as a Master of Arts. The subjects he took 
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were usually taken in preparation for seJ:Vice as a clergyman. Despite 
this Locke spent his life fighting the Anglican teaching of the divine 
right of the King and the teaching that the King's power is spiritual. In 
1659 he was electoo. to a Senior Studentship and the following year he took 
up a lectureship in Greek and later, in 1662, a lectureship in Rhetoric. 
While attending to his academic duties he befrierrloo. Robert Boyle who has 
the distinction of being Locke's scientific mentor. Boyle's influence is 
acknowloo.goo. in Locke's Essay on Human Understarrling. 
At this time his political thinking was that of a strict right wing 
monarchist and was clearly influenced by the writings of Hobbes as can be 
seen from his pcmphlet on religious toleration written in the years 1660 
to 1661, calloo. 'Iwo Treatises on Goverrunent. The Royalist traditions was 
once again becoming dominant at Orrist Church and the restoration of the 
monarchy loo to liberalism being discouragoo. at Oxford. The following 
year cromwell dioo.. The popular conception was that he had done well to 
oppose the King but was not a good. ruler. The people now felt that rigid 
puritanism was too nn.J.ch and the time was ripe for Charles 11 to ascend the 
throne. In the years 1660 to 1661 Locke wrote two essays on the demerits 
of claims to religious toleration now known collectively as 'Iwo Tracts on 
Goverrunent. '!his was the first of two works which Locke wrote in his 15 
years at Oxford but were only publishoo. this century. The second was a 
series of lectures on the law of Nature delivered in 1664, which led to 
Essays on the laws of Nature. At this time he was still following a 
Hobbesian approach to philosophy and toleration. 
Locke started his studies in medicine in 1664 but briefly left his studies 
in 1665 to become secretary to Sir Walter Vane in a mission to the Elector 
of Brarrlenburg. It was on this trip that Locke was, apparently for the 
first time, exposed to religious toleration. 'Ihis greatly influenced him 
and was contradictory to his earlier work, 'Iwo Tracts on Goverrunent. 'Ihl.s 
was a significant influence in the shift of Locke's views away from 
Hobbes. One notable difference with Hobbes is Locke's view of humankiro 
as being decent, orderly, socially mirrloo. and able to rule themselves. 
'!his could be largely due to Locke's own temperament. He made friends 
wherever he went. The e>d,stence of his wide circle of affectionate am 
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errluring friendships nn.ist have contributed to his corrpassionate view of 
human nature. 
He gained a Bachelors in medicine in 1674 by which time he had been 
associated with the Earl of Shaftesbury for some 9 years. Despite two 
attempts he was not awarded his doctorate. r::uring his studies in medicine 
Locke started reading the writings of Descartes as he did not agree with 
the Aristotelian tradition at Oxford. It was these readings in Descartes 
that prompted his interest in philosophy even though he did not always 
agree with Descartes. 
Arguably the turning point in Locke's life was in 1666 when he met Ashley 
Cooper (later Earl of Shaftesbury), the fourxier of the Whigs in EnJlarrl. 
At the age of 34 Locke went to live in the Shaftesbury household as 
Ashley's personal physician. r::uring his time with Shaftesbury he became 
part of the inner circle and the friendship brought about the change that 
had already begun in Locke to become a liberal. 'Ihis was especially in 
the area of toleration which Shaftesbury felt strongly about. In the same 
year the influences on Locke to accept the principle of Toleration bore 
fruit when he wrote his Essay on Toleration which showed that he had 
finally moved away frcnn his previously conservative stan::ipoint. 
Shaftesbury also taught Locke to understand economic responsibility. 'Ihis 
led to Locke writing "Some considerations on the consequences of lowering 
the rate of interest and raising the value of money" in 1691 which was 
followed by "Further considerations concerning the value of money" in 
1695. Also written in 1695 was "For encouraging the coining of silver 
money and for keeping it there". 
His readings of Descartes had aroused his interest in epistemology. In 
1671, Locke conunenced writing his famous Essay concerning Human 
Understanding which arose frcnn discussions with friends. He offered to 
write an answer to his friends on the question of the limits of human 
understanding. He wrote the work in isolated sections, often with long 
intEuvals between each section. It was finally published in 1688 arrl was 
the first book by Locke not to be published anonym:,usly. r::uring the years 
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after 1671 he continued the thoughts of "Essay" and published a second 
edition in 1694, with two further editions also published in his 
lifetime. These thoughts were continued in his Conduct of Understanding 
which was only published after his death. 
In 1672 Locke was appointed Secretary of Presentations. In 1673 
Shaftesbury was dismissed as Chancellor resulting in Locke losing his 
post, al though he became Secretary to the Council of Trade and Foreign 
plantations. It appears that at this stage, in 1673, he commenced his 
highly dangerous (politically-speaking) 'l'Wo Treatises of Government, 
commencing with the Second Treatise first. The bulk of the work was 
written while Locke was in exile in Amsterdam, with the major revision in 
1680. At some stage between 1683 and 1689 a middle section of the Second 
Treatises was destroyed. In the preface Locke claims that this was as 
long as the rest put together. A large part of the Second treatise deals 
with the right to property. '!his erophasise nrust be seen in relation to 
the prevalent controversy over King Charles' ship-money tax which was 
reg-arded as an invasion of property rights. It should also be borne in 
mind that Algernon Sidney had been put to death for, amongst other 
charges, attacking Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha. The gist of Locke's 
First Treatise was an attack on the · very same work. It is no wonder that 
Locke did not acknowledge authorship. 
There has been much ink spilt over whether this work was written to 
justify the glorious rebellion of 1688 or not. Peter Iaslett wrote an 
article entitled "The English Revolution and John Locke's Two Treatises" 
in 1956. He proved that it was most probably carmnenced in 1673, long 
before the revolution and therefore it was not written as a 
justification. However in 1980, Richard Ashcraft convincingly postulated 
in an article entitled "Revolutionary politics and Locke" that this work 
was part of the conspiracy known as the Rye House Plot which culminated in 
the abortive Mornnouth Rebellion in 1685. 
At this stage of Locke's career, col1SUITption had already begun to attack 
his body with periodic asthma attacks which continued to ail him for the 
rest of his life. '!his coupled with losing office in 1673, was the 
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motivation for I.ocke to sperxi the three years in France. Drring this time 
in France, Shaftesbury was irrprisonerl for a time in the Tower for his 
opposition to the King. 'Ihe King however realiserl that there was a threat 
from France and ROll'e and so tumerl to the popular party headerl by 
Shaftesbury for help. A few days later I.ocke retumerl to England in 
April 1679. 
Shaftesbury continued to be · heavily involved in intrigue and in 
October 1679 he was again dismisserl by the King. 'Ihe infamous Rye House 
Plot to assassinate the King was uncovererl. 'Ihis lerl to Shaftesbury being 
trierl and acquitterl on the count of treason in 1681 but he continuerl to 
plot against the King in support of the D.lke of Mornnouth who was the 
illegitimate son of Charles 11. on Mornnouth' s arrest in 1682, Shaftesbury 
flerl to Amsterdam where he dierl in 1683. I.ocke was also forcerl to flee to 
Amsterdam when Nathaniel Wade named I.ocke as a financier of Mornnouth' s 
rebellion. 
In 1685 King Charles dierl and his younger brother, James became King. In 
the same year Monmouth's rebellion finally failerl resulting in 300 
executions and 800 banishments. I.ocke was listerl as one of the 84 most 
dangerous Englishmen in Holland which resulterl in James 11 unsuccessfully 
tcying to have him extraditerl. 
While I.ocke was in Holland, Europe was going through a religious crisis 
with the Protestant Cormnuni ty in France facing the crusading catholic 
absolutism of the King and the French Huguenot persecution which, cambinerl 
with the French milita.cy pressure on Netherlaros createrl a climate of 
religious intolerance. Against this backgrourrl I.ocke wrote A letter on 
Toleration as a defense in favour of religious liberty, a reversal of his 
earlier but unpublisherl views. First publisherl in I.atin in 1685, it was 
supplementerl by a secom letter in 1690 and a third letter in 1692. 
catholicism was not restricterl to the continent. In Britain, King Charles 
had successfully broken the power of the Puritans and had starterl to show 
temencies toward Divine Rule. King James, who was a catholic, had 
attempted to interfere with the Church and the people fearerl a catholic 
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plot. He also attempted to replace Tories am High Churchmen in 
government with catholics. Since the Restoration, the two kings had both 
attempted. to extern. the influence of catholics to un:lennine the political 
power of the Anglican clergy. '!his had a deep influence on I.ocke's 
extension of freedom am toleration. In his writings he did not exten:1 
religious freedom to Roman catholics because at that point in histo:ry they 
owed. their allegiance to a foreign power, namely the Vatican which was 
thought to pose a threat to British Society. 
Civil war was once again on the horizon but averted. by William of Orange 
ascerxling the throne by invitation from both Whigs am Tories. William of 
orange lamed. in Britain in November 1688 am allowed. King James to flee 
to France. Locke returned. to IDndon in 1689 am took on the position of 
Conunissioner of Appeals. D.rring his final years he wrote, amongst others, 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1692-1693. '!his work originated out 
of letters first written in 1684 to a friero., :Edward Clarke giving advice 
on bringing up Clarke's son. In 1696 he became the Conunissioner for the 
new Board of Trade until he retired. in 1700. His health deteriorated. 
Not only did his asthma continue but he also suffered. fonn swelling of his 
legs am deafness. 
His last years were spent at the home of a friero., lady Masham. D.rring 
this time he wrote The Reasonableness of Christianity which was published. 
in secret in 1695. Attacks on this work by John :Edwards resulted in I.ocke 
replying in two anonym::,us vindications of his work in 1695 am 1697. A 
further attack on his work resulted in Locke writing three further works 
in 1697 defending his original The Reasonableness of Christianity. 
Nevertheless '!he Reasonableness of Christianity became the central theire 
of theology for over a century. 
Locke died. at Essex in October 28, 1704 at the age of 72. He had lived. 
through turbulent ti.roes am had experienced acceptance am rejection. As 
Jeffreys (1967:7) states "Locke was a prophet of reasonableness in a world 
that could hardly have been more unreasonable''. 
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In this Thesis my primacy source will be 'Iwo Treatises of Government, 
although Essays on the laws of nature, The Reasonableness of Christianity 
and his Essay concerning Human Understanding are also important sources 
of references. It is also important for us to remember that the basis of 
Jahn Locke's political writings is a blend between moral and religious 
principles especially with regard to the Natural Rights which occupy a 
central position in Locke's Theopolity. 
really a transposition of his theology. 
In fact Locke's politics is 
For a more detailed description of his Life and Works refer to 
.@Pend.ices 1 and 2. 
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2. LOCKE'S INFLUENCES AND CRITICS 
2.1 CIAS.SIC 1NFilJENCES 
To consider Locke's work in perspective we must lex:>k to see what other 
writers influenced him. Despite Locke's reliance on his predecessors he 
seldom acknowledges their contribution or cites their authority. There 
are, however, exceptions. For instance in his 'Iwo Treatises he quotes 
Holy Scripture 79 times. In that same work Bilson, Jarnes 1, Milton, 
Hunton, Ainsworth, Selden arrl Grotius, all get a mention as does 
Aristotle. Aristotle is also mentioned in other works 
I say this not in any way to lessen Aristotle, wham I 
lex:>k on as one of the greatest men aioongst the ancients; 
whose large views, acuteness arrl penetration of thought 
and strength of judgement, few have equalled. (ECHO 
Book 4 chap 17 sec 4) 
Another exception is Richard Hex:>ker who is mentioned a dozen times in his 
Two Treatises. This is possibly largely due to the Hooker's 
"Ecclesiastical 1?olity" which Locke purchased in June 1681 while he was 
writing his Second Treatise. Locke also mentions the Scotsman William 
Barclay. No doubt he was influenced by Barclay's "De 1?oteste Papae" and 
"De regno et regalia potestate" which he purchased in July 1681 and the 
numerous other publications on political theory arrl natural law which he 
purchased during this time. Locke attributes his philosophical 
awakening to Descartes. By this he meant his way of dealing with 
philosophical questions arrl not the actual conclusions of Descartes with 
wham he often differed. The influence of Descartes will be I'OC>re fully 
investigated in Chapter 2 dealing with epistemology. 
With regard to his urnnentioned influences, Von Leyden suggests that many 
of Locke's arguments in the Essays on the law of nature arrl especially 
the seventh essay, are traceable directly to passages in "Summa" by 
Thorcas Aquinas. Ashcraft on the other hand claims that many of Locke's 
arguments first appear in Jarnes Tyrrell 's "Patriarcha non Monarcha" as 
Ashcraft says " There are tex:> many -literally scores of them - to list 
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here. Not only the notions of the state of nature or the great law of 
nature, that evecy man ought to endeavour for the connnon good of 
humankin:i, but also the dissolution of government, the state of war, 
tacit consent, private property arising from the labour and irx:iustcy of 
the in:lividual, the exairples of In:iians living in America and many more 
specific parts of Locke's arguments first appear in 'fyrell's works". 
The actual roots of Locke's Theopolity go back to the early Greeks and 
Romans. Both Plato and Aristotle considered and rejected the concept of 
Social Contract. It was through the writings of Thomas Aquinas 
(1226-1274) who built upon the concepts of Aristotle and supplemented the 
thoughts of the Raman Marcus Cicero ( 106-43 BC) , that the idea of law of 
nature was introduced into English popular thought. In the later middle 
ages Aquinas' theo:cy became the ort.hcxiox teaching in England and on the 
continent. 
This resulted in the law of nature being subordinate to the law of God. 
The doctrine of the Fall was supreme with the result that the church saw 
society as evil. However, a revival in the interpretation of the 
covenant of the Old Testament resulted in the concept of Social Contract 
being brought back into political theo:cy via the church. 
As early as 1594, the English political Theorist, Richard Hooker 
(1553-1600) outlined the theo:cy of a social contract. Locke agreed fully 
with Hooker on the question of human nature. Unlike Hobbes who was to 
follow hill\, Hooker had seen hurna.nkirxi' s greatest tie as his sociability. 
Hobbes had seen antagonism as the greatest force between in:lividuals. 
Locke picked up this more humanistic thread thus deviating from Hobbes 
and the Calvinistic teaching of his day. Locke did not agree with Hooker 
on everything, however. For instance Hooker clailned that membership of 
society and the church were inherited while Locke saw them as a 
completely volunta:cy choice. 
Thomas Hobbes ( 1588-1679) wrote of men in the ort.hcxiox view of the late 
1500 's which was the vicious nature of humankin:i. This view became the 
hallmark of atheism by the time that Locke started writing. Locke gave a 
view contrary to Hobbes in that he saw in humankin:i qualities which gave 
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rise to the basis of social endeavour. In short Locke displayed a faith 
in human- nature which he would have thought reasonable am justified by 
experience. Hobbes silTlply could not accept this faith, al though Hobbes 
had rejected the mediaeval concept of the fall of hurnankirrl from a state 
of bliss. Hobbes believed that the theory of natural law put forward by 
those against the monarchy would lead to anarchy. Hobbes' assumptions 
led him to postulate a theory of natural law am social contract that was 
in favour of absolute rule within a state am continuing war between 
independent states. I.Dcke on the other hand was in favour of 
constitutional rule in a state with international peace through 
international law. Hobbes left unlilni.ted law in the hands of the ruler 
of the day. 
'!he D.ltch. philosopher Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in his book "De jure 
praedae" in 1607 put forward the view that the in:iividual in the state of 
nature had the right to punish those who do wrong. When a community was 
established, the in:iividual transferred his power to the state. '!his 
doctrine was clearly taken up by Locke am exix,urrled in his Two Treatises 
on Government. However Locke moved away from Grotius' thoughts on 
private property. Al though Grotius claimed that private property was 
established in the state of nature by the consent of all hurnankirrl who 
once shared in the original ownership of the resources, Locke stated that 
private property was established in the state of nature by natural law. 
'!his concept will be lt'Ore fully explored elsewhere in this thesis. 
Locke wrote his first of the Two Treatise on Government to dem:::,lish two 
views which were being used to justify privilege, oppression am 
political slavery. One view was that government requires the corrplete 
subjection of the people to the absolute will of the state or else 
society would not be possible. '!he other view was that of Robert Filmer 
who supported the divine right of Kings in his book "Patriarcha". Filmer 
had taken up all the familiar reasonings of his day that supported an 
absolute government based on divine institution. '!his reasoning said 
that Parliament is in an advisory role only. Filmer clung to the belief 
in the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures am the inability of mankirrl 
to establish its own ruler. Macke showed that Filmer could never prove 
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his theory and that unless a direct lineage of kingship from Adam to a 
king could be proven the argument fell flat and that human rule, in fact, 
came from some other source. Fil.mer had opposed Hobbes' view on the 
Social Contract as it was contrary to the concept of di vine right 
al though he believed in Natural law which is one of Locke's fundamental 
theories. 
Algernon Sydney (1622-1683) wrote a challenge to the theories of 
Fil.mer. He made a reasoned rejection of divine right and stated that 
only certain powers are delegated to the state while the people retained 
the rest. He saw Filmer's justification of unresisting obedience as 
nothing less than slavery. For his stand he was executed for treason. 
His book "Discourses Concerning Goverrnnent" was only published 15 years 
after his death. Unlike Locke, Sidney did not see the social contract as 
a formal resolution but rather a free detennination of i.rdividuals 
uniting together. In this contract Sidney recognised that ordinary 
humankirrl retained possession of certain native rights which the laws in 
the canmrunity should uphold and protect. While he praised liberty as one 
of these native rights, he nevertheless had an aversion to equality. A 
major difference between sydney and Locke is the fonner's reliance on 
historical arguments for ancient liberties while Locke relies on reason 
as a better basis for goverrnnent by consent. Sydney's m:::xierate views were 
in the same vein as George Savile, Marquis of Halifax (1633-1695) who was 
possibly the m:,st original thinker of the restoration period. He wanted 
a lilllited monarchy and i.rdividual freedom. He wanted more toleration 
than Locke would later allow but nevertheless did not extern his 
toleration to Roman catholics who, in his opinion, could not hold public 
office. 
2. 2 M:>IERN' roLITICAL '1HXGil' 
Just as we needed to look at influences on Locke to gain a better 
perspective on his works, so it is necessary to see how he influenced the 
writers who followed him to un:ierstand how Locke has been viewed in 
retrospect. It also gives us a better insight into the current Lockean 
th.inking. Dr. R N Berki states that Locke prepared the groun::i for a more 
dem::>cratic civic vision in the eighteenth century (Berki 1977:148). 'Ihis 
influence in varying degrees can be seen in m:,st major political 
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philosophers and few can write while ignoring Locke, even if only to 
refute his theories. On the other hand his influence is more overt such 
as in William Molyneaux' s demand for Irish freedom and the French 
Huguenots. 
Locke lived in a time of intense intellectual activity and political 
upheaval at a time when the struggle between the monarch and parliament 
became decisive. The world scene which followed Locke was one where 
there was a growing discontent with the rulers of the day. Th.ere was a 
demand for democracy and political equality. America was unhappy with the 
British style of rule and the French were tired of their decadent 
monarchy. This was not all that different from Britain during I.ocke' s 
time but a new dispensation had begun with a new approach to political 
philosophy. England saw the establishment of parliamentary and party 
govemment. In the eighteenth centucy the place of theology in politics 
rapidly diminished. The methods proposed by Descartes and supported by 
Locke were adopted and examined. Human reason was substituted for the 
authority of Scripture. The scientific rationalistic movement of which 
Locke was a propagator, became the predominant movement of the eighteenth 
centucy. 
The Americans developed Locke's theory of representation and came up with 
a slogan of 'No taxation without representation' . Locke's views on 
consent became the justification for their rebellion. On the Continent 
the followers of the Gennan jurist, Samuel von Pufenciorf (1632-1694) 
maintained a rationalist's point of view. One of his followers, 
C11ristian Wolff (1679-1754), developed Pufenciorf and Grotius' theories on 
a similar line to Locke using the law of nature and the theory of the 
state as his basis. Another follower of Pufenciorf, C11ristian Thornasius 
(1655-1728), made a distinction between natural rights which are inherent 
in mankind and rights acquired from hmnan law : a distinction I will be 
making in this thesis. 
The criticism of the basis of Locke's pol itical theories, namely the 
concepts of natural law and social contract started with the Scottish 
philosopher David Hume's "Of the original contract" published in 1742. 
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Hurne argued that the criterion of tacit consent is inapplicable, most 
people being inevitably constrained by cultural, linguistic arrl habitual 
ties to stay where they are, whatever the govermnent. 
Early in the eighteenth century the French philosopher Charles-Louis de 
Secorrlat, Baron de Montesqieu (1689-1755) agreed with Locke that the 
theory of divine right was unacceptable. B..lt he rejected Locke's theory 
of the social contract. Montesqieu believed that the state was a product 
of the envirornnent although he agreed that it was subject to the laws of 
nature. '!he laws of nature were in fact the law of the universe which 
was subject to growth arrl decay. From this I assume that he would have 
seen rights as a fluid situation arrl not as a static yardstick. Despite 
this he drew lai:gely on Locke for his theories of liberty. His major 
contribution was his theory on the question of the absolute separation of 
powers which he saw as the only solution to absolutism arrl which Locke 
hilnsel.f had raised in his writings but had not fully developed. overall 
Montesqieu did not use the methods of Plato or Locke but rather relied on 
Aristotle arrl Jean Bodin (1530-1596). 
ArnoncJ Montesqieu' s French Contemporaries who were greatly influenced by 
Locke were Voltaire (1694-1778) arrl the Encyclopeadiasts. Voltaire spent 
time in Englarrl studying Bacon, Newton am Locke. Based on these 
influences he fo:nnulated his theories on freedom am equal rights to 
liberty, property am protection from the law as well as political rights 
for the middle class. Of the Encyclopeadiasts, Diderot ( 1713-1784) and 
D'Alembert (1717-1783) are the most influential having complied the 
28 volume work which summarised science arrl history to create a 
philosophy of life. In this work many ideas were defined in terns of 
Locke's thoughts. 
One person that was influenced by Montesqieu was Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778) whose thought, according to Berki, is the lynch-pin of the 
political consciousness of the entire modern pericxi (Berki 1977:159). 
Rousseau connnenced with the study of the state of nature. His strict 
Calvinist upbringing left him bemused as he read the conflicting views of 
Hobbes arrl Locke. In his first political essay he rejected both Hobbes 
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arxi IDcke' s versions. He could not support IDcke' s view that mankin:i was 
boun:1 by the law of nature with no need for political institutions. He 
could not accept IDcke' s theo:ry that property was natural to mankirrl. 
Rather property was a social institution that developed in histo:ry am is 
a deformation of htnnan nature. Also contra:ry to IDcke, Rousseau saw 
property as requiring the consent of those who have none. In the state 
of nature, mankin:i was solita:ry but not lonely, innocent, happy am 
contented. In short he claimed that society corrupted mankin:i am 
society started when mankin:i first claimed private property. A closer 
look reveals that Rousseau is in fact not ve:ry far from IDcke in his view 
of mankin:l in the state of nature. The major difference is that Rousseau 
is hostile to the establishment of goverrrrnent while IDcke saw it as a 
necessity. Rousseau concluded that sovereignty must reside with the 
canununity. Unlike I.Dcke, however, Rousseau distrusted a dem:x:ra.cy am 
proposed an aristocracy. He saw the goverrrrnent as a trustee of the 
people arxi not the product of a social contract. He agreed however that 
where the goverrrrnent broke its trust ( or contract, in IDcke' s terms) , the 
canununity had the power to place its trust elsewhere. It is claimed that 
Rousseau stan:ls mid-way between the Christian solution of IDcke am the 
biological atheism of Marx (Doyle 1966:218). 
A contenlX)ra:ry of Rousseau arxi a friern of David Hurne was the Scottish 
philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790). He rejected the thoughts of Locke in 
tenns of obedience. IDcke postulated that obedience originated from the 
Social Contract. Smith felt obedience sinply arose from habit am 
respect for authority which evolved gradually. 
Not all political philosophers accepted that mankin:l had rights. The 
Irishman, F.dmurx:l B.lrke (1729-1797) for instance rejected that the idea 
of rights for mankin:i were valid. The writings of Rousseau had played a 
major role in leading to the French Revolution which horrified Burke who 
wrote as a neoclassical dem:x:ra.tic philosopher. Returning political 
philosophy to a theological base, Burke said that all relationships were 
pre-arranged by God. He also condemned any move toward dem:x:ra.cy or the 
extension of the franchise in Britain arxi wanted Parliament to be 
all-powerful. His main attacks were on the idea of natural rights am 
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the belief in reason both of which were foundations to Locke's political 
philosophy. In contrast to Locke, Burke does not rely on knowledge of 
divinely revealed truth to establish his political arguments. Burke also 
rejected the basic equality of the people which was a fundamental u:x::kean 
concept. Finally Burke would not accept Locke's belief that a Member of 
Parliament is boun:i by the wishes of his constituents. 
Political philosophy now entered the nineteenth century which was marked 
by the feud between scientists and religionists. By this time Locke had 
came to be seen as the predecessor of Kant and from the middle of the 
nineteenth century more and more philosophers considered Locke not to be 
the one-sided empiricist and sensualist that his critics had claimed 
(Petzall 1937: 6) . It was in this time that the English Ihilosopher, John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) rose to defen:i liberty which was one of Locke's 
three basic rights. Mill continued in the utilitarian vein but developed 
it into a more complicated concept. He supported the concept of liberty 
to such an extent that he almost reinstated it as a natural right, as 
Locke had done. In the same manner as Locke, Mill states that the 
function of goverrnnent is to make and enforce rules which protect the 
rights of the in:lividual. Yet later he came to question economic 
freedom in his book "Principles of political economy". Interestingly 
Mills reject.Erl rule by the majority on the groun::l that the masses were 
but average men. Where Mill agrees with Locke he does not merely repeat 
the theories but actually applies, develops and transfo:nns them. 
'!he rejection of much of Locke's theories continued with Thomas Hill 
Green (1836-1832) who redefined the essence of the law of nature as Locke 
had portrayed it. He proclaimed that law was only natural in the sense 
that it helped society reach its goal. Like Locke and Mill, Green tried 
to show what pleased Gcx:i, ma.de men happy and secured progress in tenns 
of his day and age. Green wrote his "Introduction to Hume" in 1874. In 
this work he devoted no less than 130 pages to refuting Locke's 
theories. "Green seizes upon passages which admit, in the light of the 
sequel, of being interpreted in te:nns of pure sensationalism. He 
isolates certain ideas which he thinks he firrls in Locke - often, it must 
be confessed, by putting a forced sense on Locke's expression - and, 
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after developing them mercilessly into their consequences, proceeds to 
deoonstrate their inadequacy in the light of principles derived from 
Kant's transceniental analysis of experiences . . . It applies to I.ocke' s 
work conceptions and standards quite foreign to his purpose, and so much 
outside the circle of his ideas that he could scarcely have understood 
what his critics miss and what he desiderated" (Pringle 1934:xxix). 
It would be an ilrpossible task to refer to all the philosophers am 
writers who have analysed or interpreted I.ocke' s philosophy. I have 
mentioned but a few. CUrrent writers such as Nozick, MacPherson, for 
example. will be covered in a later chapter dealing with current 
reflections on I.ocke. '!he omission of names such as Bentham, Hegel, etc. 
does not mean that they have not had a significant effect on the 
interpretation or authority of I.ocke' s thoughts, but rather the omission 
must be seen in the light of the subject matter of this thesis. 
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3. THE SOURCES OF THEOPOLITY 
3.1 EPISTEM:>LOGY 
While this thesis deals primarily with Religion an::l Rights, I believe 
that Locke's 'Iheology can only be understood if we have a grasp of his 
Epistemology. Not only does his Epistemology provide a key to his 
religious beliefs but it is also one of the foundation stones of his 
political theory. It is therefore important to ensure that we have 
reasonable insight into Epistemology before studying his 'Iheology. 
Epistemology is, in its simplest fonn, the study of knowledge arrl the 
justification of belief (Dancy 1985: 1) . Classical epistemology can be 
described as trying to find out 'What we can know an::l 'What the sources of 
knowledge are. It is also a desire to know 'What is truth. '!he pursuit 
of knowledge an::l truth, judging from his writings, appears to have been 
Locke's goal in life. M. Bunge has stated that truth can be logical, 
mathematical, factual or philosophical (Bunge 1983: 2) • Locke in his 
writings has used logical an::l philosophical arguments to support his 
views. 
To trace the arguments for an::l against innate knowledge we can go back to 
Aristotle who affinned that ideas are not ingenite but are imprinted by 
the impressions of sense. '!he basis of Aristotle's theory on how we get 
our ideas is his theory of perception. Aristotle saw perception as a 
transaction in which a fonn is transmitted by a medium, such as light, 
from the object to the perceiver who has an organ, such as the eye, to 
receive an::l pass on to the mim the fonn which is being transmitted. '!his 
was a rejection of the Stoics an::l Plato's doctrines which stated that 
from birth, or earlier, certain ideas are already in our mi.ms. By the 
17th Century the concept of innate knowledge had became fully accepted in 
one fonn or another an::l this knowledge was widely taken to be necessary 
for the foundation of religion an::l morality. 
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But during the 17th Century the scientific method began to slowly spread 
it's influences although it initially was accepted by a few. One such 
person was Descartes. According to Feiblenan (1975: 102), Descartes 
looked back to St. Augustine and took as his starting point, a mind 
cleared of all belief, a blank page. He then tried to base his theories 
on reasoning alone, with no reference to senses or experience. He said 
that mankind starts by reasoning his own existence and then reasons the 
existence of God. The idea of God could not come about if God did not in 
fact exist. Descartes was using Anselm of canterbul:y's (1033-1109) 
ontological argument for the existence of God. An ontological argument 
is the study of being as being, the investigation of what must belong to 
anything that exists. Or to put it another way, I have an idea of God as 
the perfect being or as that other than which nothing greater can be 
conceived. If the idea exists, then the thing itself must exist; the 
idea must correspond to something which is outside my mind. Therefore 
God must exist. He adapted Anselm's argument by saying that just as the 
sum of the three angles of a triangle equalling two right angles is 
included in the idea of a triangle, so the existence of God is included 
in the very idea of God. He was also using st. Thomas Aquinas' 
cosmological argument which states that it is therefore necessary to 
aff inn something which is absolutely necessary, which does not have the 
cause of its necessity from elsewhere, but which is the cause of 
necessity for others; and this everybody calls God. The argument follows 
that every effect has a cause. Therefore there must be a first cause to 
create the universe, and God is by definition the first cause. Therefore 
God must exist. Descartes adapted Aquinas' argument by using God to 
prove the validity of our perception of the world and not the other way 
roun::l. 
I.cx::ke hilnself attributed his interest in philosophy to Descartes. This 
can be found in a letter written by I.cx::ke : 
Though I must always acknowledge to that justly admired 
gentlenan (Descartes) the great obligation of my first 
deliverance from unintelligible way of talking of the 
philosophy in use in the schools in his time, yet I am so 
far from entitle in his writings to any of the errors or 
il11perfections which are to be found in my Essay, as 
derived their original from him, that I must own to your 
lordship they were spun barely out of my own thoughts, 
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reflecting as well as I could on my own mind, arrl the 
ideas I had there ; arrl were not, that I know derived 
from any other original (as quoted in Gibson 1968:205). 
In a letter from lady Masham to le Clerc in 1706 she wrote "'Ihe first 
books, as Mr. Locke himself has told me, which gave hbn relish for 
philosophical things, were those of Descartes. He rejoiced in reading 
these, because though he very often differed in opinion from this writer, 
he found. what he said very intelligible" ( ibid) . It must be clear, 
however, that Locke did not fully agree with Descartes' set of principles 
but rather he adopted Descartes' intelligent way of dealing with 
philosophical questions. Locke learned that these questions can be dealt 
with by appealing to :mankin:l Is intelligence. Had Locke not had that 
Cartesian influence much of Locke's key work, Essay on Human 
Urrlerstanding, would not have been written. 'Ihe First: book of the Essay 
was in fact written against those who held onto the scholastic tradition 
arrl Locke had learned from Descartes that there was a better way than 
scholastic, namely the way of appealing to the mind. In Gibson's work we 
read that ''we are forced to recognise Locke's view of general nature of 
scientific knowledge, including his conception of intuition as the sole 
source of certainty arrl of its relation to deronstration, is due directly 
or irrlirectly to the influence of Descartes" (Gibson 1968:212). 
Ever since the time of the early Greeks, mankin:i has addressed the 
problem of what there is. With the advent of the new interest in science 
men wanted to know how do we know. 'Ihis new approach was called 
episterrology. One of its chief advocates was Locke. 'Ihis new approach 
brought Locke into conflict with the writings of the much admired 
Descartes. Secorrlly cartesian grounds of knowledge were in opposition to 
the concept of innate ideas. 'Ihis concept was in conflict with his 
theory of the experiential basis for knowledge. It was widely held in 
his day, that God imprinted on :mankin:l certain Welible truths, one of 
these being a developed conscience which enables :mankin:l to tell right 
from wrong even if :mankin:l is not innnediately aware of his innate ideas. 
Natural law, which as we shall later see, is a cornerstone of Locke's 
political thought. 'Ihis theory was, up to Locke's time, deperrlent on the 
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idea of innate knowledge. This innate knowledge, it was claimed, enabled 
men to recognise these laws which were laid down by God. While Locke was 
pondering the question of human understanding, Ralph CUdworth (the father 
of Locke's friend lady Masham) published, in 1678, "The true intellectual 
system of the Universe", which outlined the cambridge Platonists support 
of innate ideas. Although he does not identify his opposition, he 
clearly wrote his An essay concerning human Understanding (published in 
1690) to refute the Platonists view. Locke treats the question of innate 
knowledge and innate ideas as an empirical question and uses a very 
simplistic observation to refute innateness. Because children, 
illiterate adults and . idiots do not have this innate knowledge how can it 
in'q:>rinted on mankind's mirxi. 'As further evidence he cites the person who 
is blind from birth and has no idea of color. Locke stated that the idea 
of God cannot be innate because there were people, in newly discovered 
lands who had no idea of God. Locke therefore concluded that the concept 
of innate ideas was false because if there were innate ideas they would 
have to exist in every person throughout the universe forever. It is "a 
kind of individually inspired dogmatism characterised by groundless 
affinnations" (Brehier 1966: 273) and was used merely to persuade people 
to accept authority without question. Locke further rejected the concept 
that innate ideas could be in meirory. To bolster his argument, he stated 
that to remember something I must recognise it as something that I had 
known before. 
Locke also disagreed with Descartes' ontological argument as existence is 
only supposed, not proven in that argument. However, he did not disagree 
with all that Descartes stood for. He definitely agreed that declaring 
the certainty of the existence of self involved the process of thought 
and knowledge of existence obtained in such a way was intuitive. Locke 
also agreed with Descartes that men have an idea of God as a being with 
infinite qualities such as power and knowledge. Descartes claims that 
this idea is innate. Locke on the other harrl analyses the idea of God as 
a complex idea arrived at by synthesizing our ideas of power and 
knowledge with our ideas of infinity 
This further is to be obseJ:ved, that there is no idea we 
attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not also a 
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part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being 
capable of no other sinple ideas belonging to any tlring 
but body , but those which by reflection we receive from 
thence; and all the difference we can put between them 
in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several 
extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, 
happiness, for example. For in that in our ideas, as well 
of spirits as of other tlrlngs, were restrained to those 
we receive from sensation and reflection, (ECHU book 2 
chap 33 sec 36). 
'Ihe starting point of knowledge according to ID::ke, as with Aristotle, 
was that the mini is like a blank piece of paper receiving inpressions 
from outside as ID::ke indicates: 
I.et us then suppose the mini to be, as we say, white 
paper void of all characters, without any ideas. ( ECHU 
Book 2, chap 1, Sec 2) 
In the same work ID::ke refers not to a white paper but to any "enpty 
cabinet" (ECHU book 1 chap 2 sec 15). However the ITOSt famous expression 
used to describe this state of the mini is tabula rasa or blank slate. 
So how does this tabula rasa become filled with knowledge? ID::ke answers 
in the same section as quoted above: 
How comes it to be :furnished? Whence comes it by that 
vast store which the busy and boun:iless fancy of man has 
painted on it with alinost errlless variety? Whence has it 
all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I 
answer in one word, from experience; in that all our 
knowledge is founded and from that it ultimately derives 
itself • . . (ECHU book 2 chap 1 sec 2) 
ID::ke therefore holds that experience is the creator of knowledge and 
experience can be either internal or external: 
external and internal sensation. • • • alone, as far as I 
can discover, are the windows by which light is let into 
this dark room (the mini) •... (ECHU book 2 chap 11 sec 17) 
In fact ID::ke postulates that these are the only sources of idea 
These two external tlrings, as the objects of sensation, 
and the operations of our minds within, 'objects of 
reflection are to me the only originals from whence all 
our ideas their beginnings. 
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'Ihese when we have taken a full sunrey of them ... we 
shall f i.nd to contain our whole stock of ideas; and ••• 
we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of 
these two ways. (ECHU book 2 chap 1 sec 4 and 5) 
We therefore can see that Locke considers all htll'[1ar1 knowledge to be 
either an idea or reflection on ideas: 
Knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the perception of 
the connexion and agreement, or disagreement, and 
repugnancy, of any ideas. In this alone it 
consists ... (ECHU Book 4 , chap 1, sec 2) 
Ideas are impressions from objects such as colours, cold, hard, sweet, 
etc. Human knowledge therefore has no other immediate object but its own 
ideas. Ideas can only come from objects of which we are aware. From 
these ideas mankind deduces the certainty or truths of certain ideas. 
'Ihis is called reason, which enables us to enlarge our knowledge and 
opinion. According to Locke there are four kinds of knowledge. Firstly 
there is the identity of di version which is an awareness of the various 
ideas and the difference between them. Secondly Locke talks of relation. 
'Ihis is the way ideas are associated with each other. 'Ihen there is 
co-existence or necessary connection, which refers to complex ideas 'Which 
rely on each other to fonn a single idea. Finally real existence is 
knowledge in connection with anything other than the relations of ideas 
to themselves and to each other. Building on these Locke argues that 
knowledge can came through intuition, deironstration or sensation but that 
the fonner two are the extent of our knowledge: 
Intuition and demonstration are the degrees of our 
knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with the 
assurance so ever embraced is but faith or opinion, but 
not knowledge, at least in all general truths (ECHU 
book 4 chap 2 sec 14). 
Ideas, however are divided into two categories of simple and complex 
which enables Locke to differentiate between passive cases and active 
cases in our mirrl. Simple ideas are the ideas that our senses provide us 
with. Complex ideas are derived from combining simple ideas: 
When the urrlerstanding is once stored with these simple 
ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite 
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them, even to an almost infinite variety, arrl so can 
make at pleasure a new complex idea. But it is not in 
(its) power ..• to invent ... one new silrple idea in the 
mind (ECHU book 2 chap 2 sec 2) . 
I have already stated that Locke analyses the idea of God as a complex 
idea arrived at by synthesizing our ideas of power arxi knowledge with our 
ideas of infinity. '!he knowledge of the existence of God, however, is 
established by demonstration. While it may be argued that in studying 
the existence of God we are moving away from Locke's epistemology towards 
his metaphysics, Locke's concept of how we establish the existence of God 
is relevant to his Theopolity. Locke relies more on Aquinas' 
cosmological argument rather than the Ontological argument. He argues 
that we can establish the existence of God, as well as his 
characteristics from the fact that we exist arrl have perception arrl 
knowledge 
Man knCMS by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing 
can (not) produce any real being • • . If, therefore, we 
know that there is one real being ( as we do namely 
ourselves) •.. , it is evident demonstration, that from 
eternity there has been something (ECHU book 4 chap 5 
sec 3). 
Locke argued that nothing can came from nothing therefore there must have 
been something before eternity. It could not have been matter or motion 
as neither could produce an intelligent being. '!he first being must have 
been all powerful arxi eternal. '!hat being who in fact is God. 
Locke believed that we carry a touchstone that enables us to distinguish 
truth from appearances. '!his touchstone he called natural reason arrl is 
a natural revelation. What this really alludes to is mankind's ability 
to combine ideas arxi ensures that every person will gain knowledge which 
he must have. '!his ability is most clearly outlined in his "Some 
thoughts concerning education", a book resulting from the many letters 
Locke wrote to his friends, F.dward arxi Macy Clarke, which gave advice on 
their daughter Elizabeth. Although this book was published in 1693, the 
letters to his friends were written during his D..ltch exile. 
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In his earlier writings Locke refers to this inner motivation as a light 
planted by nature: 
a law which each can detect merely by the light planted 
in us by nature, to which also shows himself obedient in 
all points and which, he perceives, is presupposed by the 
principle of his obligations: and this is the rule of 
living according to nature which the Stoics so often 
emphasized . . . since reason does not so nn.ich establish 
and pronounce the law of nature as search for it and 
discover it as a law enacted by a superior power and 
irrplemented in our heart. (EIN essay 1 page 111) 
In his later writings he uses a phrase also used previously by CUlven,el 
and refers to it as a candle 
were it not the candle of the lord set up by himself in 
men's mims (ECHU 4 chap 3 sec 20). 
Faith comes from a revelation from God and cannot be from deductions out 
of reason. Locke as an ex.ample of a truth of reason cites God's 
existence. The most obvious truth that reason discovers is the existence 
of God. Locke further states elsewhere that reason and nature point to 
certain basic values and truths which are self evident. The German 
philosopher, Gottfried I.eibenz (1646-1716), disagreed with Locke. He 
maintained that the min:i is innately predisposed to certain convictions 
rather than to others. Despite this view, he agreed with Locke that the 
notion of innate ideas is often used to justify dogmatism and credulity. 
He found. himself endorsing Locke's censure of this misuse of innate 
ideas. 
Locke's epistemology was not without prejudice in that the question of 
knowledge is based on certain preconceptions which he never questioned 
and further claims that Locke applied the principles of the exact 
sciences to epistemology. Locke's conception of mankin:l' s original 
natural faculties is an ex.ample of his uncritical acceptance of a view 
widely held in his day. Locke's concept of reason leads us to knowledge 
that follows the spirit of Hooker, Grotius and Pufendorf and therefore 
Petzall (1938:39), concludes that "Locke's epistemology is corrlitioned by 
tradition and milieu". 
- 35 -
Today I.ocke' s concept of tabula rasa which is the idea of an infant 
having a blank slate on which to write experiences, is widely rejected. 
Piaget has done nn.ich to refute this argument. There is no doubt that an 
infants interaction with the physical world increases knowledge but an 
infant knows right from wrong when it is born. 
I share the concern of I.ocke's critics such as Sherlock arrl Edwards who 
both pointed out that the alternative to innate knowledge is a relativity 
in morals. If we rely entirely on our experience to know what is right 
or wrong, if mankind is totally a product of his environment, then there 
can be no yardstick for mankind to live by in the state of nature. Yet 
for I.ocke the state of nature is a condition where men are free, with 
reason as their sole guide. 
Possibly Petzall captures the essence of some of the problems with 
I.ocke's epistem:>logy when he wrote that I.ocke's An Essay Concerning Human 
Urrlerstarxling is his main work on epistemology, arrl has been subjected to 
many varying interpretations. While same interpreters can be accused of 
bias arrl schematics, some fault lies with I.ocke. Firstly it is a wor~ 
written over 30 years in varying conditions arrl therefore not well 
arranged and open to repudiation. Secorrlly he did not attenpt a 
definitive work but a dialogue on the subjects arrl tries to encourage the 
reader to inquire further for hilnself. Petzall 's final criticism is that 
I.ocke's tenninology is often uncertain (Petzall 1937:16). 
I.ocke hilnself seems unable to be dogmatic about his theo:ry which rejects 
the concept of innate ideas. 
arrl since the arguments which are against ( innate ideas) 
do, same of them, rise from carrrrnon received opinions, I 
have been forced to take several things for granted, 
which is hardly avoidable to anyone whose task it is to 
show falsehcx::xi or improbability of any tenet (ECHU book 1 
chap 4 sec 25). 
His admittance that some arguments arise from carrrrnon received opinions 
considerably weakens his rejection of innate ideas. He seems to be 
willing to concede that his theo:ry is not infallible: 
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To deal truly, this is the only way that I can discover, 
whereby the ideas of things are brought into 
un::ierstan:ling. If other men have either innate ideas or 
infused principles, they have reason to enjoy them; and 
if they are sure of it, it is ilrpossible for others to 
deny them the privilege that they have above their 
neighbours. I can speak but of what I firrl in myself, 
and is agreeable to those notions, which, if we examine 
the whole course of men in their several ages, countries, 
and education, seem to deperrl on those foundations which 
I have laid, and to corresporrl with this method in all 
the parts and degrees thereof (ECHU book 2 sec 6 
para 15). 
No matter what modern day philosophers think of Locke's epistemology, 
there is little doubt that his thoughts were significant in that time. 
He un::iennined the idea that some traditional notions were beyorrl test or 
question. It is outside the scope of this thesis to develop the argument 
further al though theological aspects and irrplications will be considered 
in the next section and in the section dealing with '!he state of nature. 
3. 2. 'IHEDIOOY 
Locke's concept of Christianity is one of reasonableness and logic. In 
the previous chapter on Epistemology it was stated that the knowledge of 
God is established by experience. Experience is the creator of 
knowledge. It is this idea that Locke carries through to his Christian 
belief. His view of religion is extremely irrportant because I.c:x::ke's 
political writings are based on his reasoning of the Bible and his 
interpretations of scripture. This is especially so in his 'IWo Treatises 
of Government but is nevertheless a terrlency that 
by writers. 
is often overlooked 
Despite the fact that some canunentators read God out of Locke, his 
political writings are directly affected by his theological views. Locke 
hilnself considered the study of Christianity to be the most irrportant 
branch of knowledge: 
'!here is i.rrleed, one science that is incomparably above 
all the rest • . . I mean 'Iheology, which containing the 
knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to him and 
our fellow creatures, and a view of our present and 
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future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge 
directed to its true errl, i.e. the honour arrl veneration 
of the Creator, arrl the happiness of nan. This is that 
noble study which is every nan's duty arrl everyone that 
can be called rational creature is capable of (Conduct of 
Understanding section 23 as quoted in Yelton 1969:197) 
It is important therefore to know where I..cx::ke stood in terms of 
Christian dogma. However, there has been a division of opinion over 
his exact theological beliefs which had a direct bearing on his 
writings. At the outset it must be remembered that I..cx::ke did not at any 
stage try to demonstrate the truth of English Anglican Orthodoxy, he 
merely assumed it. 
Church of Englarrl orthodoxy owed much to the writings of Richard Hooker 
arrl in particular his "Treatise on the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity". 
I..cx::ke himself quotes Hooker some 12 times in his 'IWo Treatises. '!his 
influence is possibly due to the Hookers' s book which I..cx::ke purchased 
while writing his Second Treatise. Hooker had suggested the concept of 
natural law arrl a less rigid approach to the interpretation of the 
Bible. There was a fair arrount of division within the orthodox belief of 
the Church but the unifying factor was its conformity to the Book of 
Canm::>n Prayer arrl its preference for Annenianism as opposed to Calvinism. 
I..cx::ke's life covered two eras in the history of the Church. The first of 
these was known as the Refonna.tion era which was from 1517 to 1648. The 
secorx:i was the Period of rationalism from 1648 to 1789. His Christian 
faith was intertwined with his epistemology which was covered in the 
previous section. According to I..cx::ke there was only one way to obtain 
knowledge arrl that was through the experiences of our senses. Similarly 
our faith must be based on experience. 
The universe irx:iicates a creator who is a powerful, loving arrl wise God. 
The new Testament is proven by the way Old Testament prophecies were 
realised by Christ arrl his miracles which were his credentials. Locke 
saw them as proof of his authority. If we accept the truth of his 
miracles, we can accept the truth of his teaching about God. Therefore 
I..cx::ke had reasoned the existence of God. He did however concede that 
some things were contrary to reason such as the existence of more than 
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one God. He also conceded that some things were above reason such as the 
resurrection of Christ. In essence Locke proved in his book "The 
reasonableness of Christianity" which was the central theme of theology 
for over a century, that Christianity was basically reasonable an:i 
scripture confinned not contradicted reason: 
Is the voice of reason confirmed by · inspiration 
(ST chap 5 sec 32) 
The question of inspiration, however, was a dilemma for Locke as he wrote 
to his friend Limborch on 6th October 1685: 
If everything in the holy scripture is to be 
in:liscriminately accepted by us as divinely inspired, a 
great opportunity will be given to philosophers for 
doubting our faith arxi sincerity. If on the other harxi 
any part is regarded as of merely human composition, 
what becomes of the di vine authority of the scriptures, 
without which the Christian religion falls to the grourrl 
(as quoted in Cranston 1957:255) 
Fram the above we note that Locke realised that Scripture sometimes 
causes differences arxi in such instances it called for criticism an:i 
intei:pretation: 
The prejudices of our own ill-grounded opinions however 
by us called probable, cannot authorise us to urrlerstarxi 
Scripture to the contrary to the plain arxi direct meaning 
of the word • • • since parallel places of scripture are 
nost probable to make us know how they may be best 
urrlerstood, there needs but the comparing (FT chap 4 
sec 36). 
Locke further warns against building a doctrine from obscure passages of 
Scripture that has no comparative passage to support it nor appeals to 
reason : 
it is too much to build a doctrine of so mighty 
consequence upon so doubtful arxi obscure a place of 
scripture, which may be well, nay, better urrlerstood in a 
quite different sense, arxi so can be but an ill proof, 
being doubtful as the thing to be proved by it, 
especially when there is nothing else in Scripture or 
reason to be fourrl that favours or supports it (FT chap 9 
sec 112). 
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Robert Hoffert clailns that when Locke talks of scripture, he means the 
New Testament. Even in a letter to Richard King in 1703, Locke writes 
that the best way to gain knowledge is through the New Testament and 
elsewhere clailns that the Gospels are of more value than the epistles. Of 
the Gospels he appears to favour John the most with Romans being the best 
non-gospel book of the Bible. 
In trying to und.erstand Locke's orthodox Christianity, we need to look at 
the influences on Locke's religious outlook. Of these among the most 
important are those he was exposed to in his fonnati ve years. Locke's 
father and mother where both from Puritan families and it would seem that 
he had a strict Puri tan upbringing. I observe that he may not have 
enjoyed his upbringing, for in a letter he wrote: 
'!he two things I love most are my gran:lfather and quiet 
(A letter to Lord Ashley dated 11th March 1692) . 
While excessively strict and religious parents often leave mental scars 
on their children, Locke seems to have escaped the danger of becoming 
embittered and resentful which could have influenced his thinking and 
writings especially in the sphere of religion. Locke appears to have 
come to terms with his father, for lady Masham wrote" (Locke) never 
mentioned (his father) but with great respect and affection. His father 
used a con::luct toward him when young that he often spoke .afterwards with 
great approbation. It was the being severe to him by keeping him in much 
awe and at a distance when he was a boy, but relaxing, still by degrees, 
of the severity as he grew up to be man, till, he being capable to it, he 
lived perfectly with him as a frierrl. Arrl I remember he has told roe that 
his father, after he was man, solemnly asked his pardon for having struck 
him once in a passion while he was a boy" (as quoted in Jones 1980:153). 
According to Locke's biographer, Cranston, the strong unquestioning faith 
that Locke imbibed from his home was largely erased by the influence of 
his master at Westminster School, Richard Busby. Locke started at 
Westminster in 164 7. At the age of 20 he entered Christ Church 
a~ed by the Presbyterian :politician, Col. Alexander Popham. At 
Oxford his tutor was 'Ihomas Cole who was also from Westminster but 
indeperrlent in his religion. '!he Dean, John owen, on the other hand was 
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one of Cromwell's Independent sect and based his regular sennons on the 
Bible, in true calvinist fashion. John owen was one of the early 
propagators of the religious duty of toleration, having left the 
Presbyterians in 1649. (Fraser 1890: 12) . D.rring this time Locke would 
have also heard sennons by the professor of histocy, I.ewis de Moulin who 
espoused international calvinism. 
It is obvious from Locke's letters when writing about a Quakers trial he 
witnessed in 1656, that he was intolerant of dissidents. 'Ihis was a view 
far from the teachings of John OWen although Locke did become friends of 
the quakers, William Penn and Benjamin F\lrley, in his later life. In 
fact Locke stayed with F\lrley for a year during his exile in Holland. 
One of Locke's correspondents at the time was James Nayler who was 
eventually put on trial for claiming to be the Son of God. 
Despite his calvinistic family background he was unsyrrpathetic tavard.s 
non-confonnists in his earlier years. 'Ihis seems to be in keeping with 
the general mpression of Locke in his early years when he appears to 
have been somewhat intolerant and vecy much his own man. As Anthony Wood 
wrote of Locke at the time, "'Ihis John Locke was a man of turbulent 
spirit, clamorous and never contented. 'Ihe club wrote and took notes 
from the mouth of their naster, who sat at the upper errl of a table, but 
the said John Locke scorned to do it, so that while evecy man besides of 
the club were writing, he would be prating and troublesome" (as quoted in 
Cranston 1957:76). 'Ihis is further borne out by his French translator, 
Pierre Coste who said he was a naturally hot terrpered man who had learned 
to control his feelings (Aaron 1971:52). Yet by the time he was seventy 
he was considered a wann man dependent on the errotional input of friends. 
Locke visited the continent for the first time in 1665 in the position of 
Secretacy to the Diplomatic Mission of Sir Vane. What mpressed IDck.e, 
as he stated in a letter to Robert Boyle written in December of that 
year, is that cal vinists, llltheran and Roman catholics were all allowed 
to practise their beliefs: 
The distance in their Churches gets not into their 
houses. 'Ihey quietly pennit one another to choose their 
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way to heaven; and I cannot observe any quarrels or 
animosities amongst them on account of religion. This 
good correspon:ience is owing partly to the power of the 
magistrate, and partly to the prudence and good nature of 
the people, who, as I fin:i by inquiring, entertain 
different opinions without any secret hatred or rancour. 
(as quoted in Cranston 1957:82) 
on his return to Oxford, Locke was again urged to enter holy orders. 
According to Fraser, Locke's religious and metaphysical bent gravitated 
towards theology but he was unhappy with the dogmatism of the 
Presbyterians and the fanatics of the Congregationalists led him towards 
latitudinarian churchmen (Fraser 1890:16). At this stage he was offered 
a position in the Irish Church and in answering it he wrote 
Should I put myself into orders, and by the meanness of 
my abilities grCM unworthy of such expectations . . . I 
lose all my former study, and by putting myself into a 
calling that would not leave me. Were it a profession 
from which there were any return, you 'WOUld fin:i me with 
as great forwardness to embrace your proposals as I now 
acknowledge them with gratitude. (Quoted in Fraser 
1890:17). 
He then chose medicine instead. Even a canunan:i from the Secretary of 
State and the suggestions of the then Dean of Christ Church, John Pan:y 
did not swerve him from his decision. 
Arguably the person who had the IOOSt influence over Jahn Locke's thinking 
was Ashley-cooper (later lord Shaftesbury). He had started off in the 
Royalist Artrrj but switched to the Puri tans to protect the protestant 
faith. His religious sympathies were, according to Cranston, 
Presbyterian. Cooper as also a believer in toleration and no doubt 
influenced Jahn Locke's views on the matter. lord Ashley, as he was then 
known, was an outstan:iing politician in the court of Charles the Secon:i. 
At the age of 34 Locke went to live in the Shaftesbury household in 
Exeter as Ashley's personal physician. D.lring his time with Shaftesbucy 
he became part of the inner circle. Cranston is convinced that his 
friendship brought about a change in Locke to a liberal (Ashcraft 
1980:433), which is a statement I would agree to as there is a definite 
shift in Locke's thoughts during this time. 
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I.ocke' s first exposure to the Huguenots view was during his stay in 
France in 1675 to 1679 when he discovered that they were not different 
from Presbyterians or the Church of England. He was again open to the 
Huguenot influence during his time of political exile in Holland during 
the years 1675 to 1679. He often participated in discussions with the 
Huguenot canonist, Justly. Drring his exile he fonned a lasting 
friendship with Fhilip von Lllnborch, a liberal theologian and Remonstrate 
professor of theology who enlarged I.ocke's ideas of religious liberty and 
liberal theology. 
'Ihose who see I.ocke as a deist, use his rationalism to label him a 
deist. In fact Alexander (1908: 89) cites I.ocke as the !)9.rent of Deism 
and although I.ocke must be reckoned on the side of the orthodox, Deists 
derived their inspiration from him. Chapman ( 1981: 163) points out that 
I.ocke is a deist as he "pointed to certain basic values and truths which 
were self-evident" and quoted the following passage from I.ocke as proof: 
'!he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, 
teaches all mankirxi who will but consult it, that being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to hann another 
in his life, health, liberty or possessions (ST 2: 6) . 
It is true that in I.ocke's day the Deists and Utilitarians were all 
striving to rationalize religion by bringing dictates into confonnity 
with reason. I.ocke foun::l a ready audience for his epistemology when 
applied to religion. '!his does not mean that he was directly aligned to 
arrt of these sects. Deism however was a religious belief that did not 
deny God al though this was only because it was convenient to have a 
creator who could create the uni verse and then leave it to run by 
itself. 'Iheir belief was that it was against God's nature to again 
intervene in nature. Deists further believed that world is governed by 
natural moral law and all rewards and punishment will be based on 
adherence or lack of adherence to the law. 'Ihese :fundamental beliefs of 
Deists are contrary to I.ocke' s view of God which believed that God took 
an ongoing interest in his creation. Firstly he deals with those who 
pleased God before God sent Jesus Christ to earth: 
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Those therefore who pleased Gcxi, and were accepted by hm 
before the coming of Christ, did it only by believing the 
promises and relying on the goodness of Gcxi as far as he 
had revealed it to them. (RC paragraph 229). 
Therefore Gcxi was active in his creation during Old Testament times which 
is further borne out by I.cx:ke when he deals with David being made the 
King of Israel: 
And when Gcxi resolved to transfer the government to 
David ... (ST 8:109). 
Gcxi's involvement with his creation did not stop at the Old Testament. He 
then sent his Son to earth to play a pivotal role in humankind: 
He (Jesus Christ) was sent by Gcxi; His miracles shew it; 
and the authority of Gcxi in his precepts cannot be 
questioned. RC paragraph 242). 
His writings confirm that Gcxi is no absentee creator who has lost 
interest in his creation and left it in the control of natural laws. 
Locke firmly believed that Gcxi still takes an active interest in 
humankind : 
I desire those who tell us, that Gcxi will not (nay, same 
go as far as to say, cannot accept) any, who do not 
believe every article of their particular creeds and 
systems, to consider, why Gcxi, out of his infinite mercy, 
cannot as well justify man now, for believing Jesus of 
Nazareth to be the promised Messiah (RC paragraph 229). 
While the writings of I.cx:ke may have made hll1\ a parent of Deism, those 
who adhered to Deism ignored the faith that I.cx:ke combined with his 
rea.sonirg. Therefore taking into account all his writings, it is not 
possible to clam I.cx:ke as a Deist. 
Another ' ism' that could be attributed to I.cx:ke is that of Rationalism 
which flourished in Europe in the 18th Century. 'Ihis was the belief that 
only human reason and not Gcxi's revelation was the final arbitrator of 
mankind' s affairs. Despite same scholar's clam that I..ocke was a 
Rationalist such as Meyer (1973:239), I can use the same references as I 
did for Deism to show that I.cx:ke was not supportive of such a belief. 
Another furrlamental difference is in his epistemology. Rationalists 
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believed that the mind had stamped on it from birth certain primary 
self-evident notions. As we have already discovered, Locke most 
categorically rejects that. 
One party that Locke categorically denied belonging to was the Unitarian. 
In 1698 Locke, in response to claims that he was a Unitarian, wrote: 
(He) would ultimately be found of no party but that of 
truth, for which there is required nothing but the 
conceiving tnith in the love of it. I matter not Itn.lch of 
what party any one shall denominate. (as Quoted in 
McClachlan 1941:78) 
In which denomination to categorise him is another matter. There seems 
to be a case for Anglicanism based on his general outlook an::l bad<groun:l 
yet Brehier(l966:269) in his book on the "History of philosophy", stated 
"Locke stniggled all his life against the Anglican Theocracy" although I 
have found little evidence of this in my research an::l the parish records 
of High I.aver in:licate that Locke nonnally worshipped there. Calvinists 
on the other hand claim that from Locke's frequent use of Calvinist 
writers such as Hooker, Bilson, Mil ton, Hunton, Ainsworth an::l Selden in 
his own writings, he was in fact a Calvinist. They further bolster their 
argurrents from his writings which clearly reflect Calvin influence in 
such premises as absolute sovereignty of God an::l sole authority of 
Scripture. He also epitomized the 5 points of political Calvinism i.e .. 
:fun:iarnental law, natural rights, contract an::l consent of people, popular 
sovereignty and resistance to tyranny through responsible 
representatives. Some, including Locke's contemporary John Edwards, 
even accused him of being a Socinian, an obscure heresy prevalent in 
Locke's day. Even as recently as 1960 Richard Cox claimed that Locke was 
a heterodox, probably Socinian. 
One of the basic elements of Socinianism was the denial of the Trinity 
and the divine Incarnation. Edwards was able to use Locke's 
Reasonableness of Chrisitianity as a proof of his Socinianism because in 
that work Locke denies the doctrine of original sin an::l is silent on 
Christ's satisfaction an::l atonement. However Locke himself repudiated 
this claim as he only followed Christ: 
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A Christian I am sure I am because I believe Jesus to 
be the Messiah, the King and saviour sent by God and, 
as a subject of his kingdom, I take the nile of faith 
and life from his will, declared and left upon record 
in the inspired writings of the apostles and 
evangelists in the New testament, which I erdeavour, to 
the utmost of my power, as is my duty, to un:ierstand in 
their true sense and meaning {A Secorrl Vindication of 
the reasonableness of Christianity pages 281-2). 
Von Leyden claims that even before the restoration, I.ocke was detaching 
himself from Calvinism and becoming attracted to the teachings of 
Anglican Churchmen. '!his was not difficult as Anglicans and calvinists 
agreed on many points. In I.ocke's earlier writing days from 1660 to 1663 
von Leyden points out that the Anglican, Bishop Robert Sanderson, was one 
of I.ocke's greatest influences. However, in this investigation it is of 
no matter as the critical aspects do not revolve arourrl name tags he can 
be attributed with but with the doctrines he held as truth. 
With that background it is now necessary to evaluate what John I..ocke 
believed as being the truth. I.ocke considered the truths of scripture to 
be easy to see and un:ierstand so that even labourers and the opposite 
sex could compreherd. Yet he conceded that it was the more elite that 
would be able to interpret its real wisdom and in fact I.ocke introduced 
a more critical interpretation. 
Firstly he believed in God. Using the arguments of experience I..ocke 
concluded that God exists. OUr awareness of ourselves is a silllple but 
sure element in experience and from this I.ocke deducts that there is a 
God. 'Ihe following clearly indicates his belief: 
'!hough God has given us no innate ideas of himself; 
though he has stamped no original characters on our 
minds, wherein we may read his being; yet, having 
furnished us with those faculties our mirrls are erdowed 
with, he hath not left himself without witness .... To show 
therefore that we are capable of knowing, i.e. , being 
certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this 
certainty, I think we need go no further than ourselves 
and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own 
existence (ECHU Book 4 chap 10 sec 1). 
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Secorrlly he believed that because of Adam's sin, all mankind had fallen 
arrl the result was that all od mankind would die : 
the doctrine of the gospel is, that death came to all 
men by Adam's sin {RC paragraph 3) . 
In the same work he again supports his view: 
As Adam was turned out of Paradise, so all his 
posterity were born out of it.... in a state of 
mortality, void of the tranquility and bliss of 
paradise. {RC paragraph 6) 
It is ilnportant to note that Locke refers to spiritual death as a result 
of Adam's sin. Physical death results from the original law of nature. 
'Ihirdly, although he believed that mankind had fallen , he did not 
accept the concept of original sin which is the hereditary ten:iency to 
sin. 
If by death threatened to Adam were meant the corruption 
of human nature in his posterity, 'tis strange that the 
New Testament should not any where take notice of it, arrl 
tell us, that corruption seized on all because of Adam's 
transgression as well as it tells us so of death. But as 
I remember, every one's sin is charged upon himself only" 
{RC paragraph 4) . 
That he would reject the concept of Original Sin is obvious from his 
epistemology. According to Locke, God. has given us no innate ideas of 
himself arrl he has not stan"ped any original characters on our minds. If 
we continue with Locke's theo:ry of being born with a clean slate we come 
up against the fact that mankind, at birth, has no concept of God. arrl no 
conscience. The idea that mankind is born with a clean slate is a 
rejection of the idea that man in born in sin. Locke therefore was 
repudiating the connnonly held belief of his day which had its beginnings 
in 397 AD. It was st. Augustine who claimed that all of mankind sinned 
in Adam arrl are therefore guilty arrl all including infants are biased 
toward sin although Ambrose who died in AD 397, had previously written 
that he had fallen with Adam arrl was as guilty as Adam. Locke clearly 
disputed these interpretations arrl follows the doctrine of innocence 
first propounded by Pelagius in 409 AD. 'Ihis doctrine says that mankin::l 
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is born innocent, free from any corrupt tendencies and each individual 
will only be punished for the sin they conunit: 
How doth it consist with the justness and goodness of 
Gcx:i, that the posterity of Adam should suffer for his 
sins; the innocent be punished for the guilty? 
'!hough all die in Adam yet none are truly punished, but 
for their own deeds (RC a paragraph 6) . 
I disagree with Locke and support my difference with a quote from 
Reinhold Niebuhr who wrote in his book Intellectual autobiography, that 
the estiniate (that mankind is born in sin) is supported by ove!Whelming 
evidence taken both from a sober observation of human behaviour and from 
introspective analysis. 
Locke also believed the only way to salvation is though belief in the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ as borne out by the following 
"For", says st.Paul,Romans iii, 9, 23, ''We have proved that 
both Jews and Gentiles, that they all urxier sin:For all 
have sinned and come short of the glory of Gcx:i" (RC 
paragraph 19) . 
Arrl further on in the same book he writes 
''We are now required to believe to obtain eternal life, 
is plainly set down in the gospel, st.John tells 
us,John iii. 36, "He that believeth on the son, hath 
eternal life;and he that believeth not the Son, shall 
not see life." (RC paragraph 26). 
Finally Locke also believes in the obligation to obey Gcx:i. Gauthier 
identifies three aspects of this obligation in the following two 
passages: 
That Gcx:i has given a rule whereby men should govern 
themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to 
deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures. He 
has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that 
which is best; and he has :p::,wer to enforce it by 
rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and 
duration, in another life; for nobcxiy can take us out 
of his hards (ECHU Book 2 chap 28 sec 8) . 
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Arrl in another work identifies the second aspect: 
'Ihe state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges everyone; Arrl reason which is that law· 
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to barn. 
another in his life, health, linearity or possessions. 
For men being all workmanship of one Omnipotent and 
infinitely wise maker; All sei:vants of one sovereign 
master, sent into the world by his order and about his 
business, they are his property, whose workmanship they 
are, made to last during his, not one anothers pleasure 
(ST sec 6). 
Firstly we see God's power and omnipotence as a basis for the enforcement 
of the law of nature which is God's law. Mankind is not a law unto itself 
but subject to God's law and this compels obedience. Secondly God's 
wisdom directs us to what is best. 'Ihirdly our obligation to obey Goo. 
derives from God 's right over his creation. We are his workmanship and 
his property. 
This then is the viewpoint from which Locke wrote his political 
philosophy. 
An irrportant part of Locke's Anglican Orthodoxy is his attempt to see 
political power as opposed to other fonns of power. He attempts to 
define bourrlaries between the political sphere, the religious sphere and 
the family sphere. 
"I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish 
exactly the business of civil goverrnnent -from that of 
religion and to settle the bourrls that lie between the 
one and the other" (Letter pages 350/351). 
Unlike Hobbes or Filmer whose political doctrine is simply a secularized 
version of the prevalent Anglican theory, Locke set out to destroy the 
current Anglican theory of politics and persuade his political audience 
to resist the crown, although in all three cases their theories were 
based on the necessity of individual episterrological autonomy. 'Ihe 
dominant Anglican theory and by far the most widely believed theory of 
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political obligation was outlined in an explicit attack on Locke's theo:ry 
by Charles Leslie in 1703, although the official Arqlican theo:ry of 1688 
was prevalent throughout the eighteenth century . 
In the Two Treatise, human political arrangerceits derive their legitimacy 
from God's expression of God's purposes for :nankini. As this thesis 
enph.asises Locke's reliance on his religious beliefs in fo:rnrulating his 
political ideas it is inportant to note his view on government am 
church. Many of Locke's thoughts on Church/State relations are to be 
fourrl in his connronplace book urxier various headings am show us that 
during 1661 Locke was giving a great deal of thought to the nature of the 
church ani the power of the state al though by 1659 Locke had already 
fo:rnrulated his attitude to toleration. Firstly it should be noted that 
Locke never stretched his toleration to Raman catholics because they owe 
their allegiance to a foreign ruler who caused nonarchs to lose their 
crown if he chose to exconnnunicate them. Locke also classed them as 
atheists. Hence to Locke the question was a political one. It was not a 
question of the freedom of conscience or intellectual freedom but it 
related to the extent of civil power over religious affairs. 
Locke's theo:ry of toleration is based on his theo:ry of the nature of 
society ani government. If man could live peacefully together without 
uniting in a social contract, there would be no need for government or 
politics. Not withstanding the above, Locke saw religious freedom as 
separate from secular freedom. No person can inpose his personal 
interpretation of Christianity on another. Because churches are 
volunta:ry associations no church has the right to persecute al though 
they may as a last resort exconnnunicate a member provided they do not 
take away any possessions. Finally, toleration must be shown in allowing 
preaching am the expression of opinions about the church. He also 
points out that the state cannot punish men for the sins of covetousness, 
uncharitableness am idleness, for example. 
Jahn Locke established the theological but autonomous rights of all men 
in the conduct of politics. Locke saw :nankini's general political duty 
as one of conscientious subservience as well as it's aptness for 
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fulfilling God's purpose. God created the whole lll1iverse and it is his 
world and he has established the relationships of the parts to the 
whole. The world belongs to God and he alone has sole authority over it. 
It is he who constitutes the order of law which instructs all of mankind 
in their duty. 
I.ocke agreed that the supreme legislative power (magistrate) of a 
conununity had no power to touch that which was required for the worship 
of God. Political power which is used to confine individual behaviour 
which does not threaten peace, is the misuse of power (D..mn 1969:32). 
This view deviates from the thoughts of Hooker, Hobbes and Spinoza, all 
of whom insist on the supremacy of political authority over any 
ecclesiastical authority although they accepted freedom for the Christian 
conscience. For them any threat to religious liberty did not come from 
the state but from religious fanatics. 
Under a heading Ecclesia, I.ocke draws a number of conclusions regarding 
the separation of the Church's power from that of the political sphere. 
I.ocke clearly outlines the fact that a goverrnnent, or indeed any secular 
power, has no right to compel any man to belong to a church. Joining a 
church is man's own decision and is a private affair of the individual 
conscience. A decision which will be borne out of mankind's desire to 
publicly worship God. A church does not originate from mankind crying to 
be sociable. The need to be sociable can be satisfied by other 
associations in society. 
Similarly no power can force a cererrony on the church. According to 
I.ocke, the actions of a church nrust be in accordance with the will of God 
and not subjected to the sinful wishes of mankind, although the state can 
intervene when the actions of a church threaten the peace. But only 
then. 
I.ocke also outlines his thoughts on the Church's role in society and its 
right to interfere with the State which all contributed tc::Mard his 
Theopolity. 
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'As we have already seen, the manner of worship of God, its time or place, 
opinions on religious matters such as the Trinity, etc. are no concern of 
the state or society. It follows that the church cannot dictate to the 
state on any views it may hold on these aspects of religion, assuming of 
course that the state is not interfering. By the same token the church, 
although it may remove members, has no jurisdiction over anyone who is 
not a member. 
Mankin:i will also have views and take action on matters which on their 
own are neither good nor bad but concern society and men's relationships 
with each other. Mankin:i may continue provided that he does not distum 
the state or is not of ITOre hann than good for the conununity. 'Ihe state 
then has a right to prevent the action from taking place and may prohibit 
publication of the opinions. 'Ihe state, however, may not in,pose with a 
greater restraint than necessary. 'Ihis applies to the church as an 
institution as well as to mankin:i. 
'Ihere are ITOral vices and virtues which are either good or bad in nature 
and directly concern society. 'Ihe state is not the keeper of ITOral 
virtues or vices. They are merely subservient to the good and 
preservation of hurnankin:i. 'Ihere will be men who firrl the restrictions 
inp::>Sed by the state to be in conflict with their conscience. Locke 
thinks that such men nn.ist follow their conscience as far as they can 
without violence and at the same time accept the penalty inflicted upon 
them for break.inq the law. By doing this they will purchase heaven for 
hiin.self and peace for his land though at the cost of estate, liberty or 
even life itself. 'Ihis of course is fully applicable to the church. 
From the above we note that there can be no such thing as a state church 
as this is a contradiction in tenns. 'Ihe state is in principle legally 
neutral on the question of belief but Locke assumes that there is 
consensus on ITOral rules necessary for the preservation of society as 
determined by rational men. 
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3 .3 roLITICS 
'As stated in the second chapter, it is in'p:,rtant for a understanding of 
I.ocke's political writings that we realise that in I.ocke's time political 
issues and religious issues were linked. For example there was the 
English Civil war and later the King James the Second crises. The 
previous chapter explored I.ocke's religious beliefs. Based on those 
beliefs, this chapter shows that with Liberalism, Locke argued for a new 
political dispensation and which would there.by put an end to wars of 
religion. The very real influence that I.ocke had, has earned him the 
honour of being called the father of Liberalism. 
Liberalism is a very loose term. It is a type of "secular-religion which 
encloses the individual as a whole. It is the belief in man as a creator 
and as the master of his own world" (Merkyl 1972: 119) , or as Alabaster 
puts it "the belief in the value of liberty of the individual" (Alabaster 
1984:11), or as Bullock and Maurice claim" the belief in freedom and the 
belief in conscience as the twin foundations of liberal philosophy" (As 
quoted in Alabaster 1984: 11) . Generally liberalism means a body of 
m:x:lern political doctrine while a liberal is usually a person who has a 
cultural allegiance and not necessarily of politics as such. D.mn has 
suggested that liberalism has its basic political value as a dislike of 
authority while a liberal has the value of toleration (D.lnn 1979:28). 
The \tJOrd liberalism is derived from the Latin \tJOrd meaning free. Although 
liberal thought is found in the Magna Carta of 1215, the \tJOrd did not 
enter the English language until the nineteenth century when it was taken 
over from the Spanish political party, the Liberales. 
The beginnings of liberalism are found among the ancients, especially the 
Greeks of whom the Sophists were the m::,st notable. The Sophist 
rhetorician, Alcidamas, claimed" The Gods made all men free; nature made 
none a slave" ( as quoted in Gray 1986: 2) . Karl Popper and Eric Havelock 
argue that the conflict between Plato and the Athenian democrats was the 
same as the differences between totalitarianism and liberals today. The 
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concept of liberalism can be found in the writings of Socrates 
(470-399 BC) whose attitude to life was one of scepticism, experimenting 
arrl being rational arrl free. Aristotle's ethics had basic natural human 
rights which all have on the basis that they belong to the family of 
mankind. Perhaps of all the Greeks, it is Pericles who can be seen as 
the father of Liberalism as we see in his writings : "The laws afford 
equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, but we do not 
ignore the claims of excellence . • . The freed.am we enjoy extends also to 
ordinary life; we are not suspicious of one another, arrl so not nag our 
neighbour if he chooses to go his own way . • • But this freedom does not 
make us lawless. We are taught to respect the magistrates arrl the laws 
arrl never forget that we must protect the injured ... We are free to live 
exactly as we please, arrl yet, we are always ready to face any danger " 
(as quoted in Gray 1986:3). 
The Romans also had elements of liberalism evident in their society. For 
instance, Marcus Tillius Cicero (106-43 BC) taught that man obeys the law 
in order to be free. This cause:i F. A. Hayek to claim Cicero as the main 
authority for modern liberalism (Gray 1986:4). In medieval times there 
was the voice of Peter Abelard (1079-1142) keeping the liberal tradition 
alive. He was a theologian who refused to abide by the authority of the 
Church Fathers. He introduced arguments which resulted in Christianity 
being doubted which in turn allowed in:iepe.ment thinking. But the spread 
of Christianity brought about intolerance, resulting in an end to free 
enquiry arrl freed.am. This was particularly true urrler the rule of 
Justinian arrl Constantine. D.lring the Renaissance of the 14th to 16th 
centuries a liberal world view began to emerge arrl was fourxi to be quite 
carrpatible with religious orthodoxy of the day. 
Al though modern liberalism is considered to have stennned from the 
philosophers of the seventeenth arrl eighteenth centuries during the age 
of enlightenment or Reason, its roots can be fourrl in the Renaissance. 
D.lring this period thought m:wed away from the spiritual world to the 
temporal world arrl focused on the person as an in:iividual. The 
Netherlarrler, Desiderius Erasnrus (1465-1536) was a Christian humanist in 
the Renaissance period. As a pioneer of the liberal way of thinking, he 
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proclaimed that Christianity had nothing to fear from the new questioning 
that was emerging arxi strongly rejected the dogma of lllther. Erasmus 
insisted in the spirit of the law arxi not the conunas arxi semicolons. To 
him religion was a code of ethics arxi not a fo:nn of government. 
The m::wement from the spiritual to the temporal continued in the 
Protestant refonnation when Christianity m::wed toward individualism. 
Finally the Scientific revolution revealed the world to be run by 
natural laws. It was this scientific revolution that became the model 
for liberalism. '!he key exp:,nent of liberalism during this period was 
I.ocke who built his epistemology on another pioneer in the liberal way of 
thinking I Rene Descartes o 
While liberalism can be identified from I.ocke onwards, the strain of 
thought that led up to this can be seen in the attitude of live an:i let 
live. In one word this is tolerance. Tolerance is the conflict between 
the safety of the group arxi the degree of individual liberty. In 
particular religious freedom was taught before Locke wrote his 
quintessential work on toleration. One such teacher was Giordano Bruno 
(1549-1600) who said that the state has no right to tell people what to 
believe nor could it punish those who do not hold accepted dogmas. '!his 
teaching eventually led to his death at the stake at the harxis of the 
Inquisition. 
tolerance. 
Liberalism in I.ocke can be detected in his attitude to 
Liberalism also led to the re-examination of the theories of state. New 
ideas on the state, its origin, functions arxi ~ were the inspirations 
for I.ocke in the development of his 'Iheopolity. '!he word liberalism 
usually conjures up the idea of constitutional government, democracy an:i 
responsibility of governments to the citizens they rule. '!he core of 
liberal thinking is the commi 'bnent to freedom arxi rights. Also central 
to the ideology of liberalism is the stress on the rule of law an:i the 
ability of the citizens to have some fo:nn of control over their 
government. 
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Liberalism, as a political doctrine, has lost much of its 
distinctiveness lai:gely due to Mcxiern Liberalism noving closer to other 
ideolcXJies such as Socialism an::l Radical Democracy which also share 
similar ideas on the role of the state, for example. '!his has led to the 
popular concept of Liberalism being a doctrine somewhere between 
Consavatism an::l socialism. Hence it is opposed to radicalism an::l in 
favour of refonn. It is the nearest equivalent to the layman's conception 
of democracy which contrasts with communism an::l fascism. It seeks to 
preserve suffrage, representative assemblies, government responsibility 
an::l an obligation to adhere to the principles of political 100rality. 
The urrlerlying attitude of Liberalism is that mankim is basically gocxi. 
Hidden below the accidental attributes of nationality, social position, 
or race is an essential humanity which makes men everywhere alike. It 
therefore concerns itself with freeing the individual from restraints 
inq;,osed on him by entrenched class distinction or discrimination on the 
basis of ethnic origin or sex. It is not a specific programme for a 
particular situation in any given country, but rather embraces the entire 
life of the individual, the family, the State, for example. In other 
words it tends to hold that mankim is the master of its own fate. 
While it is impossible to single out a theoretical position, we can 
identify a mnnber of fundamental elements. Firstly there is a belief in 
the supreme value of the individual, his freedom an::l his rights. The 
irrportance of the individual as opposed to society an::l its institutions 
can be expressed in tenn of rights - both natural rights or the rights of 
mankim (human rights). Liberalism acknowledges the 100ral worth, the 
absolute value an::l the essential dignity of the individual. Each person 
is to treated as an end in himself an::l not as a pawn in the game of 
others. For the liberal, the freedom an::l welfare of the individual 
depends on clear an::l enforced legal relationships between the members of 
the society. 
This first element is closely linked with the secorrl element of 
Individualism which is a combination of liberal doctrine with a 
metaphysical groun:ling. The outlook of liberal Individualism is ascribed 
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to I.a::ke which says that the individual human person arrl his needs are 
more important than society or the state. Liberalism is said to be a 
type of individualism which tries to urrlerstarrl the society, state an:l 
economy as the sum of the actions of individuals. I prefer the 
description that sees individualism as a capacity arrl willingness to 
claim your rights arrl freedom while respecting the dignity, rights an:l 
freedom of others. '!he third element is a belief in individual rights 
from nature which nrust be protected by the government of the day. 
Recognition of the supreme value of freedom or liberty is the fourth 
element. It is this recognition that sets liberalism aside from other 
political doctrines. Freedom can only be limited to grant freedom to all 
citizens. Irrlividual freedom is a personal freedom to believe what he 
chooses, express those beliefs publicly arrl then act on them. His 
freedom is restricted in as far as such rights are compatible with others 
who have the same rights arrl they nrust be within the law. Everyone has 
the right to live, think arrl believe as he wishes providing it does not 
prevent or hirrler others from exercising the same rights. Allied to the 
freedom of the individual is the right of association. An individual has 
the right to join any group such as political, social, economic, for 
examaple. with the idea of advancing the interests of the members. 
'!he fifth element is in the area of freedom. For philosophers in the 
17th to 19th Centuries freedom meant the absence of external control an:l 
restraint on the behaviour of others. As I.a::ke wrote : 
Liberty is to be free from restraint arrl violence from 
others (ST chap 4 sec 23) . 
It is, therefore, an anthropocentric rather than theological view of 
mankin:I.. In other words it tends to see mankin:I. as the centre of the 
universe arrl not God. 
'Ihe sixth element of liberalism is one of the hallmarks arrl that is the 
stall'p of toleration in matters of morality arrl religion. Tolerance is 
the duty of the state, society arrl individual. '!hey are obliged to 
allow arrl not interfere with the beliefs arrl actions of others especially 
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where they disagree. Provided they do not infringe on the rights of 
others they must be able to act and believe as they will. 'Ibleration 
does not mean a lack of interest but in actual fact requires effort arrl. 
even self discipline. Locke's epistemological scepticism forms the 
fourrlation of his views on toleration especially political toleration. 
However Locke's toleration was a religious right. Religious liberalism 
was initially the cry by Calvinists, Huguenots, for example. for freedom 
under catholic rule, while in Locke's Britain, it was the non-confonnists 
against the established church. Since then toleration in the religious 
sphere has focused on Church/State relations. 
'Ihe seventh element of equality is a fundamental liberal principle. 
While it does not mean that all have equal abilities, it does mean that 
all are equal before the law. No law should allow certain privileges 
only on same. All social relations including political relations must be 
based on a nn.itual and free consent of equally sovereign individuals. 
Reason is strongly linked with the right to believe and express whatever 
you want. Mankirrl is basically a rational creature. Liberal in general 
believe that objective truth can be discovered through reason. What 
cannot be accepted by reason must be rejected. Locke claimed : 
'Ihe word reason in the English language has different 
significations: sometimes it is taken for true and 
clear principle, sometimes for clear and fair 
deductions from those principles; and sometimes for 
the cause and particularly the final cause. (ECHU 
chap 17 sec 1 Quoted in Gennino 1972:123) 
Constitutionalism and rule of law must be basic to the government. 'Ihis 
is the tenth element. Even though htnnan laws are based on natural law, 
they are fonnulated by the rulers and this means that there must be some 
restrictions on the law makers. 'Ihis restriction is the constitution. 
'Ihe whole concept of the government is to uphold the liberty, equality 
and security of each and every citizen. 'Ihese elements will place a 
limit on the power of the government and this will ensure that the rights 
of the individual are protected. A liberal govermnent has limited 
abjecti ves such as the preservation of the lives and property of the 
society's members. It ensures freedom from the hazards and uncertainties 
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of the state an:i oppression of absolute dominion. Liberalism is the 
foundation of modern democracy although I.ocke's liberalism is not 
identical with democracy. 
Al though Classical Liberalism is very diffuse, the Classical Liberalism 
put fo:rward by I.ocke was a vision of men indepen:lent, private and 
competitive for the pursuit of their own interests. Classical Liberalism 
expresses the political theory of limited goverrnnent. 'Ihe parameters of 
any Goverrnnent is the accountability of human liberties an::i rights. 
'Ihese human liberties an::i rights exist indepen:lently of the govennnent 
and it is the goverrnnent that is to protect this inherent right. 
Locke's' version of liberalism had its origins in Britain where various 
groups within its society were working during the 17th Century to free 
themselves from the restrictions of their society. Each group stood to 
gain from limited goverrnnent which guaranteed. certain freed.oms. 
Al though the differences between Classical Liberalism an::i Modern 
Liberalism are often blurred we find that Classical Liberalism opposes 
government aid, restraints an:i inteJ:Vention while Modem Liberalism 
regards goverrnnent inteJ:Vention as providing opportunities which result 
in liberty. Further, Classical Liberalism rests on the assumption that 
there are natural rights an::i natural laws such as noral, political, 
economic an:i social. Modem Liberalism on the other harrl is m::,re 
enpirical an::i pragmatic in arriving at its conclusions. 
In this thesis, however, I do not use the word Liberalism in its narrow 
sense which refers only to political doctrine but rather in the sense 
that it refers to breadth of mind. It is an approach to a way of 
thinking which encourages free thinking an:i enquiry an::i is not tied to 
historical dogma. 
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4. THE ORIGINS, NATURE AND COROLLARY OF RIGHTS 
4.1 '!HE STATE OF NMURE 
IDcke's Theopolity follows five distinct stages as ma.nkirxi moves from an 
original state to a political society. 
( 1) There is the natural state or state of Nature which is governed by 
Natural laws which give rise to Natural Rights 
(2) Enters into a compact known as the Social Contract to establish a 
civil society 
(3) Elects a goverrnnent to protect natural rights and pass laws to 
extem these rights to human rights 
(4) Adults join the existing society thereby allowing Goverrnnent by 
consent. 
( 5) Opposes or revolts against a goverrnnent which fails to keep it's 
mandate. 
All these steps will be dealt with in the next couple of chapters. To 
urrlerstand rights it is essential to grasp these stages in Iocke' s 
political theory. 
The starting point of John IDcke's political theory is his concept of a 
state of nature which he believed was instituted by the creator ; 
we must consider what estate all men are naturally in 
(ST chap 2 sec 4). 
lDcke is saying that because we are naturally in this state of nature, 
God must have set ma.nkirxi in this state. The state of nature in its 
si.nplest terms can be expressed as civil society minus goverrnnent. Not 
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only is it the starting point, but it clearly occupies an important 
position in I.ocke' s political philosophy. His fundamental belief is that 
nankind is rational by nature: 
To umerstarrl political :p:,wer aright and derive it from 
its original, we must consider what estate all men are 
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom 
to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and persons as they think fit, within the 
bourrls of the law of nature, without asking leave or 
deperrling upon the will of any other man. 
A state also of equality, wherein all the :p:,wer and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having m::,re than 
another. (ST chap 2 sec 4) . 
I.ocke's concept of the condition of nankind before the establishment of 
political institutions was very similar to the Stoic conception of the 
Golden Age. According to the Stoic teaching, which flourished for 
500 years from 300 BC onwards, the ideal perfect society had once existed 
and it was a staroard from which to assess current societies. In this 
perfect society, known as the golden age, all of mankin:i was equal 
We can equate with our law that m::>ral good or virtue 
which philosophers in fonner times ( and aroc>ng them 
especially the Stoics) have searched for with so much 
zeal and adorned with so many praises (EI.N 1: 109). 
Besides Hooker who I.ocke' s quotes in chapter two in his Second Treatise, 
influences on I.ocke' s thinking on the State of Nature can also be traced 
to the cambridge Platonists in England and Grotius and Pufendorf on the 
Continent. B..l.t obviously he did not agree with all the views put 
forward. Hobbes had held that the state of nature was because of 
competition am:>ng men, the state of nature was anarchy and · violence. 
I.ocke on the other hand wrote: 
'!he state of nature . . . as a state of peace, goodwill, 
mutual assistance, and preservation (ST chap 4 sec 19). 
I.ocke' s standpoint was a contradiction of Hobbes' claim that antagonism 
was the supreme force between men. I.ocke picked up the humanistic 
thread, thus diverging from the intolerance of 'lhomas Hobbes in his book 
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Leviathan, published in 1651, and calvinisrn. However it should not be 
asSUI!'led that I.ocke considered all of mankind to be inherently good, as a 
closer reading reveals that 
it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own 
cases, that self love will make men partial to 
themselves and their frierrls; and on the other side 
ill-nature, passion and revenge will can:y them too far, 
in punishing others. (ST chap 2 sec 13) 
He continues later in the same book: 
Yet men being biased by their interest as well as 
ignorant for want of study of it are not apt to allow 
of it as a law bi.rrling (ST chap 9 sec 124). 
I.ocke here clearly shows that mankind has a bias toward self love 'Which 
is one of the sins that Biblical texts talk about. Here I found my first 
problem with I.ocke in his theo:ry of the state of nature. He rejects the 
concept of original sin because it contradicts his own theo:ry of tabula 
rasa. As we have already seen previously, I.ocke believed that death, not 
guilt or the necessity of sinning, came by all in the fall. 
Despite his rejection of the fall of mankind as a reason for punishment, 
in the section quoted above he admits mankind has an inherent bias. 'Ihis 
bias is again supported by the following: 
if left to their full swing, they would can:y men to 
the overturning of all ll'Orality. Moral laws are set 
as a cum arx:i restraint to these exorbitant desires 
(ECHU Book 1 Chap 2 sec 13) • 
'Ihis passage again shows the bias of mankind to follow his own desires 
irrespective of the consequence to others. I.ocke then accepts that all 
of mankind are capable of setting rules upon themselves which means that 
mankind is able to govern himself in the state of nature. He gives an 
example 
Promises and bargain ... between a swiss or an Imian in 
the woods of America are bi.rrling to them though they 
are perfectly in a state of nature in reference to one 
another. (ST chap 2 sec 14). 
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Locke believed that mankind is not by nature lawless but is subject to 
obligations which he is inclined to respect. To me this suggests that 
Locke was using some of the thoughts put fo:rward by Pelagius in the early 
fifth century. Pelaguis believed that mankind is able to hilnsel.f choose 
between good an:l evil as he wills. There is no hereditary sin an:l all of 
mankind was born in the same moral con:lition as Adam before the fall. A 
logical conclusion based on these thoughts would be that mankind can 
govern itself, which Locke would agree with, although Locke also 
introduces the question of the natural bias toward good. While this may 
seem an enigma, part of the answer may lie in Aarsleff's ascertaining 
that mankind has mixed desires guided by reason to happiness (Yol ton 
1969:102). Despite this probable answer there is nevertheless this 
unexplained bias. Who taught mankind this inherent bias? Locke is 
silent. 
My secom problem is the concept that the state of nature is a state of 
mankind without civil order. The imividual in Locke's state of nature 
is supposed to exist away from society, yet Locke writes : 
'!he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges everyone to, an:l reason to which is that 
law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that 
being all equal an:l :i.n:lepen:ient no one ought to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty, or possession. 
(ST chap 2 sec 6). 
'Iherefore the State of nature is a situation where all are equal an:l no 
one person needs to interfere with another. Locke exparrls on this when he 
states 
A state also of equality wherein all the power an:l 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than 
another. . . an:l the use of the same facilities should 
also be equal one amongst another (ST chap 2 sec 4). 
Now surely if the :i.n:lividual 's rights are limited by a consideration for 
others then the imi vidual is in some sort of society. 'Ihis concept is 
further bolstered by the fact that Locke sees in the state of nature, 
people working, gathering food, sowing an:l reaping, hiring ser:vants, 
creating an:l using tools, for exa.ample. Society is generally perceived 
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to be a group of irrlividuals who associate in a relationship of nn.itual 
benefit arx:i it is quite clear that Locke sees the state of nature as a 
nn.itually beneficial situation. In apparent contradiction Locke says 
men are naturally in, arx:i that is, a state of perfect 
freedom to order their actions arx:i dispose of their 
possessions arx:i persons as they think fit within the 
bourrls of the law of nature without asking leave or 
depending upon the will of any other man (ST chap 2 
sec 4). 
Nevertheless it is clear that there has to be co-operation between 
individuals or else a state of chaos as envisaged by Hobbes would 
result. '!his contradiction by Locke can be rationalised by accepting 
that Locke explains the origin of political authority by conceiving a 
state of nature which is pre-political rather than a pre-social 
condition. In the state of nature, social relations birrl person to 
person arx:i this relation is moral not political. 
As the quotes from section 4 of Chapter 2 irrlicate, the study of science 
influenced Locke to maintain that rnankirrl's actions are regulated by the 
necessity to obey reason which was the law of nature even before social 
restraints were put on hil'll. 'lhrough the exercise of reason, irrlividuals 
are able to know what God wills them. As rational creatures of God, each 
person is equal with each other, equal in their entitlements arx:i equal in 
duties. It is in this equality of right arx:i duty that humans confront 
each other in this State of Nature. Locke emphasized that in the state of 
nature rnankirrl is governed by the law of nature. 
'lhe state of nature has a law of nature to govern it 
which obliges e eryone arx:i reason which is that law, 
teaches all rnankirrl who will but consult it, that being 
equal arx:i irrlependent no one ought to hann another in 
his life, heal th or liberty or possessions; for men 
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent arx:i 
infinitely wise :maker. (ST chap 2 sec 6). 
My third problem with Locke is his treatlllent of the state of nature as 
a historic reality which could be fourrl, even in his time, existing in 
the wilds of America. 'Ihis illustration, could have been derived from 
some travellers account of primitive society. Locke read such books 
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with enthusiasm an::i they were often traditional starting point for 
political philosophers. However, a connnercial economy without civil 
society is improbable according to Mc:Fherson (1979:209). Further there 
is no historical evidence of men living in individual isolation in 
primitive times. Locke hilnself confesses : 
History gives us but a very little account of men that 
lived together in a state of nature (ST 101). 
Ebenstein in his book "Political 'Tu.ought" an::i Sabine in his book 
"History of Political 'Ih.eory" both consider the state of nature to be 
logical fiction which I agree with because it does not seem possible that 
mankin:i could have lived in such a state no matter how logical it may 
appear. So what was Locke trying to prove, or did he really believe in 
such a state? For me this vexing question is answered if we see this 
improbable suggestion's main function in his thoughts as an analytical 
device to reveal the essence of government by showing an existence 
without government. 
One notable characteristic in the state of nature is that there are no 
scarcities of resources an::i Locke imagines that m:>st individuals would be 
nomadic thus the little ownership of larrl that takes place will not 
impinge upon any other persons right of ownership: 
And thus considering the plenty of natural 
provisions •... the i.rrlustry of one man could exterrl 
itself and engross in to the prejudice of other; 
especially keeping within the bourrls set by reasons of 
what might serve for his use ; there could be little 
room for quarrels or contentions about property so 
established. (ST chap 5 sec 31). 
Section 4 of book two in Locke's Two Treatises of Government, which I 
quoted earlier in this chapter, also shows that in the state of nature no 
one has greater authority than any one else. Locke has written further, 
that no one has art:>itrary power over liberty or possessions of another. 
'Ih.erefore there is no overall authority to punish a person who attacks or 
en:iangers the property of another. In such a case any one has the right 
to restrain the offemer but only the person who owned the property has 
the right to claim reparation. 'Ih.e concept of reparation arrl punishment 
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is only to restore things as near as possible to what they were before 
the crime. Violent men who ignore the law of nature and make war on the 
righteous may be destroyed like beasts of prey as they are not urrler the 
ties of the conunon law of reason. 
A state of war occurs when a person violates the basic rights of another 
so that his property is at risk. : 
'Ihe state of war is a state of enmity and destruction; 
. . . it being reasonable that and just that I should 
have the right to destroy that which threatens me with 
destruction; for by the :furrlamental law of nature man 
being preseJ:Ved, the safety of the innocent is to be 
preferred and one may destroy a man who makes war upon 
me. (ST chap 3, sec 16) 
'Ihe war will continue until the aggrieved party is satisfied and no 
further violations are likely to take place. Although this seems similar 
to Hobbes, Locke is at pains to differentiate between the state of nature 
and the state of war. Although Locke and Hobbes agree that nan 
originally lived in the state of nature, Hobbes claims that Government is 
instituted to escape from the state of war while Locke maintains that 
government is instituted to prevent war. Despite his freedom, mankind is 
continually exposed to the danger of invasion: 
If man in the state of nature be so free as has been 
said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and 
possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to no 
body. • • the enjoyment of the property he has in this 
state is very unsafe very insecure. (ST chap 9 
sec 123). 
Macpherson claims that this section is contradictory as on the one han::i 
the state of nature is sometimes actually in a state of war which are 
meant to be the anti thesis of each other. In other words sometimes the 
state of nature is the opposite of the state of a war and sometimes it ·is 
identical. I do not agree with this interpretation. When the state of 
nature is urrler invasion it does become a state of war. In other words 
the state of nature can change to its opposite for a period of time but 
will eventually returrl to its original state of nature. Aarsleff on the 
other harrl terns to think that the state of nature applies to both a 
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state of peace arrl a state of war (Yelton 1969:101). '!his state of war 
is, however, a constant threat due to the degenerate bias of mankind. To 
overcome this threat he enters into the social contract. 
It appears that a state of nature does not last Vert long before mankind 
enters into the social contract we have mentioned.: 
Goverrnnent is hardly avoided. amongst men that live 
together (ST chap 11 sec 103). 
Locke puts it even more strongly when he suggests that mankind is 
quickly driven into society: 
'Ihus all mankind, not withstan:ling all the privileges 
of the state of nature, being in an ill corrlition while 
they remain in it are quickly driven into society. 
Hence it comes to pass that we seldom fin::i any m.nnber 
of men live any time together in this state (ST 
sec 127). 
Nevertheless a state of war can still occur un:ier a goverrnnent. If a 
goverrnnent invades the rights of the people arrl the judiciary is biased., 
then a state of war exists between the ruling regime arrl it's subjects 
. . . despite the Social Contract. 
4. 2 NA'lURAL I.AJiE 
'!he law of Nature which regulates the State of Nature is a key element in 
this thesis as it is the law of Nature that gives rise to Natural 
Rights. In the State of Nature mankind is subject to the raw of Nature. 
'Iherefore the law of nature detem.ines the corrluct of nankind both inside 
arrl outside civil society. Locke in his various writings outlines many 
of the characteristics of the law arrl its practical outworking. In this 
chapter I will restrict myself to the broad principles pertaining to the 
law of nature which is God's law known to nankind through reason and not 
by tradition, inscription or consensus as the following five quotes from 
Locke irrlicate: 
'!he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges evertone. (ST chap 2 sec 6) . 
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For the law of Nature being unwritten arrl so nowhere to 
be found but in the minds of men (ST chap 11 sec 136). 
For though the law of nature be plain arrl intelligible 
to all rational creatures (ST chap 9 sec 124). 
The law of nature which is the law of reason (FI' chap 9 
sec 101). 
Since reason does not so nn.ich establish arrl pronounce 
this law of nature as search for it arrl discover it as 
a law enacted by a superior :p::,wer arrl implanted in our 
hearts (EIN p 111). 
The concept of the law of Nature is a cornerstone of 
I.ocke' s Theopolity arrl leads to a consolidation of his 
political philosophy arrl the foundation of the three 
natural rights. Dunn (1969:187) claims that I.ocke 
originally intended it to be part of his Essay 
concerning Human Understanding but von Leyden 
(1954:62-80) comprehensively shows that I.ocke's Essays 
on The law of Nature were really just the starting 
point for I.ocke's early drafts of his Essay. D.mn 
further conterrls that I.ocke' s thoughts on the law of 
Nature errled up as being the premise behin:i the 'Iwo 
Treatise of Government although in this work he did not 
investigate the law too closely as chapter 2 section 12 
of the Secom treatise irrlicates. 
In I.ocke' s Essays on the law of Nature he proves that the law of Nature 
was not as a result of a general consent of roan. In the process of 
discounting the notion of consent, I.ocke maintains that there are two 
types of consent. The first is positive consent which can be either 
express or tacit: 
We call positive consent one arises from a contract, 
either from a tacit contract, ..• or from an expressly 
stated contract (EIN no. 5 page 161). 
This concept from his early writings remained intact in his later works 
There is a conunon distinction of an express arrl tacit 
consent (ST chap 9 sec 119) . 
The secorrl type of consent, according to I.ocke, is natural consent which 
is based on natural instinct arrl can be either moral behaviour, opinions 
or principles: 
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Natural Consent, namely one to which men are led by a 
certain instinct without the intei:vention of some compact 
can be of three kinds 
(1) Concerning morals or actions, that is, the conformity 
to be foun:i in the moral conduct of mankind and in 
the practice of social life. 
( 2) Concerning opinions to which individuals give assent 
in various ways, finnly and invariably to some, 
feeble and unsteadily to others. 
(3) Concerning first principles which are precisely such 
as to compel any person of soun:i mind to assent to 
them readily. (EI.N no. 5 p 165) 
Locke goes on to prove that the law of nature is not as result of the 
general consent of mankind. He make references to both Brazil and South 
Africa to support the above argument 
For example, some nations in Brazil and the inhabitants 
of Saldanha Bay acknowledge or "Warship no Gcxi at all, as 
is reported by those who have considered it 'WOrth while 
to go to these places (EI.Np 175). 
He instead maintains that: 
The original and fourrlation of all law is dependency. A 
dependent intelligent being is urrler the power and 
direction and dominion of him on whcnn he deperrls and nn.ist 
be for the erxls appointed him by that superior being. If 
man were iroependent he could have no law but his own 
will no errl but himself (Quoted in Tully 1980:36). 
In the previous section dealing with the state of Nature it was shown 
from sec 6 in Locke's Second Treatise that mankind is the "WOrknanship of 
Gcxi. Mankind is therefore dependent on Gcxi for power, direction and 
dominion. The law of nature is therefore from Gcxi. 
The first step in following Locke's logic is to accept that mankind has 
the ability to reason. The next step is to accept that mankind is 
expected to use his Gcxi-given power to reason. By reason I.ocke did not 
mean the type of reason that "WOrks out the truth through argument or 
deduction, but reason that is a set of moral principles which can become 
the object of knowledge and the rule of action. 'Ihis means that he did 
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not regard reason as the source of knowledge but a vehicle for obtaining 
that knowledge. Despite Locke's contention that knowledge does not come 
from tradition, he was happy to accept that tru.e knowledge could be 
passed on from parent to child. 
Locke is clear in his contention that because nx:>ral principles ( and 
therefore the law of nature) are reasoned by rnankin:l this does not mean 
that they are not God's cannnands (Von I.eyden 1954: 56) . According to 
Richard Ashcroft, automatic complete knowledge of the law would have 
meant that the actions of individuals would have been unavoidable and the 
nx:>ral obligation to God, not freely dischal:ged. (Yelton 1969:220). Each 
person is therefore able to understarrl his responsibility to God. It is 
clear, however, that God does not force the law of nature on any person 
nor does he oblige person to use these laws to rule his life. '!he fact 
is that it is God who is the binding force of natural law because it is 
his wisdom that brought about the nature of things including the law of 
nature. roes this mean that the law of nature is binding on the people 
because God cammands it arrl any breach of the law would be nx:>rally 
wrong? or is it binding because it is reasonable? rrhe real question in 
my min::l is : roes it matter? Possibly it does, but I will retmn later 
to this question at the end of this section. For now we need only note 
the fact that it is binding, but it is not binding on everyone as Locke 
stated: 
For although the law is binding on all those to wham it 
is given, it does not, however, birrl those to wham it 
is not given, arrl it is not given to those who are 
unable to understarrl (EIN no 7 p 203). 
Although some such as Crowe (1977:229) claim Grotuis as being the father 
of the school of natural law , the concept of natural justice can be 
traced back to the Stoics. '!hey had a law of human reason which was 
inherited by the Romans who in tmn passed it on to the Christian fathers 
arrl it became part of the Middle Ages' philosophy. law of nature had 
become a solid set of practical rules which meant that any law or 
judgement given which conflicted with the law of nature was not valid. By 
Locke's tilTle, however, they were considered to be a set of ethical 
principles. 
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Locke's conception of natural law is largely based on this medieval 
philosophy in that he saw it as a guide to behaviour including the 
behaviour of goverrnnents. Despite the law of nature being a foundation 
stone of hl..Utlan interaction, Locke maintained that it was unwritten and 
only fourrl in the mirrls of men. It was on this fourrlation stone that 
mankind could regulate society and develop a legal system. I.ocke 
regarded natural law as separate from and antecedent to any connnands. 
This distinction between natural law and laws made by mankim was traced 
by Locke to Aristotle 
Likewise in Book v Chapter 7, where he draws a 
distinction between legal justice and natural justice, 
Aristotle says "A natural rule of justice is one which 
has the same validity everywhere". Hence it is rightly 
concluded that there is a law of nature since there is 
a law which obtains everywhere (EIN 1:113). 
Some years after Aristotle, St. 'Ihomas Aquinas identified four laws. It 
is on the concept of Natural law that I fourrl a major contradiction 
between Locke's epistemology and his political writings. Locke, as has 
already been established believed that we are born without innate ideas 
or knowledge. He confims that the law of nature is also not innate 
'Ihere exists no such imprint of the law of nature in 
our hearts (EIN no.3 p 137). 
'Ihe law of nature does not appear to be written in the 
hearts of men (EIN p 141). 
Yet in a quote from his Secon:i Treatise in the opening paragraph of this 
chapter we read: 
Since reason does not so nn.ich establish and pronounce 
this law of nature as search for it and discover it as 
a law enacted by a superior power and implanted in our 
hearts (EI.Np 111). 
OWn support and preservation and govern his actions 
according to the dictators of the law of reason God had 
implanted in him (ST chap 11 sec 56). 
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"Implanted in our hearts" is far from "no such in,print of the law of 
nature". '!his contradiction, for me, was answered by I.ocke himself 
'!here is a great deal of difference between an innate 
law an:i a law of nature; between something in,printed on 
our mi.ms in their very original an:i something that we 
being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of, by 
the use an:i due application of natural faculties. Arxi 
I think they equally forsake the truth running into 
the contrary extremes, either affinn an innate law or 
deny that there is a law knowable by the light of 
nature. (ECHU book 1 chap 3 sec 13) 
Natural law cannot be gained solely from experience. I.ocke does maintain 
that law of nature can be known through reason. 'Ille fact is that the 
two compliment each other. Experience or sensation provides the ideas of 
things while reason computes these ideas arrl sensations to create images 
or concepts. '!his leads to knowledge of Goel arrl of natural law being 
Gocl's will. 
Pan:y has highlighted a major dilenuna for those who support the concept 
of Natural law. Either it is so widespread that it becomes empty or it 
is confined to a certain era arrl social relationships. (Pan:y 1978: 113) . 
I have no problem with the law of nature. Without it there could be no 
determined value of good or evil. Good or evil would merely be whatever 
the inil vidual connived it to be. Secon:ily as already quoted in this 
section, the whole universe follows set patterns based on God-given 
laws. Whether we are talking about physical laws such as the law of 
gravity or ethical laws such as the law of nature, all of God's creation 
is governed by orderly axioms. 
While I agree that there is a I.aw of Nature I have a major problem with 
I.ocke's view that it is only known through Experience arrl reason (an:i 
sometimes taught by parents or teacher). Returning to my problem of 
reconciling I.ocke's concept of tabula rasa with the Biblical concept of 
original sin which I covered in the previous chapter, I disagree that the 
natural law is not stamped on each person's mind. I.ocke uses a forceful 
argument in favour of his case : 
How does it come about that human beings .. do not 
forthwith all to a man agree about it without 
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hesitating and show readiness to obey it ? For in 
respect to this law they differ so very widely. (EIN 
no. 3 p 139) 
What Locke is saying that in different societies, gcx:xi an evil take on 
different roles. What is considered to be gcx:xi in one society is 
considered to be evil in another. Part of the answer is, in rrrt opinion, 
once again supplied by Locke himself: 
I am in no doubt that IOC)St persons ... build up their 
morals after the manner and belief of those among whom 
they happen to be born and educated and that they have 
no other rule of what is right and gcx:xi. (EIN no. 2 
p 129) 
I believe that man is born with the law of Gcx:i, ie the law of nature, 
written on his heart. 'Ihis innate knowledge is, however, molded or 
suppressed by the eiwirornnent in which the person is raised. To support 
Irrf argument I quote from Romans Chapter 2 verses 14 and 15 "'!he gentiles 
do not have the Law; but whenever they do by instinct what the Law 
camrnarrls, they are their own law, even though they do not have the law. 
That conduct shows that what the Law camrnarrls is written in their 
hearts. '!heir consciences also show that his is tnle, since their 
thoughts sometimes accuse them and sometimes deferrl them". 'Therefore the 
law is written in the heart of men but the application is based on what 
they learn to be right and wrong in their society. 
Locke outlines what he considered to be the essential characteristics of 
the law of nature, but his concepts are coloured by the society and time 
in which he lived. '!he basic selfpresenration characteristic of natural 
law is evident in all societies. It is only the method by which that 
self presenration is attained that differs. 
I.ocke also asks why youngsters, illiterate people and primitive races do 
not know or un:ierstand the Law of nature. On the cont.racy I obsel:ve that 
they do know the concepts in the law of nature, only that it is not 
necessarily in accordance with the version that Locke holds which was 
formulated in the customs of his day. Locke is bigoted and ignorant when 
dealing with the customs of primitive and untutore:i tribes . In his 
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third Essay on the laws of Nature, he accuses them of being without 
piety, merciful feeling, fidelity, chastity arrl other virtues. He 
continues to accuse them of living with robberies, thefts, debaucheries 
arrl nrurders. In the fifth essay he cites the case of the socially 
accepted suicide of a widowed In:iian woman, using this as an example that 
the law of nature cannot be innate as it's principles are not uniform 
throughout the world. Yet if we look at the suicidal karnakazi pilots of 
Japan, are we really forced to the conclusion that the average Japanese 
has a different set of principles pertaining to the law of nature when 
compared to the average m::x:iern day Englishnan. I believe not. It is a 
pity his toleration did not extend beyond the religious realm. 
I submit that in the same way that mankind is born in sin with a 
knowledge of wrong arrl right, so too he has the law of nature imprinted 
in his mind ready to be molded by the envirornnent in which the person 
lives. 
Finally to answer the question previously put - Is the law of nature 
binding? My answer is yes because it's origin is in God who has placed 
it in our minds so that we may live in an orderly manner just as the 
universe follows its pattern of behaviour. Since the fall, mankind has 
inherited the bias of sin yet God has revealed in the Biblical text that 
it is God's desire that we should live in accordance with his law. God 
is in a position to deman:i that because he is all wise arrl has created 
everything in the universe: 
'Ihis obligation seems to derive partly from the divine 
wisdom of the law maker arrl partly from the right which 
the creator has over his creation (EIN no. 6 p 183). 
arrl therefore 
God is supreme over everything arrl has such authority 
and power over us which we cannot exercise over 
ourselves arrl since we owe our body, soul,arrl life -
whatever we are, whatever we have, arrl even whatever we 
can be - to him arrl Him alone (EIN no. 6 ibid p 187) . 
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Anyone who un:ierstands the nature of Goo. has no option but to obey the 
raw of Nature: 
Who ever sincerely acknowledges any law of Goo., 
cannot fail to acknowledge also that it has all the 
reason an:i ground that a just an:i wise law can or 
ought to have, an:i will easily persuade himself to 
forebear raising such questions an:i scruples about it 
(Secon:i Reply to the Bishop of Worcester as quoted in 
Yelton 1969:214). 
4. 3 NNlURAL RIGHl'S 
4.3.1 Nature of Rights 
While writers such as John D.mn, Hans Aarleff, Richard Ashcraft, 
John Yelton an:i others see Locke's theories as being based on 
natural law, Geraint Pan:y (1978:12) is of the opinion that it is 
the concept of natural rights that holds the key. W.T. Jones 
(1980:208) also considers rights to be the principal feature of 
Locke's theoi:y. I agree with these conclusions, as this thesis 
will prove. Locke can claim to be first writer to put forward a 
theoretical design of the idea of human rights which in his day 
were being suppressed by excessive government powers. 
Locke identified three natural rights of mankin:i in the the State 
of Nature, namely life, liberty an:i property. If there is natural 
law in the state of nature, as we know there is, then it follows 
that there will be natural rights in the state of nature. There 
are these natural rights existing by virtue of the law of nature. 
Locke in one of his earlier writings, drew a clear distinction 
between natural law an:i natural rights: 
This law ( Law of nature) donated by these 
appellations, ought to be distinguished from natural 
right : for right is grounded in the fact that we 
have the free use of a thing, whereas law is what 
enjoins or forbids the doing of a thing. (EIN no. 1 
page 111) 
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If Gcxi ordained. natural law then it follows that Gcxi has given 
nankind his natural rights. 
There have been theories about natural rights dating back to the 
stoics and Roman Jurists. In the Hellenistic pericxi which 
followed the breakdown of the Greek City-States, the Stoics 
fonnulated. the doctrine of Natural Rights. These Stoics believed 
that all men irrespective of race, creed or colour were endowed by 
Gcxi with natural rights with which the state could not interfere. 
Plato arrl Aristotle grappled. with the concept of freed.om while 
Thomas Aquinas took these Greek ideas arrl molded. them into 
Christian-based. natural rights. Britain can look back to the 
Magna carta in Englarrl in 1215 which ensured religious freedom an:i 
a fair trial. This preceded. the Bill of Rights of 1689 which 
subjected the King to parliament. 
Building on the thoughts of Locke, Thomas Jefferson secured 
natural rights in America in 1776. The American Constitution has 
section 14 which reads "No state shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property without the due process of the law, or deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
law. " (Kauper 1966: 172) . In France natural rights were secured in 
1789 by the National Assembly when it approved. the French 
Constitution. Natural and Human rights continued. to enjoy 
attention with Ermnanuel Kant (1724 to 1804) being one of the most 
celebrated.. His theory was that there was one single basic right 
which he identified. as Inherent Freedom. 
The early nineteenth century saw the rise of positivism which led 
to a decline in the human rights concept. The seconi part of the 
twentieth century, however, has seen a change, the perrlu]:urn 
swinging back in favour of human rights theories. In 1948 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in Paris (with South Africa abstaining 
among 7 other nations). Among its 30 articles are the first two 
which recognise entitlement to inalienable rights as expounded by 
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Locke. 'Ihi.s has influenced. 1Ml1Y countries, among them Nigeria 
which in 1960 included the right to life arx:i the right to liberty 
among 11 other rights in its constitution. 
In 1Ml1Y constitutions today the three basic natural rights can be 
fourrl especially if the state incorporates a Bill of Rights. A 
recent example is in the Kwa Zulu Irrlaba, which is part of the on 
going search in South Africa for a new constitution. In it's Bill 
of Rights item 2 is 'Ihe right to life, item 4 is the Right of 
Liberty arx:i item 7 is the right of property. 
In the state of nature, Locke had shown that one such right is to 
execute the law of nature. It is on this right that civil society 
is based. Balanced. against this power to execute the law of 
nature is mankind's right to freedom. Freedom is inseparable from 
the law because the purpose of all laws is to protect the freedom 
of the in::li vidual. We therefore need laws to protect us from the 
violence of others. 
'Ihe purpose of the Social Contract was to promote arx:i exterrl 
mankind's natural rights of . life, liberty arx:i property. In the 
new social order mankind does not give up his rights but retains 
all of them. 'Ihe Dictionary of Political 'Ihought describes a Bill 
of Rights as an attenpt to formulate a system of natural rights 
that can be recognised by, arx:i enforced against, particular 
goverrnnents. 
According to Locke one natural right may be ced.ed. '!hat is the 
right to execute the law. Locke errphasises this thought by 
postulating that some rights are inalienable. He stresses that 
nobody has the right over his own life arx:i therefore the right to 
life cannot be alienated from the in::lividual to the state. 
It could be argued, as does Pany, that Locke's views on natural 
rights must be seen within the narrow character of Christian 
thought which sees God as the author of all rights. 'Ihis view is 
supported by Locke's contention that: 
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God, the maker of heaven an::i earth, who is sole 
proprietor of the whole world, man's proprietary in 
the creatures is nothing but that "liberty to use 
them" which God pennitted. (FT chap 4 sec 39) 
Jahn Stott (1984: 144), a modern-day theologian, supports Locke's 
view in a recent book which states : "'Ihe origin of human rights 
is creation. Mankirrl has never acquired them. Nor has any 
goverrnnent or other authority conferre:i them. Mankirrl has had them 
from the beginning. He received them with his life from the harrl 
of his maker. '!hey are inherent in his creation. '!hey have been 
bestowed on him by his creator" . '!his is a view which I find 
supported by Scriptural concepts. 
Natural rights are therefore not intrinsic to mankind in the way 
that reason or personality is, but rights are granted by God so 
that mankind can fulfil his requirements. '!his means that God 
retains a right in evecything he has made. However it is 
irrportant to remember that mankind is estranged from God yet God 
upholds these rights even after the fall. 
I therefore find that Locke's concept of natural rights to be in 
complete hannony with his theology but it should be noted that the 
Church plays no role in upholding mankind's natural rights 
Neither the use nor the omission of any cererrony in 
those religious assemblies does either advantage or 
prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man 
(LT page 11) 
'Ihe following sections deal with Locke's natural rights of life, 
liberty arrl property in depth. 
4.3.2 Life 
'Ihe first Natural Right that Locke identified was the God given 
right to life. Locke wrote in his First Treatise 
One of the ordinary appellations of God in 
scripture is, God our maker, an::i the lord our 
maker (FT chap 5 sec 53). 
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'Ihis theme is continued in his Secorrl treatise: 
For men being all the workmanship of one Omnipotent 
arrl infinitely wise Maker; All ·the seJ:Vants of one 
Sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order 
arrl about his business, they are his property, whose 
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not 
one another's' pleasure (ST chap 1 sec 6) . 
It is very clear that there is a special relationship between God 
arrl mankind. But this relationship is based on the fact that 
mankind is deperrlent on God for origination of life arrl for 
continued existence. : 
(God) has not created the world for nothing without 
purpose. For it is contral:y to such great wisdom to 
work with no fixed aim (EI.N page 157) . 
Arising from this relationship we firrl mankind's right to presei:ve 
life: 
'lllough the earth arrl all inferior be conunon to all 
men, yet every man has a property in his own person. 
Nobody has the right to but himself. (ST chap 5 sec 
27). . 
Locke distinguished between mankind arrl person. A right, he 
claimed, arises from an act. God's right in mankind arises from 
his act of creation. A person, who Locke describes as : 
Person is a Forensick Tenn appropriating actions arrl 
their merit; arrl so belongs only to intelligent 
Agents capable of law (EOiU 2.27 .26). 
A person has two i terns which he controls. 'llle first is his being 
arrl the secorrl is his labour or actions. While mankind did not 
create the world, he does create the actions of his body ani 
therefore has the makers right over them. So while God has 
proprietary over his body arrl lilnbs, mankind has proprietary over 
the use of these his body arrl lilnbs. 'Ihis is a key concept in 
Locke's thoughts on property. Whatever mankind creates or makes, 
it becomes his property just as mankind became God's property. 
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Returning to the question of preserving the life of the 
individual, we find that by so doing, rnankin:i is in fact 
preserving hurnankirrl am society as quoted by Tully (1978:48). 
If he fin::ls that Gcxi has made hi1ll am all other men 
in a state wherein they cannot subsist without 
society arrl has given them judgement to discern what 
is capable of preserving that society, can he but 
conclude that he is obliged am that Gcxi requires 
hi1ll to follow those rules which corrlucive to the 
preserving of society? (Locke's journal ent:l:y dated 
15 July 1678) 
'!his was further borne out by Locke when referring to freedom in a 
section dealing with the erxi of goverrnnent. 
If man in the state of nature be so free as has been 
said, if he be absolute lord of his own person ... (ST 
chap 9 sec 123) 
His thoughts are based on the Christian principle that mankind is 
the hamiwork of Gcxi am therefore Gcxi has the sole right to end 
someone's life. '!his goes back to the Cormnarrlment that Gcxi gave 
Moses "'Ihou shall not kill" (Excxius 2 o: 13) am again in the words 
of Jesus, "You have heard that it was said to the people long ago 
'Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to 
judgement (Matthew 5:21). '!his includes the fact that it would 
not be right to cannnit suicide which is self murder. 
If mankirxi has property in life arrl is absolute lord over life 
it is a logical assumption that the preservation of life would be 
one of the first duties of mankirxi. '!his is supported by Locke 
.•. for the desire, strong desire, of preserving his 
life am having been planted in hi1ll as a principle 
of action by Gcxi Himself, reason, which was the 
voice of Gcxi in hbn, could not but teach hi1ll am 
assure hi1ll that, pursuing that natural inclination 
he had to preserve his being (FT chap 9 sec 86) • 
From the above section we are left in no doubt that to talk of 
natural rights is to first recognise the right to life. A right 
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which Goo. has given. Modem day writers claim that from this 
sterns the right to wholeness and totality of mankind, their 
physical and emotional needs, health, personal dignity, freedom to 
live their lives to the full and to contribute towards the 
development of society. Human life is about this wholeness of 
freedom, justice and peace for all. Locke on the other hand sees 
that natural rights are the incorporation of the circt.nnstances 
required to protect and presei:ve our lives under natural laws 
given by Goo.. 
Locke maintains that life is a basic right of mankind and no one 
has the arbitrary power to take it away. Locke bases his thoughts 
on a very different premise to that of modem day writers when he 
states: 
... '!hough men in that state (of nature) have an 
uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or 
possessions, yet he has not the liberty to destroy 
himself, or so much as any creature in his 
possession, but where some nobler use than its bare 
presei:vation calls for it. '!he state of nature has a 
law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, 
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind 
who will but consult it, that all equal and 
.in:iepen1ent, no one ought to hann another in his 
life, health, liberty or possessions; (ST chap 2 
sec 6) 
Locke continues later in the same work: 
... nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over 
hilnself, or over any other, to destroy his own 
life, or take away the life or property of another. 
A man as has been proved, cannot subject himself to 
the arbitrary power of another; and having, in the 
state of nature, no arbitrary power over the life, 
liberty or possessions of another. . . (ST chap 11 
sec 135) 
However, there are instances where life can be taken 
And thus in the state of nature, one man comes by a 
power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary 
power to use a criminal, when he has got him in his 
hands, according to the passionate heats or boun:iless 
extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute 
him so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, 
what is proportionate to his transgression, which is 
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so nn.ich as may serve for reparation and restraint. 
For these two are the only reasons why one man may 
lawfully do hann to another, which is that we call 
punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the 
offerrler declares himself to live by another rule 
than that of reason and common equity, which is that 
measure God has set to the actions of men for their 
nn.itual security: ..... Arxi in this case, and upon this 
ground, every man hath a right to punish the 
offerrler, and be executioner of the law of nature (ST 
chap 2 sec 8). 
Mankir:rl having right to his own life gives him a freedom from 
domination by others. '!his is the primary freedom of which he 
wrote. Two hurrlred years before slavery was abolished, Locke was 
writing that it was not logical that a person would willingly 
become a slave. It follows, acccording to I.ocke that a slave is 
no longer truly human (D..mn 1969:108). 
True freedom is to be free from restraint and violence from 
others. For this to be a reality, there nn.ist be laws. In the 
state of nature men are equal. They face each other on the same 
level in that none has the right to restrict the behaviour of the 
other and therefore a person has the absolute right to be 
himself. '!his is of course, provided that the behaviour is within 
the laws which create the reality of freedom. Yet not everybody 
agrees with this interpretation. Graham, for instance says that 
I.ocke in his book Essay ai the Iruman Umerstamin:J puts forward 
the proposition that no government allows absolute liberty (Graham 
1911:50) even though freedom should be increased not diminshed by 
laws. It seems that I.ocke is not in accordance with Bentham who 
affirms that every law restricts liberty but is more akin to the 
thoughts of Kant who proposed that laws are there to preserve and 
enlarge freedom. 
I.ocke argues that no man is born into a condition in which another 
man has the right to dispose of him at pleasure. No human being 
is born with rights over another human being (Yelton 1969:53). 
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Flowing from man's right to self-preservation and life we fim a 
secomary right to: 
Meat and drink and such things, as nature affords for 
their substance (ST chap5 sec 25). 
4.3.3 Freedom 
The secorxi right which he identified was the right to freedom. 
Freedom is possibly one of the ioost abused rights today without 
the concept of freedom being fully understood. In his early years 
Locke was a right wing royalist and in 1660 wrote: 
A general freedom is but a general borxiage (as 
quoted in Jeffreys 1967:22) 
Yet in the section dealing with natural laws I quoted the 
following two sections from Locke which show that by 1673, when he 
carmnenced writing his Secom Treatise of Goverrnrent, he had moved 
towards a more liberal attitude towards freedom: 
The natural liberty of man is to be free from any 
superior power on earth, and not to be under the 
will or legislative authority of man, but to have 
only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty 
of man in society is to be under no other 
legislative power but that established by consent 
in the connnonwealth (ST Chap 4 sec 22). 
rater in the same book, Locke continues that this natural liberty 
or perfect freedom was to be fourxi in the raw of Nature: 
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to 
perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all 
the rights and privileges of the law of nature .... 
(ST chap 7 sec 87). 
Therefore mankind is naturally free. This freedom originated at 
creation. Locke continues this theme later in the same work when 
he states that this perfect freedom that mankind is born into, 
cannot be taken away without his consent: 
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Every :man being, as has been showed, naturally free, 
and nothing being able to put him into subjection to 
any earthly power, but only by his own consent ... (ST 
chap 8 sec 119) • 
'Ihe above passage clearly shows that mankind is subject to an 
earthly power only by his own consent and consent itself is an act 
of freedom. 
According to I.ocke there is an obligation on mankind to presez:ve 
his freedom and that of his fellow : 
(Gcx:i created :man) in his own inage after his own 
likeness, makes him an intellectual creature and so 
capable of dominion ......•.. Gcx:i has given :man an 
urrlerstanding to direct his actions, has allowed 
him freedom of will .... 'Ihe liberty of :man in 
society is to be urrler no other legislative power 
but that established urrler consent. (FT chap 4 sec 
30). 
But, says I.ocke, freedom can only be realised on a fourrlation of a 
pursuit of happiness; 
As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature 
lies in a careful and constant pursuit of tru.e and solid 
happiness, so the care of ourselves, that we mistake not 
inagi.nacy for real happiness, is the necessacy fourrlation of 
our happiness ( Essay book 2 chapter 21 section 51). 
I.ocke saw freedom as a mcx:ie of power which is given by means of 
sensation and reflection: 
Power also is another of those simple ideas which we 
receive from sensation and reflection. (ECHU Book 2 
chapter vii section 8) . 
However freedom is also the power to organise the individual's 
thoughts and movements in whatever :manner the individual prefers: 
So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power 
in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, 
according to the determination or thought of the 
min:l (ECHU Book 2 chapter xxi section 8) . 
- 84 -
Not only is freedom a decision of the mind but it is being able 
to choose an::i once that choice has been made it nn.1St be put into 
action. 
In this, then, consists freedom, viz., in our being 
able to act, or not to act, according as we shall 
choose or will. (ECHU book 2 chapter 21 section 27) 
Therefore there is no freedom in not choosing. In other words 
mank.W has to choose although they may choose to delay the 
choice. Locke called this ability to choose, the 'source of all 
liberty' (ECHU on Man book 2 chap 21 sec 47) 
Locke also believed that there could be no freedom without 
reason 
Men have been created capable of freedom an::i 
capable of reason. We are born free as we are born 
rational. (ST chap 11 sec 61). 
In the same chapter Locke exparrls on the above statement to show 
that freedom can be meaningful only if it is related to the order 
of the world which in itself is the order of reason: 
The freed.am then of man an::i the liberty of acting 
accordin;J to his own will, is grounded on his 
having reason, which is able to instruct him in 
that law he is to govern hilnself by, am make him 
know how far he is left to the freedom of his own 
will (ST chap 5 sec 63). 
Therefore we can conclude that reason will ensure that mankin::i 
enjoys freedom but also allows the person to understand that the 
law is necessary for him to continue that enjoyment. The freedom 
that comes from obeying the law is further expounded by Locke 
. . . Freedom of men under government is to have a 
standing rule to live by, common to evecyone of 
that society an::i made by the legislative power 
erected in it, a liberty to follow my own will in 
all things where that rule prescribes not; an::i not 
to be subject to the inconsistent, uncertain, 
unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom 
of nature is to be under no other restraint but 
the law of nature... (ST chap 3 sec 22). 
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However I.ocke states that in the first instance one :person must 
not interfere with the right of liberty of another 
Evecy one . . . when his own preservation comes not 
into competition, ought he as much as he can to 
presei:ve the rest of rnankin:1, an:i not unless it be 
to do justice on an offender, take away or impair 
the life, or what tends to be the preservation of 
life, the liberty, health , lilllb or goods of 
another (ST chap 2 sec 6) • 
In the second instance rnankin:1 can only enjoy free.darn if they 
obsel:ve the law: 
Freedom of men under government is to have a 
standing rule to live by, cormron to evecyone of 
that society, an:i made by the legislative power 
erected on it; A liberty to follow Irrf own will in 
all things, where the rule prescribes not; an:i not 
to be subject to the inconsistent, \ll1certain, 
unknown, arbitrary will of another man. (ST chap 4 
sec 22). 
Tru.e free.darn is to be free from restraint an:i violence from 
others. For this to be a reality, there must be laws. Here we 
find a contradiction. Mankind must be free but rnankin:1 must have 
laws. 'Ihere must be laws to guarantee free.darn, yet it is laws that 
restrict free.darn. 'Ihis can possibly be explained by the fact that 
absolute free.darn means the ability to do just what one pleases. 
But I.ocke realises that a person cannot be free to what they 
wish : 
No government allows absolute liberty (ECHO book 4 
chapter 3 sec 18) • 
'Iherefore in society, rnankin:1 is obliged to forfeit same freedom 
for the good of society: 
He is to part also with as much of his natural 
liberty, in providing for hilnself, as the good, 
prosperity, and safety of the society shall 
require, since the other members of the society do 
the like. (ST chap 9 sec 130) 
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It is the laws of society that limit his freedom: 
'Ihe first power - viz. , of doing whatsoever he 
thought fit for the preservation of himself and 
the rest of mankirrl, he gives up to be regulated by 
laws made by the society, so far forth as the 
preservation of himself and the rest of that 
society shall require; which laws of the society in 
many things confine the liberty he had by the law 
of nature (ST chap 9 sec 129) 
Locke even went as far as to state that there is no freedom 
without civil laws: 
For in all the states of created beings, capable of 
laws, where there is no law there is no freedom ( ST 
chap 6 sec 57). · 
However, the laws that a goverrnnent establishes can only protect 
the rights of the individual if that individual wants them 
protected: 
laws provide, as much as is possible, that the goods 
and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud 
and violence of others; they do not guard them from 
negligence or ill-husbandry of the possessors 
themselves. No man can be force::3. to be rich or 
healthful whether he will or no (LT page 8) 
If the goverrnnent established these laws then, like all other 
rights, freedom is not real unless the goverrnnent can be called to 
account. 
Locke can be interpreted as viewing private property as the basis 
of freedom. 'Ihis thought follows through to that of personal 
freedom which is possible only through a free market economy 
because it deals with satisfying individual wants. To explore 
this concept further is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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4.3.4 Property 
In keeping with reliance on Christianity as a basis for his 
rights, I..ocke supports his doctrine on property with various 
quotes from both the Old Testament and the New Testament. From the 
fall of Adam mankind has been in a state of sin. 'Ihe fall also 
originated the human condition, labour and the socio-moral 
category derived from labour in the corrlition of scarcity and 
private property (D..mn 1969: 115) . Goo. gave the world to all 
humankind in general and also gave mankind the ability to roake use 
of this world that he had given him. Without the will of God, 
mankind could not possess anything. 
'Ihe thinking during I..ocke' s time was that genuine property was a 
product of agreement or contract and originated with the state 
itself. I..ocke on the other ham believed that mankind came into 
society with natural rights which included property already in his 
possession. (Gough 1969:73). Natural Rights were the foundation of 
property. 'Ihe state therefore did not create property. Based on 
this premise he frequently speaks of the right to property and an 
unlimited liberty to dispose of it. 
It also follows that the state has no right to take any part of an 
i.rxiividual 's property without his consent. In the early 17th 
Century there arose an interesting debate on the question of 
raising taxes based on the Biblical inj\.mction that we are to 
"Rerxier unto caesar the things that are caesars." 'Ihe clergyman, 
Roger Maynwaring used this text to prove that all subjects are 
urn.er obligation to pay tax. John Pym, argued that the Jews at the 
time of Christ were a conquered nation, governed by the laws of 
the conqueror and the concept of the social contract did not apply 
in the same manner (Sommerville 1986:67). Nevertheless Locke 
wrote : 
'Ihe supreme power cannot take from any man any part 
of his property without his own consent. For the 
preservation of property being the end of 
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government, and that for which men enter into 
society, it necessarily supposes that the :people 
should have property without which they must be 
supposed to lose that by entering into society 
which was the end for which they entered into it; 
. . . For I have truly no property in that which 
another can by right take from me when he pleases 
against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think 
that the supreme or legislative power of any 
carmnornvealth can do what it will, and dispose of 
the estates of other subject arbitrarily, or take 
any part of them at pleasure. (ST chap 11 
sec 138). 
I..ocke always qualifies his stance by pointing out that at all time 
God has a superior right over the rights of mankind both in the 
state of nature and under legitimate govennnent. This includes the 
right of property: 
Man being born, as been proved, title to perfect 
free:iom and an uncontrolled enjoyment, of all the 
rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally 
with by either man, or a mnnber if meaning the 
world, hath by nature power not only to presenre 
his property - that is, his life, liberty and 
estate .... (ST chap 7 sec 87). 
I..ocke further explores in the same book: 
If man in the state of nature be so free as has 
been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person 
and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject 
to nobody why will he part with his free:iom, this 
empire, and subject himself to the dominion and 
control of any other power? To which it is obvious 
to answer... in this state (he) is Ver'f unsafe, 
Ver'f insecure. This makes him willing to quit this 
con::lition which, however free, is full of fears and 
continual danger; and it is not without reason 
that he seeks out and is willing to join in society 
with others who are already united or have a mind 
to unite for the mutual preservation of their 
lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the 
general name - property. (ST chap 9 sec 123) 
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Locke's theory on property was unprecedented in the history of 
political thought. His thoughts on property are a remarkable piece 
of writing. For certain, his writings are not important because 
they were clear and cogent. Their importance rests on the fact 
that they fonn the basis for two principal and opposite doctrines 
on property. On the one hand there is the liberal theory of free 
market exchange which includes the sale of labour while on the 
other hand there is the socialist theory which sees the sale of 
labour as a process of exploitation (Redhead 1985: 117) . I..ocke 
begins to develop a theory which seems to anticipate Marx's labour 
theory of value. Mankind mixes his labour with the envirornnent 
to create economic worth. With it goes private property. However 
we must not look at property as a simple economic fact. 
Individual ' s saw property as an extension of themselves am 
therefore a reflection of themselves. 
John, Locke differed greatly from his contemp::>raries with his 
theories as to why men enter into society. The key to this he 
believed was purely the presei:vation of his private property. An 
irrli vidual' s ci vie right to property is fourxied on the law of 
nature. This is based on the . fact that mankirrl' s first basic right 
is the right to life. Property is a IreanS of presei:ving that 
right. If mankirrl had to wait for general consent they would 
starve while waiting. 
If we look to see what Locke constitutes the primary title to 
private property we fini that it is labour. Although labour is 
only the final stage in the property-making process in the. state 
of nature, mankirrl' s labour is his own. Locke paid extensive 
attention to the right to own private property which is mainly due 
to the influence of the outlook of the section of society in which 
he rroved (Copelston 1964:130). Locke stated that everyone has the 
right to his own person and to inherit property. : 
(each man) is born with a double right; First, a 
right of freedom to his person which no other man 
has :EXMer over, but the freed disposal of it lies 
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in himself. Secondly: a right before any other man, 
to inherit, with his brethren his fathers gocds 
(I.ocke P.Iaslett 'Iwo Treatise page 441 quoted. in 
Shapiro 1986:84). 
However that is not the only way to obtain property as the next 
section indicates: 
God who hath given the world to men in conunon, 
hath also given them reason to make use of it to 
best advantages of life and convenience. 'Ihe earth 
and all that is therein is given to then for 
support and comfort of their being. An:l al though 
all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it 
feeds, belong to mankirrl in conunon, as they are 
produced by the spontaneous hand of nature, and 
nobcdy has originally private dominion exclusive of 
the rest of mankirrl in any of them, as they are 
thus in their natural state, yet being given for 
the use of men, there must of necessity be man's to 
appropriate them same way or other before they can 
be of any use .... (Second treatise chap 5 sec 26). 
'Ihe above passage raises other apparent problems with its phrase" 
being given to all men in conunon", as this seems to infer that God 
gave all things collectively to mankirrl to own. 'Ihis would then 
preclude any claim to private property. But what he really means 
is that mankirrl is entitled to appropriate private property for 
itself provided no one else has already claimed it. 
I.ocke identifies • three limitations on mankirrl in his quest for 
appropriation of gocds and land. 'Ihe first of these limitations is 
that mankirrl must mix labour with whatever is appropriated. (Ryan 
1965:220) : 
'Ihough the earth and all inferior creatures be 
common to all men, yet every man has a property in 
his own person. 'Ihis nobcxiy has any right to but 
himself. 'Ihe labour of this body and the work of 
his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever 
then he removes out of the state that Nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own 
and thereby makes it his property. It being by him 
removed from the common state of nature placed it 
in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it, 
that excludes the conunon right of other men. For 
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this labour being the unquestionable property of 
the labourer, no man but her can have a right to 
what that is once joined to, at least where there 
is enough, and as good left in connnon for others. 
(ibid sec 27). 
Gcx:l gave the world to mankW to use and enjoy. By the work of 
their own bodies they transformed the natural world into a 
flourishing and productive place where they created material 
goods. '!hose who worked and obsel:ved the laws of nature could 
enjoy Gcx:l' s world. 'lhe key to the possession of property is found 
in the lines quoted in the last section : ''mixed his labour with 
it and joyned to it something that is his own". We fin::i a 
reoccurrence of this theme later in his Second Treatise: 
'lhus this law of reason makes the deer that 
Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be 
his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, 
though, before, it was the connnon right of every 
one . . . Now of those good things which Nature hath 
provided in connnon, everyone hath a right (as hath 
been said) to as much as he could use, and had 
property in all he could effect with his labour; 
all that his in::lustry could extend to, to alter 
from the state Nature put on it. He that gathered 
a hundred bushels of acorns or apples had thereby a 
property in them; they · were his goods as soon as 
gathered. (ibid chap 5 sec 30 and 46). 
In the aoove sections of his writings, "Locke speaks of propriety 
or property where the teachers of natural law talk of the sum. 'lhe 
concept is the same. Property means that which belongs to a 
person. When Locke contends that fruit or the deer becomes the 
Indian's in the sense of being a part of him, he follows the same 
line of thought as Grotius and Pufendorf. "'lhe spiritual 
personality is extended so as to encarrpass physical abjects ... 
Since being one's own means being part of oneself, making a thing 
one's own means making it part of oneself. Something of oneself is 
infused in the abject." (Olivecrona 1974:225) 
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I.ocke draws no distinction between labour am actions when it 
carres to appropriating am further points out that no ones 
pennission is required before appropriating. 
Fram all which is evident, that though the things 
of Nature are given in canunon, man(by being master 
of hilllself am proprietor of his own person, am 
the actions or labours of it) had still in hilllself 
the greatest foundation of property. ( ibid chap 5 
sec 44) 
I.ocke, also draws no distinction between the right to taking the 
prcx:iucts of the earth am the ability to appropriate lam am 
fence it off, as they are both acquired in the same manner 
But the chief matter of property being now not the 
fruits of the earth am the beasts that subsists 
on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes 
in am carries with it all the rest, I think it is 
plain that property in that too is acquitted as the 
fonner. ( ibid chap 5 sec 32). 
In the same section I.ocke points out that to acquire lam, labour 
is involved. The lam must be tilled, for example. before it can 
be enclosed which in itself is labour.: 
God am his reason carmnarrled him (man) to subdue 
the earth - i.e. in'prove it for the benefit of life 
am therein lay out something upon it that was his 
own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this 
carmnarrl of God subdued, tilled, am sowed any part 
of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his 
property, which another had no title, nor could 
without injury take from him (ibid chap 5 sec 32). 
Even though I.ocke writes about the contribution of labour to the 
value of property he remains vague about its exact contribution 
It is labour indeed that puts the difference of 
value on everythipg; am let anyone consider what 
difference is between an acre of lam planted with 
tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley,. am 
an acre of the same lam lying in canunon without 
any husbandry upon it, am he will find that the 
in'provement of labour makes the far greater part of 
the value (Second Treatise Chap 5 Sec 40). 
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Locke was writing in an age where there was no shortage of land. 
Appropriation of lan:i would not result in any in::li vidual being 
deprived of his own lan:i: 
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of lan:i, 
by ~roving it, any prejudice to any other nan, 
since there was still good enough an:i as good left, 
an:i more than the yet unprovided could use. So 
that, in effect, there was never there less 
provided for others because of his enclosure for 
himself. (ibid chap 5 sec 33) 
Despite this apparent aburrlance of lan:i arrl goods we note that 
the second limitation to the right to appropriation is that there 
must be enough left for others: 
No nan's labour could subdue or appropriate all, 
nor could his enjoyment consunva more than a small 
part; so that it was inpossible for any nan, in 
this way, to entrench upon the right of another or 
acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of 
his neighbour, who would still have roam for as 
good an:i as large a possession (after the other had 
taken out his) as before it was appropriated. Which 
measure did confine every nan's possession to a 
very moderate proportion .. (ibid chap 5 sec 36). 
This second limitation on appropriation is set by one's needs. 
This means that an individual cannot amass property · to the 
detriment of others. Nor can he exercise the right to 
appropriation if it will result in the staJ:ving or death of 
another: 
But we know God hath not left one nan so to the 
mercy of another that he may staJ:ve him if he 
pleases. God, the Lord an:i Father of all, has given 
no one of his children such a property in his 
peculiar portion of the things of this world but he 
has given his needy brother a right in the 
surplusage of his goods, so that it cannot justly 
be denied him when his pressing wants call for it; 
an:i, therefore, no nan could ever have a just power 
over the life of another by right of property in 
lan:i or possessions, since it would always be a sin 
in any nan of estate to let his brother perish for 
want of affording him relief out of his plenty 
(First Treatise chap 4 sec 41). 
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The prime consideration is the common right of all to 
presei:vation. 
An individual may not merely grab all that he can, he may only 
take that which he can use. 'Ihis principle can be clearly found 
in the Old Testament when God gives instructions to those who 
reach the land of canaan. "Distribute the land by lot, according 
to your clans. To a larger group give a larger inheritance, and to 
the smaller group a smaller one" (Numbers 33:54). If he takes more 
than his share then he is taking what belongs to others. 
Men had a right to appropriate by their labour, each 
one to himself, as much of the things of nature as 
he could use . • • where the same plenty was still 
left to those who would use the same irrlustry . . . if 
the fruits rotted or the venison putrefied before he 
could spen:1 it, he offended against the conunon law 
of nature and was liable to be punished; he invaded 
his neighbour's share. (ST chap 4 sec 37). 
In the section below he quotes from 1 Timothy chap 6 v 17 and 
leads to the conclusion that individuals should not hold more 
than they can make use of. 
It will be perhaps, be objected to this, that if 
gathering the acorns or other fruits of the earth, 
etc. makes aright to them, then any one may engross 
as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. 
The same law of Nature that does by this means 
give us property, does also bourrl that property to 
God has given us all things richly. Is the voice 
of reason confinned by inspiration ? a.it how far 
has he given us to enj cy? As much as anyone can 
make use of to any advantage of· life before it 
spoils , so much he may by his labour fix a 
property in. Whatever is beyom this is :rrore than 
his share, and belongs to others. Nothing is made 
by God for man to spoil or destroy. ( ibid chap 5 
sec 31) 
The third limitation is therefore the fact that nothing must be 
allowed to spoil or be destroyed. Also from this section we can 
see that the industrious poor are always entitled to the 
opportunity to make a livelihood ( TUck 1982:172). 
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Locke does qualify this third limitation by allowing appropriation 
of more goods than can be used provide the excess is used to 
exchange for other property which can be used : 
He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or 
apples had thereby a property on them; they were 
his goods as soon as gathered. he was only to look 
that he used them before they spoiled else he took 
more than his share, and robbed others. Arrl, indeed 
it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to 
hoard up more than he could make use of. If he gave 
away a part to anybc:xiy else, so that it perished 
not uselessly in his possession, these he also made 
use of. Arrl if he bartered away plums that would 
have rotted in a week for nuts that would last good 
for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he 
wasted not C011UTOn stock; destroyed no part of the 
portion of goods that belonged to others so long 
as nothing perished uselessly in his han:ls. Again, 
if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, 
pleased with its colour, or exchange his sheep for 
shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a 
diamorrl, and keep those by him all his life, he 
invaded not the right of others; he might heap up 
as much of these durables things as he pleased. 
(ibid chap 5 sec 46). 
Locke accepted, however, that money had a great impact on the 
theories which he held 
Arrl thus came in the use of money; same lasting 
thing men might keep without spoiling, and that, by 
mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the 
truly useful but perishable supports of life 
(Secorrl Treatise chap 5 sec 47). 
Locke then concedes that the advent of money greatly increased the 
unequalness of mankind's possessions. Strauss points out "In 
civil society almost everything has been appropriated; land in 
particular has became scarce. Gold and silver are not only scarce 
but through the invention of money they have becarne so valuable to 
be hoarded up" (Strauss 1952: 240) : 
Arrl as different degrees of industry were apt to 
give men possessions in different proportions, so 
this invention of money gave them the opportunity 
to continue and enlaige them. (ibid sec 48). 
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Strauss continues "One should therefore expect that the original 
law of nature has been replaced by rules imposing much severer 
restrictions on appropriation than those which existed in the 
state of nature ... Yet Locke teaches exactly the opposite; the 
right to appropriate is much more restricted. in the state of 
nature than in civil society" (Strauss 1952:240) 
In dealing with the right of the irrlividual to appropriation of 
property, Locke does not address the fact that the good for the 
irrlividual is not always for the good of the majority. There is no 
attenpt by Locke to tie up these two points which could be in 
conflict. This problem continues with his lack of analysis of the 
concept of the carnroc>n good am his assunption that this concept 
and the concept of private property are synonyrous. This 
objection should be seen as a view that has the advantage of 
looking back in history am is therefore valid only because we nCM 
have knCMledge which Locke did not have. 
Locke has also been severely criticized for the loose manner in 
which he uses the word property. He ten:ied to use the word in its 
ordinary sense am gave it prominence among the natural rights of 
mankirx:l (Gough 1969:87). It is this loose manner in which Locke 
used the word that allCMed Macpherson to identify two properties, 
a finding that was hotly disputed by Macpherson's critics, 
especially Viner who used this aspect to attack Macpherson in his 
article "Possessive Irrlividualism as original sin". Despite 
Macpherson' s rebuttal, Viner issued a counter rej oin:ler in which 
he stated " I am still unconvinced that the emphasis he 
(Macpherson) puts on an alleged dichotomy in Locke's views on 
property does not have its origin in part on insufficient 
awareness of how general in his time was Locke's double usage with 
respect to the word Property. It is, of course open to Macpherson 
to argue that the double usage by other than Locke was, or may 
have been, associated with a similar confusion of thought on 
their part. " (Viner 1963: 564) 
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In concluding this section on property we should take note of 1 
Timothy 6: 17 which we previously quoted from the Second Treatise 
chap 4 sec 31 and which I.ocke also referred to in his First 
treatise 
God gives us all things to richly enjoy (FT chap 5 
sec 40). 
From these two quotes we can conclude that property can be used 
for more than mere presei:vation but that mankind has the right to 
use his property for enjoyment. However, enjoyment cannot take 
place without sufficient for all and the security of possession as 
Locke wrote: 
Happiness cannot consist without plenty and 
security ( As quoted in Tully 1980:101). 
4. 4 '!HE SOCIAL a:NmACI' 
In a previous chapter we dealt with Natural Rights the line of argument 
used must be followed here to establish the origin of Human Rights. The 
notion of the Social contract from the Biblical text of the Old Testament 
to the writings of John Locke ill'plied an assumption of a deliberate act 
of foundation of society. 'Ihe actual concept of a Social Contract as 
philosophical theory had it's origins with the Greek Sophists who 
maintain that government was limited to the protection of the 
individual. Plato and Aristotle moved away from the emphasis on the 
individual and concentrated on the individual as a part of a bcx:iy of 
people. Both Plato and Aristotle considered the concept of a social 
contract but rejected it. 
Epicures returned to the individual in stating that civil society was 
fonned to avoid pain. 'Ihe early Christians saw society as a result of the 
fall of mankind thus marking society as a necessary evil. It is in the 
writings of st 'Ihornas Aquinas that the Medieval concept of a Social 
Contract was originated in about 1250 relying heavily on Aristotle's 
"Politics" and Biblical text. Biblical text indicated that rulers were 
ordained by God al though there are instances such as with King David 
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where the ruler made a covenant with the people. St Thomas split the 
concept into three with the substance of authority given by God while the 
constitutional fonn and its exercise is given by the people. Drring the 
middle ages the divine origin of the state was seldom questioned. 
Richard Hooker, however, outlined the idea of a social contract. This 
idea became popular in England due to the up and coming class of wealthy 
mercantiles. 
The theories of social contract reached their peak with I.ocke. Even King 
James 1, to whom I.ocke was opposed, conceded that there was a contract 
between King and People: 
King James ... in his speech to the Parliament, 1609, he 
hath these words : "The king birrls hilllself, by double 
oath, to the obseJ:vation of the furrlamental laws of the 
kingdom - tacitly, by being king, and so bound to 
protect, as well as the people as the laws of his 
kingdom. and expressly by his oath at his coronation; 
so as every just king in a settled kingdom is bound to 
observe that pactation made unto his people .. " ( ST 2 
chap 18 sec 200) 
Therefore Locke's concept of a social contract is nothing new. But it 
would be wrong to assume that his predecessors believed that the people 
should govern. Seldon for instance believed that the best fonn of 
government was a democracy but to argue that power had originally resided 
with the people was to emphasize that the monarch had limited power. 
I.ocke does not conceive it as a contract between ruler and ruled as do 
many political philosophers. I.ocke rather sees it as a contract between 
all the members of a society. An individual may give either his express 
or tacit consent to becoming a member of any political conununity. The 
inportant difference between I.ocke and his predecessor is that Locke did 
not see the original Social Contract as a basis for government. His basis 
for government is a contract between individual and individual 
All this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one 
political society, which is all the compact that is, or 
needs to be, between individuals that enter into or 
make you a comm:>nwealth. (ST chap 8 sec 99) 
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It is this iro.ividual and privacy of responsiblity that brings about the 
features of Locke's possessive individualism which we will refer to 
later in this thesis. 
Locke based much of his political thought on Hooker who was the authority 
acceptable to a large section of the conmrunity in Locke's days. 'Ihere are 
also many parallels between Locke's theory and Papendorf's theory. Locke 
was maintaining that the King, unlike in King James' version, was in a 
trusteeship position. 'Ihis idea had been previously located in Bishop 
Planet's short Treatise of Political Power written in 1556. 
Civil Societies start with a State of nature in which all people are free 
and equal. 'Ihis State of nature is bound by the law of Nature which in 
turn bounds them to real obligations. However it is clearly stated that 
people are not meant to live as iro.ividuals: 
God having made man .. put him under strong obligations 
of necessity, convenience and inclination, to drive him 
into society (ST chap 7 sec 77). 
Mankind gives up the state of nature for civil society only for mutual 
preservation of life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness 
For the political society is instituted for no other 
em, but to secure every man's possession of the 
things of this life ... thus the safeguard of men's lives 
and of the things that belong unto this life is the 
business of the conunonwealth. (LT page 16) 
Civil Society starts with the fact that mankind is born into families and 
cannot survive outside this basic unit. It is only after a long period 
that an iro.ividual can become independent. For Locke it is the sexual 
desires that forms the most basic social unit. 'Ihis voluntary union 
provides a social, biol~ical and theol~ical function in providing the 
child with a stable and protected environment. According to Dmn, Locke 
was unable to explain the development of legitimate societies outside the 
family structure. Nevertheless Locke maintains that as a child, mankind 
is amoral and full of selfish desires but as an adults becomes free and 
independent, responsible for their own behaviour. 
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A political society comes into existence when every person has given up 
irrlividual power in the State of Nature to protect themselves and their 
property. According to I.ocke there are four reasons why we should protect 
our property. '!he first is because it is a carmnan::l from God and is 
reasonable that mankin:i must be in::lustrious. A lack of protection could 
deprive them of their earned property. Secondly the protection of 
property and body is the basis of security and thirdly it means that the 
lazy cannot sponge off the in::lustrious. Fourthly the irrlividual who has 
protected property can free his mirrl to concentrate on the happiness of 
salvation. 
'lherefore because it is mankin:i's desire to change from a State of nature 
to Civil Society this change takes place by consent. He does so because 
in the State of Nature his liberty is seldom assured. He therefore takes 
what liberty he has and places it in the care of the majority : 
Arxi thus every man by consenting with others to make 
one body politic urrler one government puts him.self 
urrler an obligation to every one of that society to 
submit to the detennination of the majority ( ST 
chap 7 sec 97). 
I.ocke deduces that the right of majority rule is the principle govenring 
the action of the conmrunity and fonns part of the social contract 
For when any m.nnber of men have, by consent of every 
irrlividual, made a conmrunity, they have thereby made 
that conmrunity one body, with power to act as one body, 
which is only by the will and detennination of the 
majority ( ST chap 8 sec 96). 
Not only must there be majority rule but the minority must agree to 
accept the rule of the majority. If this did not happen the chance of the 
social contract being kept would be out of the question. 
At this point it is relevant to quote from Aaron (1971:280). When dealing 
with what type of constitution there should be "Of the three fonns, 
democracy, oligarchy and monarchy, I.ocke felt that none was wholly 
satisfactory in itself, and he favoured a mixed constitution, namely, the 
constitutional or limited monarchy". 
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When entering society, mankind gives up some rights in order to protect 
the remainder of the rights. 'Ihis action is only to improve his 
situation: 
But though men when they enter into society give up 
equality, liberty, and. executive power they had in the 
state of nature into the hand.s of the society, to be so 
far disposed of by the legislative as the good of 
society shall require, yet it being only with an 
intention in every one the better to preseJ::Ve hbnself, 
his liberty and. property ( for no rational creature can 
be supposed to change his condition with an intention 
to be worse) {ST chap 9 sec 131) . 
By placing his liberty in the care of the majority, people transfer power 
from themselves to society. In the state of Nature, God has given mankin:i 
the agency to judge and. sentence fellow mankind for offences cotmnitted. 
'Ihis executive power has fo:nne'.i the basis of all legitilnate power of 
person over person. 'Ihis means that the irrli vidual agency from God is 
transferre:i to the Government and. the state can therefore legitilnately 
claim that it's authority is from God. 'Ihis power has certain basic 
rights for the government: 
Political power then I take to be a right of making 
laws, with penalties of death, and. consequently all 
less penalties for the regulating and. preseJ::Ving of 
property ... ( ST chap 1 sec 3) 
A Government is established as a trust to be operated solely for the 
protection of irrlividual rights. 'Ihe only right that the irrlividual has 
that is seceded is the right of executing the law, while all the other 
rights in the state of nature are retained. 
Lcx::ke deduces that in the social contract the irrli vidual authorizes the 
state to use force when executing its judgement on the rights involved in 
the law of nature. 'Ihe irrli vidual is obliged to contribute his force to 
execute the decisions of the political authority which he has founded. 
'Ihe success of the Social Contract is based on mankind's duty to keep a 
promise. 'Ihis duty imposed by Natural I.aw, places an obligation on the 
irrli vidual. But it also places a duty on the government to protect the 
rights of each irrlividual. As Lcx::ke writes: 
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It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by inlpartial 
execution of equal laws, to secure unto all people in 
general, and to every one of his subjects in 
particular, the just possession of these things 
belonging to his life. (LT page 3) 
Once civil society has been establisherl its first act is to fonn a 
legislative power, but to prevent it from becoming a menace it is 
separaterl from the executive 
The first and fundamental positive law of all 
cannnonwealths is the establishing of the legislative 
power (ST chap 11 sec 134). 
Although I.ocke detailerl limitations of the legislative power he did not 
consider this new union to be a contract of Goverrnnent. 'Ihus the 
goverrnnent in the fonn of the legislature am the executive are not 
contracterl but are placerl in a position of trust leaving the people as 
both trustor am beneficiai:y. '!he concept of trustee is to be within the 
parameter set by the law of God am nature on which the contract stams: 
'Ihese are the bounds which the trust that is put in 
them by society am the I.aw of God am Nature have set 
to the legislative power of every cannnonweal th in all 
fonns of goverrnnent. (ST chap 11 sec 142) 
Obviously the concept of trustee as opposed to contract means that the 
irrli vidual 's rights are enhancerl. In a contract both parties have rights 
while in a trusteeship only the trustee retains rights. '!he net result is 
that the goverrnnent is left with duties while the people are left with 
rights. '!he irrlividual, however, is left with an obligation to obey the 
will of the majority as we have already shown in the section. 
I.ocke then identifies a third power callerl Ferleration 
which allows the concluding of treaties. '!his power 
which deals with foreign affairs, is usually uniterl 
with the executive. 
Returning to the concept of power in the social contract, Locke 
identifies three types of power but only one is legitimate. Firstly there 
is despotism which is the kind of power a master has over his slave: 
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. . . despotic exceeds it; and that absolute dominion 
however placed is so far from being one kind of civil 
society that it is inconsistent with it as slavery is 
with property. (ST chap 15 sec 17 4) . 
Locke gives examples of this type of power as in Ceylon, the Tsar, in 
Turkey and in F.gypt (Pany 1978: 67) . Despotism is incompatible with civil 
government. In fact it was Hobbes who allowed this type of power to 
become accepted. 
The second type of power is paternal. This is the power that a father has 
over his family. This was the argument of Filmer which Locke spent the 
whole of his first treaties refuting. 
"government" may have been fathers: 
I.ocke agrees that the first 
As government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that 
live together, who so likely to be the man as he that 
was their connnon father (ST chap 8 sec 105) 
But Locke goes on in sections 106 and 107 to claim that these 
"governments" being a result of consent, recognizing the father as a 
political goverrnnent not paternal government. Following this argument, 
Locke is justified in considering paternal power as not being acceptable 
because with this type of power such as in a family, there is no choice. 
Locke also does not see paternal power as an illlportant element in 
mankind's transition from the state of Nature to the Social Contract. He 
agreed that first society was between man and woman. : 
The first society was between a man and wife which gave 
beginning to that between parents and children to which 
in time that between master an servant came to be 
added. (ST chap 7 sec 77) 
But I.ocke continues to state that this basic society could be evolved 
into a state. The father as paternal head and :ruling with the consent of 
his children could easily transform himself into a political leader 
without any major changes in duties and power yet retaining the consent 
of the individual. The social contract is a deliberate choice by 
mankind to subject himself to an authority or political power. Paternal 
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power would be in conflict with this approach. Finally paternal power 
would instruct as well as order and protect while the reason for civil 
goverrnnent is just to order and protect. 
Political power is defined by Locke as: 
Political power then I take to be the right of making 
laws, with penalty of death and consequently all less 
penal ties for regulating and presaving of property and 
of employing force of the community in the execution of 
such laws and in the defence of the commonweal th from 
foreign injucy and all this only for the public good 
(ST chap 1 sec 3). 
'Ihis power has limitations. Firstly the society thus fonned cannot 
function outside the marrlate given to it by the people in the society. 
'Ihis means that a society cannot have rrore authority over it's members 
than that which they had in the State of Nature. Nor can an individual 
confiscate the land of another nor enslave that person without a real 
reason. Finally it may not redistribute rights as this means that it 
would need to violate the rights of an individual to give it to another. 
Comrrn.mity always has supreme power. The community is the public will of 
society which members obey. BJ.t the power of collective right of law 
enforcement is not regained by the political society while civil 
goverrnnent acts within the trust placed in it. Similarly this power 
cannot revert to the individual while there is a political society. 
A major defect in the Social Contract theory is its failure to recognise 
that cohesion of society relies on much deeper psychological factors than 
Locke allows us to believe. These is a problem in trying to reconcile 
the necessity of individual concern and obedience to majority rule. 
Nevertheless in Locke's day it was quite accepted. 
The greatest problem, I believe, is that mankim was never really in a 
state of Nature. From a practical point of view the original contract 
silllply did not exist. This is acknowledged by Locke's affirnation that 
there are no actual instances of men earning together to fonnulate an 
explicit agreement. Locke identifies the examples of Rome, Venice and 
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certain American communities. Despite these examples Locke admits that 
there are no reco:rds of any contracts: 
Government is everywhere antecedent to reco:rds and 
letters seldom come in amongst people till along 
continuation of civil society ..... then they begin to 
look after the history of their fourxiers and search 
into their original when they have outlived the memory 
of it. (ST chap 8 sec 101.) 
Locke does not satisfy the historical evidence required by Sir Hemy Main 
and other philosophers who adhere to the historical method. History does 
not show us men in primitive times living in isolation. Every grouping 
had a chief and this seems to be the origin of govenunent by one ruler. 
Since Locke, men have tried to deride the notion of a contract with the 
idea of Neanderthal man assembling in a vast plain to vote. His theory 
has come under the criticism of Hume, Bentham, Burke and Kant. 
Nevertheless Locke's theory is more reasonable than Hobbes who theorised 
that mankirrl was prepared, in the social contract, to surrender all 
powers including control of property to one person. Locke said the 
social contract was not a surrender but a union that would protect 
property, life and liberty. Perhaps the most logical explanation is 
that Locke did not mean to i.nply that men actually lived in a state of 
nature at one time and then decided to enter a social contract. Nor did 
he mean that an individual when born has a choice in the matter. He used 
the concept to explain the priority of the individual to society and the 
standing of an individual in it. 
A further critic of Locke's is Sir Frederick Pollack who maintained that 
the rights to personal safety, reputation, for example, are not 
transferable and are wholly distinct from the rights of property. In 
his opinion Locke was merely trying to pass on the whole burden to the 
state and this was seen to be the clever passing of the buck by an 
ingenious layman (Gough 1969:77). 
My own theory is that the social contract evolved over a period of time 
and sooner or later the individuals in the community came to realise that 
they were subjecting certain liberties for protection. At this stage of 
realization the individual decided that he/she would accept the situation 
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they foun:i themselves in thereby tacitly sealing the contract between 
person an:i person an:i this need not have come to all men at the same 
time. '!his is bo:rne out by Locke's view that political authority is as a 
result of consent of the individual not the drawing up of a conununal 
contract. While this theory may not be unique I have been unable to find 
any trace of it in the references I have read. 
The contract theory had to withstan:i sustained attacks by David Hume and 
Hegel. Bentham rejected the theory an:i thought that utility was the 
catalyst for societies although he agreed that there was a State of 
Nature. The decline in popularity of the contract Theory continued with 
ffM nf!M arguments being put forward. In the 19th Century there was a 
revival an:i a successful resurrection by Nozick in the 20th century. 
The Social Theory has through the ages, attempted to explain a 
reconciliation between laws an:i liberty. There are many theories which 
litter philosophy books of the past but ffM are without anomalies or 
fault. Today popular Conmrunist theory sees political obligations as a 
struggle for power (Gough 1969:255). 
Generally Locke's doctrine is held to be unhistorical an:i sociologically 
an:i psychologically weak. Yet reading through the weird an:i wonderful, 
the outstanding an:i puerile ideas of the past I am left with the notion 
that while Locke in theory floun:iers on the rocks of history, his concept 
of trusteeship is a logical explanation of political obligation. Even 
if there was no contract, men seem to behave as thoughther was one. In 
other words there is a contract implied. 
4.5 OOVERNMENr BY CX:HSENr 
The foun:iation stone of the social contract is the invol vernent of the 
consent of the individual. As Locke wrote : 
When any number of men so consented to make one 
conmrunity or goverrnnent; they are thereby presently 
incorporated an:i make one body politic (ST chap 8 
sec 95). 
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Later in the same chapter Locke wrote: 
The beginning of politic society depends upon the 
consent of the individuals to join into an:i make one 
society (ST chap 8 sec 106). 
Locke saw that the sovereignty of the people had to be given 
nanifestation in same type of government. He had already refuted an 
absolute monarchy. Aristocracy became an oligarchy which was also not 
acceptable on the basis that it became a minority nlle. Democracy was the 
only alternative. '!his meant nlle with the consent of the najority. 
As we considered in a previous section, Locke naintains that there are 
two types of consent. The first is positive consent which can be either 
expressed or tacit. The secon:i type of consent, according to Locke, is 
natural consent which is based on natural instinct an:i can be either 
moral behaviour, opinions or principles. When Locke talks of consent in 
terms of legitimate government or the social contract, then he is 
referring to express or tacit consent only as foun:i in positive consent. 
Nowhere does he bring in the distinction between positive an:i natural 
consent save where he is attempting to prove that natural law is not 
derived from the general consent of mankind. 
Locke naintained that no government could be legitimate unless it had the 
consent of the citizens behind it. It must be nlled by the consent of the 
najority by which the law of nature was COnsel:Ved. This was similar 
to the thoughts of CUsanus who had same two centuries before accepted 
that a camnunity had a divine right to nlle. For this to be effective, 
representative government is necessary. There must be a proper 
relationship between the people an:i nllers. '!his idea of consent had 
descerrled from the Middle Ages as a regular part of the doctrine of 
parliament. / 
Government by consent is therefore the basis for legitimate government, 
an:i is a historical an:i sel:Viceable, loose though it nay be, description 
of a constitutional type of government. 
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While writers such as John n.mn claim that Locke's failure to give a 
clear account of what constitutes express consent {D.lnn 1985:chap 10) 
and Gerant Parry who clailns that Locke is not clear on how express 
consent is registered {Parry 1978:104), Paul Russell irotivates that 
express consent is verbal declaration of mankind's consent to make 
hilnself subject to the laws of the government. This express consent is 
not deperrlent on the individual being a landowner. He uses the argurrent 
of Hobbes and Paperrlorf, and bearing in :mi.m their influence on I..ocke, 
he has shown that Locke was using the eminents of his time. 
Where Locke does fall down is as to wham this consent is given and where 
it was given. The irost plausible suggestion comes from n.mn who sees 
the oath of allegiance prevalent in England at the time of Locke. 
The social contract is an agreement whereby individuals agree to accept a 
restriction on their freedom and indeperrlence and by this express consent 
are urxier obligation to corrply with the rules of society. But then the 
question arises, what happens to succ.eed.ing generations. Locke answers 
by saying that individuals can be seen to give their tacit consent. This 
tacit consent is described by Locke as 
Evecyman that hath any possessions or enjoyment of any 
part of the dominions of any government doth hereby 
give his tacit consent. {ST chap 8 sec 119) 
A person tacitly consents to the rules of the government by living and 
working within the jurisdiction of the state. This acknowledges the 
legitimacy of the government and consents to obey its laws but does not 
necessarily approve of those laws. Therefore tacit consent is given by 
an individual when he/she owns land or merely resides within the 
boundaries of the state. This tacit consent means they recognises the 
jurisdiction of the government over their land and the individual as 
he/she lives on the land. such a person is able to utilise the land and 
therefore is in a society but a person who has given their express 
consent may never leave that society. 
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I.ocke accepted that al though every individual's consent was necessacy at 
the inauguration of the political conununity, this did not imply that 
political liberty was the same as the liberty in the state of nature. In 
its extreme form this doctrine of consent could mean that mankind is 
bound only by that which is consented to but I.ocke did not advocate 
anarchy arrl therefore mankind does not naintain the extreme individualist 
position. 
I.ocke tells us that when individuals agree to make one bcxiy politic this 
implies acceptance of an obligation to submit to najority decisions and 
he further points out that the only alternative is the disintegration of 
the conununity. '!he truth is that the whole principle that the decision 
of the najority is binding on all (and whether it be by two-thirds 
najority or not makes no difference in principle) is quite artificial. 
As far as nature goes the only binding decision is a unanimous one. (Gough 
1969:62) 
I.ocke lays down the boundaries which society, the law of God and the law 
of nature have put on rulers. Firstly, the legislature must govern by 
pronn.ilgated laws which apply equally to all individuals in all cases. 
Secon11.y, the laws must be only .for the gcxxi of the members of the 
society. 'Ihil::dly, the legislature cannot raise taxes without the consent 
of the members. In this point I.ocke disagrees with Hobbes that the 
legislature can dispose of an individual's property. Finally, the 
legislature nay not transfer the law-making powers to any person to whom 
the members have not entrusted this power. 
'!he legislature is the power in the state as it alone can make the laws. 
'!he power is unalterable but it derives its authority from the covenant 
of the people. These thoughts, Locke derived from Hooker (Graham 
1918: 54) . But 1ocke also realized that the legislature that formulated 
the legislation arrl the executive that executed the legislation must be 
separated to prevent the legislators from becoming above the law and thus 
having an interest distinct from the rest of the cormnunity. A goverrnnent 
with absolute powers can become worse than the natural state. In a 
letter to Richard King on August 15, 1703 1ocke defined goverrnnent as 
those who : 
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comprehend all the arts of peace and war; the 
management of trade, the employment of the poor; and 
all those other things that belong to the 
administration of the public {As quoted in Tully 
1980:170). 
In 1836 earl Jarcke detected that Locke had been the originator of the 
doctrine of the separation and balances of power {Gough 1969:93). As has 
been previously quoted: 
The first and fundamental positive law of all 
conunonweal ths is the establishing of the legislative 
power {ST chap 11 sec 134). 
Once laws have been made, the law makers put those laws into the hands 
of others and the law makers then themselves become subject to those 
laws. He unhesitatingly asserts that the legislature is the superpower 
to which all are subordinate. Even though the legislature is the supreme 
power it cannot have absolute and arbitrary power over its subjects. It 
is limited to the public good. 
A legitimate authority of one person having power over another is 
ultimately conferred by Goo. '!his is based on the writings of st Paul in 
the New Testament. When those in legitimate authority judge offences 
cannnitted by their subjects, they judge them as agents of Goo. 'Iherefore 
we can deduce that being part of society has certain political 
obligations. For example, in Locke's day an oath of allegiance was taken 
to be a natural obligation and he pointed out that oaths of allegiance 
cannot be withdrawn at will. 
It follows that based on Locke's theories an absolute monarchy and an 
absolute oligarchy are not a legitimate govenunent. Locke also indicated 
that existence under an arbitrary despot would be worse than in the state 
of nature. Locke would also not admit the sovereign omnipotence of 
Parliament {Graham 1911:61). 
As far as I am concerned, after sifting through the maze of conflicting 
thought ranging from the feasible to the embarrassing, I see that mankind 
consented with the social contract to comply with the rules and law of 
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the state. niis included subjecting his lan:l. When lam reverts back to 
another the restrictions also revert thus enforcing the new owner to 
corrply with the original contract. niis is tacit consent. 
A person is therefore able to consent either expressly or tacitly to 
become a member of a political society an:l this binds the irrlividual to 
obey the goverrnnent which is placed in a position of trust. niis consent 
does not mean that the i.rrli vidual agrees with the fonn of government in 
power. Political Obligation is derived from promises, an:l promises are 
given tacitly or expressly. 
The role of consent in the day to day governing of a count:ty is not 
adequately covered. by I.ocke an:l remains an area for scholarly study at 
some future date. 
What about the situation where a foreign power defeats a nation an:l sets 
up its own rule? Is this conununity under obligation to the occupying 
power? 
The strong historical evidence that Charles the First' s ancestor William 
of Nonnarxiy, had conquered. Englam · an:l thus became the legitimate ruler 
of Englan:l forced theorists in the early 17th Century to concede that 
legitimate rule could also be gained by means other than consent. 
Hooker, however, claimed that the King of Englan:l was bound by a social 
contract an:l therefore was forced to conclude that the King ruled by 
lawful succession an:l not by conquest. The thinking at the time was that 
rule by conquest meant that the ruler was answerable to God alone an:l not 
the people. 
In I.ocke' s day many, if not most, states came about by conquest. It was 
I.ocke' s opinion that these goverrnnents, so formed did not constitute a 
legitimate goverrnnent as there was no combining of the executive rights 
of the imi. vidual in a social contract. niis meant that the relationship 
between the conqueror an:l conquered. remained one of hostility even after 
the situation became accepted by the world: 
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For first the conqueror never having had a title to the 
land of that country, the people, who are the 
descerrlants of, or claim under those who were forced. to 
submit to the yoke of a goverrnnent by constraint have 
always had the right to shale it off and free 
themselves. (ST chap 15 sec 192) 
When a conquest takes place, the conqueror may obtain redress under the 
law of nature but may not deprive the conquered family from obtaining 
subsidence: 
He has no right to seize nore than the vanquished could 
forfeit; his life is at the victor's mercy arrl his 
S&Vice arrl goods he may appropriate to make himself 
reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife 
arrl children, they too had title to the goods he 
enjoyed (ST chap 15 sec 183). 
This conquest cannot take away the rights of following generations as the 
conqueror cannot claim the whole country. He is however able to claim war 
damages being five years production: 
'Ihe destruction of a year's product or two ( for it 
seldom reaches four or five) is the utn'ost spoil that 
usually can be done. For as to noney, arrl such riches, 
and treasurers be taken away, these are none of 
Nature's goods (ST chap 15 sec 184). 
A conqueror does not have genuine right to govern as the people have not 
given their consent. Consent cannot come under duress as it then remains 
invalid: 
'Ihe conqueror it is true, usually by force he has over them, compels 
them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his corrlitions arrl 
submit to such a goverrnnent as he pleases to afford them .... to which 
I say they bi.rxi not at all (ST chap 15 sec 186). 
'Ihe conqueror can only become the legitimate goverrnnent if the citizens, 
after the conquest, agree to submit themselves of their own free will. 
This has the effect of legitimizing the act of conquest: 
'Ihe conqueror gets no power but only over those who 
have actually assisted, concurred. or consented to that 
unjust force that is used against him. (ST chap 15 
sec 177) 
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Sornmel'.Ville points out that John Pym claimed that the biblical text 
"Render l.mto caesar the things that are caesar's" showeci that the Jews 
were at the ti.n'e urrler their conquerors the Romans. 'Ihe Jews were 
therefore obligeci to pay taxes not by consent but by reason of conquest. 
(Sornmel'.Ville 1986:67). 
laws are enacted to ensure the safety of others. As Locke wrote 
laws en:ieavour, as far as possible, to protect the 
goods am the heal th of subjects from violence of 
others, or from fraud, not from negligence or 
prodigality of the owners themselves. No man against 
his will can be forced to be heal thy or rich ( A Secom 
Letter concerning Toleration page 91 as Quoteci in 
Pany 1978: 87) . 
Should a goverrnnent ignore this obligation, it could in the future be 
useci against them. As the historian 'Ihucydides wrote 2, 000 years ago 
"In:leeci it is true that, in these acts of revenge on others, men take it 
upon themselves to begin the process of repealing those general laws of 
humanity which are here to give hope of salvation to all who are in 
distress, instead of leaving those laws in existence, remembering that 
there nay came a ti.n'e when they too, will be in danger am will neeci 
their protection (As quoteci in Matthew 1984:10). 
But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another that he 
nay starve him if he pleases. God, the IDrd am Father of all, has given 
no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the 
things of this "WOrld but he has given his needy brother a right in the 
sw:plusage of his goods, so that it cannot be justly be denieci him when 
his pressing wants call for it; am, therefore, no man could ever have a 
just power over the life of another by right of property in lam or 
possessions, since it would always be a sin in any man of estate to let 
his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty (FT 
chap 4 sec 41). 
Does this mean that the State is responsible ? Is this Locke's 
justification for a welfare state? I will return to his question in the 
next chapter dealing with Hunm1 Rights. 
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All political rights are corrlitional on acceptance of political duties. 
Even aliens CMe duties as they enjoy the resources of the society (Dunn 
1969:138). For example an implicit, if not explicit, oath of allegiance 
to the ruler or monarch is (was) expecte1 of each subject. These natural 
obligations were the borrls of society in the seventeenth century. 
The dust jacket of the book "Plato to Nato" reads as follCMS: 
"Question: Why should I obey the state? 
Answer: 1. Because if I don't they will cut my head off* 
2. Because it is God's will* 
3. Because the state arrl I have done a deal* 
4. Because the state is the actuality of the ethical idea* 
(*strikeout whichever is unapplicable) 
The history of political thought is the history of mankind's attenpts 
over the centuries to answer the question 'Why should I obey the state ? ' 
rut even to ask it poses IOC>re questions. 'What is the state arrl what 
should it be?" (Redhead 1985). Locke's political thought is no 
different. 
Locke begins Political obligation with the principle that mankind needs 
only obey a government whose authority he has given his personal consent 
to. Locke appears not to notice any difference between strict irrli vidual 
consent arrl the vague consent of the majority. In spite of this, Elaine 
Spitz concludes that Locke enunciated a logical relationship between 
consent arrl majoritarism. 
Locke's treatment of majority is a weak link in his Secom Treatise. He 
clailns that in consenting to become a member of society the irrli vidual 
automatically is bound by the majority. Alpheus Mason arrl Willrnoore 
Ke.rrlall both highlighted the danger of maj ori tarian tyranny inherent in 
Locke's theory. There are no protections for minority rights in this 
concept. Ken:lall further considers Locke to profess faith in the moral 
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capacity of the many. In other words I.ocke says the will of the people is 
not right because of the size of the group but their will is as close to 
rationality and justice as is possible. 
Mcfherson on the other han::l says that I.ocke restricted his concept of 
people to the capitalists who will preserve everything necessary to 
maintain their economic system. 
4. 6 HUMAN RIGHl'S 
The previous two chapters have shown that Governments are established as 
a trust for the protection of individual rights and each individual 
consents to be governed. To cany out it's function of protection the 
government must create laws. The individual agrees to abide by these 
laws as part of their consent. These laws in general go beyond Natural 
Rights. 
Natural Rights were founded in creation and were given to man by Goo.. 
Htnnan rights, however, are those rights which are derived from law and 
are an extension to the basic rights which man enjcys. Contenporary 
exponents of I.ocke argue that rights do not have to be specified as they 
are all derived from the basic, equal right to freedom (Bany 19881: 191). 
In fact civil laws are made with the sole purpose of expanding man's 
basic freedom : 
'!he erxi of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to 
preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all states of 
created things, capable of laws, where there is no law 
there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from 
restraint and violence from others. (ST Chap 6 sec 57) 
Furtherm::>re these laws must be established by those in society or the 
government as I.ocke wrote in his journal on May 21, 1678 
A civil law is nothing but the agreement of a society 
of men either by themselves, or one or more authorised 
by them; detennining rights and appointing rewards and 
punishments to certain actions of all within society 
(As quoted in TUlly 1980:165). 
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It is then the duty of the governing powers to distribute to each member 
in the society the right to life, liberty and the requisite goods. 
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the 
impartial execution of equal laws to secure unto all 
the people in general, and to every on of his subjects 
in particular the just possession of these things 
belonging to this life. If any one presumes to violate 
the laws of public justice and equity, established for 
the presm:va.tion of these things , his presumption is 
to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting in 
the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests, 
or goods, which he otherwise he might and ought to 
enjoy (A letter concerning Toleration page 17). 
'!he goods which man normally ought to enjoy is describe by Locke as 
life, liberty, health and irrlolency of bcxiy; and the 
possessions of outward things such as m::mey, lams, 
houses, furniture, and the like (ibid page 15). 
For Locke, human (civil) rights are derived from the institutions which 
are created to preserve natural rights. I disagree with Cranston who 
considers human rights merely to be a ioore IOOdern term for natural 
rights. (Iaqueur 1979:19) 
Human rights cannot be built on human opinion or social values as these 
are not pennanent. Human Rights nn.ist be pennanent. But Locke was not 
able to fall back on scripture to support his views on civil or human 
rights because "'the bible does not provide us with a ready-made IOOdel for 
a bill of human rights. Yet, on a basis of man's various relationships 
and the marrlates and calling he has received from God, we are able to 
indicate certain essential rights (which always include specific 
obligations)" (DRC 1977:30). It is not possible to hunt through the 
scriptures to fim isolated sections which errlorse this right or that 
right. Nevertheless Locke fourrl that rights are an undeniable implication 
of Biblical teaching. We need to look at the Bible as a whole to see 
what it teaches about mankirrl and God's requirements of him. It seems 
to me that the Bible does support basic rights such as life and. even 
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freed.am in that freed.am is needed if man is to exercise his will. Jesus 
defines much of his mission in tenns of freed.am. "He has chosen me am 
sent me to bring good news to the poor, to heal the broken hearted, to 
announce release to the captives and freed.am to those in prison" (Isaiah 
61:1). 
'!here are sections of scripture that tie in with Human Rights even if 
these sections are not rights or demarrls. These sections deal with 
attitudes to other people. One example is "In everything, do to others 
what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the law and the 
prophets (Matthew 7: 12) . 
According to Locke, mankind is created in the image of God. : 
'Ihe words are : "And God said, I.et us make man in our 
image, after our likeness, and let them dominion over 
the fish" ,etc. (F T chap 4 sec 30) 
'Ihis has became the theological justification of Human Rights for those 
who have rejected Locke's theocy of the state of nature. Elaine Pagels, 
professor of Histocy and religion at the Colmnbia University, gives a 
slightly different angle : ''Where, then, do we get the idea on which 
contenporary htnnan rights theocy rests; that ultimate value resides in 
the in::li vidual, indeperxient from or even prior to participation in any 
social collective? The earliest suggestion of this idea occurs in the 
Hebrew account which describes Adam, whose name means "htnnanity", as 
being created in the 'image of God" •.• 'Ihis account implies the essential 
quality of all htnnan beings, and supports the idea of rights that all 
enjoy by virtue of their connnon htnnanity" (Montgarnecy 1986:206). In my 
opinion, Human Rights are based in God's will for man (natural law) made 
in his image. Further mcxiem theological recognition of htnnan rights is 
found in the three elements of Christian love : equality, respect am 
perception of mcxiem needs. Equality because rights are possessed by 
all, respect because rights help preserve htnnan dignity and perception of 
connnon needs as rights protect the in::lividual in society. 
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The liberal goal of free development of the in:lividual personality 
i.nplies rights to the resources which allows the in:lividual to develop. 
Rights are always asserted defensively against an in:lividuals private 
interest (Barry 1981:183). over tillle, however, there has been a tren:i to 
raise the importance of rights to the extent that they are ncM 
interpreted as legitimate claillls on the goverrnnent. I divide these new 
exterxied rights into three categories 
Social Rights; '!his includes economic rights, the right 
to education, living wages arrl the basic 
rights that are espoused as needs in 
Maslow's famous Hierachy of Needs. 
Civil Rights: This encompasses the freedom of 
association, novement, expression, for exaITple. 
Political Rights: '!his is the right to vote arrl the 
right to be able to starrl for election. 
However, same of rights which are expourrled today are not really rights 
at all. '!he elaboration of rights usually stem from those who feel they 
have been denied certain "rights" which they are entitled to. Often these 
include racial minorities, homosexuals, women, etc. For instance the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights includes, paid holidays, participation in the 
scientific affairs of one's connnunity, etc. r:rhese are not hl.lltlan rights 
but rights which pertain to institutions arrl particular arrangements 
within a society. However there are other which are included which are 
morally required taking into account the complexity of hl.lltlan life. Among 
these are the right to vote,etc. (Melden 1977:180) 
Similarly Locke specifies few rights outside the three basic rights of 
Life, freedom arrl property. In the same way that he took Biblical 
teaching as a whole, we need to take Locke's teaching as a whole to see 
what other rights his writings support. We need not look for isolated 
sections of Locke's writings to support this or that right. In looking at 
hl.lltlan rights in the light of Locke's political philosophy, we nn.ist 
therefore consider them in relation to his works as a whole. Rights are 
not static. '!hey are not all the same in all places arrl for all time. 
'!he moral rights of 20th Centmy man in Englarrl differs from rights of 
Englishman in 1688. One such exaITple is the right to vote. 
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Romans had citizen rights. In the Biblical text st. Paul was a citizen of 
no actual city, yet he appealed to caesar am Pontius Fester had no 
choice but to sen:l Paul to Rome to appeal against his sentence. One of 
the earliest uses of the tenn Human Rights can be found in the writings 
of Tertullian in AD 212 when he appealed to the Roman Proconsul Scapula 
on the question of religious freedom : "It is a basic furrlamental human 
right, a privilege of nature, that all beings should worship according to 
their own convictions" (as quoted in SWidler 1986:vii). Christian 
Thomasius (1655-1728), made a distinction between natural rights which 
are inherent in man am rights acquired from human law, a distinction I 
will be making in this thesis. 
Philosophers have since divided rights into two categories, namely 
substantive and procedural while the catholic Jacques Maritian in 
particular divided substantive into three categories. These being the 
rights of the human, civic am social person. Procedural rights are 
encapsulated by the rule of law of which A.V. Dicey's 1885 1s exposition 
is the m::>St famous. In principle the rule of law states that when 
formulating legislation, a government must take into account certain 
furrlamental human rights. The m::>St crucial of these is that no one's 
freedom may be restricted without recourse to an indepen:lent judicial 
system. 
The natural rights of man are the basis for all civil rights. According 
to IDcke, civil rights arise from the institutions which are created for 
the preserve of mans natural rights: 
. . . For law in its true notion, is not so much the 
limitation as the direction of a free am intelligent 
agent to his proper interest, am prescribes no farther 
than is for the general good of those under the law. 
Could they be happier without it, as a useless thing, 
would of itself vanish; am that ill deserves the name 
of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs am 
precipices. So that however it may be mistaken , the 
en:l of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to 
preserve, am enlarge freedom. ( s T chap 6 sec 57) 
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'Iherefore law actually enlarges freedom which is one of the basic rights 
of mankin:l. It is logical to accept that the basic rights of ma.nkirrl are 
exparrled to other areas of human experience such as freedom of the body, 
mind and conscience. These extended rights must, however, be in 
accordance and not conflict with other basic or natural rights of life, 
freedom and property. Locke clearly stated that : 
• • • men are naturally in, and that is, a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of 
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within 
the bounds of the law of nature without asking leave or 
depen:ling upon the will of any other man. (S T chap 2 
sec 4) 
Mankin:i therefore has the right to do with himself/herself whatever they 
like provided that it is within the law of nature. such freedom would 
include freedom of occupation, freedom of association, religious freedom, 
to learn and to have pleasure as well as the right to expression or 
freedom of speech •• 
It is the principle of rights, which I believe is the key to Locke's 
political theory. Dennis Davis, a senior lecturer in law at the 
University of cape Town claims that the very notation of Htnnan Rights 
derives from the individualistic liberal theories whose roots can 
generally be traced back to John Locke (Davies 1981: 15). He also claims 
that the theories of Locke, which still penneate today's thoughts on 
Htnnan Rights, are too irrlividualistic and thus have became an anachronism 
in our welfare societies. (Davies 1981:16). However, Davies seems to 
overlook the fact that the welfare state evolved from Locke's theories. 
Pull out Locke' s theories and the concept of a welfare state is 
urrlennined. 
I base this on the fact that in the late nineteenth century, liberalism 
came to realise that the rights of the irrli vidual were meanin:Jless unless 
the irrlividual was in a position to claim them. Illness, poverty, 
misfortune and lack of education were among the factors which hindered 
enjoyment of natural rights. A redistribution of resources by the 
connnunity through the state was seen to be the answer. 'Ihis would mean 
that the state had to provide errployment, or at least unerrployment 
benefits, pensions, education facilities and medical care. 
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"If there are no rights, I.ocke's Treatise must obviously be dismissed as 
meaningless nonsense. On the other ham, if there are rights we need not 
worry too nn.ich about whether I.ocke is correct in all particulars about 
the list of rights which he assigns to men. What is inp:>rtant am. 
valuable about his theo:ry is that he recognises that man is a moral being 
am. that the state, therefore, should be a moral institution". (Jones 
1980:215) One indication of a moral state would be it's adherance to the 
Rule of law. '!his means that no power can be exercised unless it is 
granted by law. Even the most humble citizen would be able to fim 
redress against any other irrespective of that person's status. The Rule 
of law has the effect of entering the rights of the individual. It is 
the legal protection for the rights of the individual to hold minority 
views am express them, to hold property am to have the right to a fair 
trial as is the freedom of the press am fair electoral procedures 
(Wilson 1987: 125) . The United Nations Universal Declarations of Human 
Rights which was referred to earlier in this chapter, has in sections 3 
to 15, specific individual rights. 
Religious tolerance was in many ways the forerunner of wider application 
of Freedom am was the first civil liberty to get widespread approval. 
In fact one of the few rights that I.ocke identifies is that of the 
freedom of worship. The concept of religious freedom was a new concept. 
In fact in AD 212 Tertullian wrote to the Roman Proconsul Scapula "It is 
a fundamental right, a privilege of nature, that all human beings should 
worship according to their own convictions" ( quoted in Swidler 
1986:vii). According to Galston, I.ocke gives five arguments in favour of 
toleration, namely ontological neutralilty, epistemological neutrality, 
character-based neutrality, rights-based neutrality am p:rudential 
neutrality (Galston 1986:3-4), to which I have added a sixth. 
Firstly, he argues that genuine worship requires sincere belief. Because 
genuine worship is required for salvation, any attempt to interfere with 
worship means that there is an atttempt to replace God. No one is able 
to accept responsibility for the beliefs of another am it is outside the 
legitimate powers of a government which are to look after civil 
interests am therefore have no right to interfere with the church : 
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'Ihe corranonweal th seems to ne to be a society of men 
constituted only for the procuring, preseJ:Ving arrl 
advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I 
call life, liberty, heal th arrl irrlolency of body; arrl 
the possession of outwards things such as money, larrls, 
houses, furniture, and the like (A letter on 
Toleration sec 3) 
Secon:lly, I.ocke claims that the state cannot know what is a right opinion 
arrl which is error. 'Ihe state has no objective yardstick arrl therefor 
cannot take sides. 'Ihis does not nean that there is no right or wrong but 
it neans that there is no one on earth that can judge : 
For this would certainly do well enough if she were 
once left to shift for herself. She has not received, 
arrl never will receive, much assistance from the power 
of great men, 'Who do not always recognise or welcome 
her (Secorrl Letter on Toleration as quoted. in Parry 
1978:86) 
In short, the search for true salvation is the irrli vidual' s personal 
affair. Irrlividuals join the church on a voluntary basis just as they 
join any other organisation: 
I.et us now consider what a church is. A church is, 
then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining 
themselves together of their own accord in order to the 
public worshipping of God in such a manner as they 
judge acceptable to Him, arrl effectual to the salvation 
of their souls. I say it is free arrl voluntary society. 
No one is bom a member of a church ... No man by nature 
is bound unto any particular church or sect, but 
everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in 
which he believes he has fourx:l that profession arrl 
worship which is truly acceptable to God. (ibid sec 4) 
No goverrnnent or any other secular power has the right to compel any 
person to belong to a church. Joining a church is the irrlividual 's own 
decision arrl is a private affair of the irrlividual conscience. A decision 
will be bome out of mankirrl' s free desire to publicly worship God. A 
church does not originate from mankirrl trying to be sociable 
It appears not that God has ever given any such 
authority to one man over another as to compel anyone 
to his religion. Nor can such power be vested in the 
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magistrate by the consent of the people, because no man 
can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as 
blin:lly to leave the choice of any other (ibid :3). 
Similarly no one can force a ceremony on a church. '!he actions of a 
church nrust be in accordance with the will of God am not that of sinful 
man. '!he rites am ceremonies of the church are separate from civil 
society am does not concern the world as a 'Whole. No irxlividual has the 
right to meddle am neither does the magistrate have the right, even if 
he is a member of the church : 
Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, 
that the magistrate has no power to enforce by law, 
either in his own church, or nn.ich less in another, the 
use of any rites or ceremonies 'Whatsoever in the 
worship of God. ( ibid :11) 
Thirdly, Locke believed that the self-appointed guardians of orthodoxy 
tended to be more interested in cruelty am the lust for power than a 
love for truth am the desire to save souls. 
Fourthly, Locke turns to a political argurrent 'When he refers to the fact 
that individuals enter civil society to protect their person am 
possessions. '!he state has no further jurisdiction than this : 
the 'Whole jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only 
to their civil Concemrnents (am) neither can nor ought 
in any manner to be exten:ied to the salvation of souls. 
(A letter concerning Toleration as quoted in Galston 
1986:3) 
Fifthly, Locke again turns to a political argurrent 'When he points out 
that histo:ry has shown that 'Whenever there are religious differences am 
the state attempts to bring about unity, it results in unrest am war. 
Finally it is also true that we can never be sure that our own opinion is 
in fact the correct one. Just because another person's religious views 
differ from ours it does not mean he is a heretic 
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We should do well to connniserate our nn.itual ignorance 
and endeavour to remove all it in a gentle and fair 
ways of conununication; and not instantly treat others 
ill as obstinate and perverse because they will not 
renounce their own and receive our opinions ( As 
quoted in O'Conner 1967:225). 
Despite this Locke did not believe in tmlimited freedom of religious 
opinions. Civil magistrates have the right to take action if the 
practises of any religious group pose a threat to the stable order of 
society or if their actions are illegal. Nevertheless where the 
magistrate encroaches into moral behaviour and it is no threat to 
society, this is seen as an injustice. 
He does not exten:i religious freedom to Roman catholics because they CMe 
their allegiance to a foreign nil.er who caused monarchs to lose their 
crown if he chose to exconununicate them. 'Ihis view is lru:gely 
unacceptable nCM as the catholic Church of today no longer has political 
aspirations. Taking into account the situation in Locke's day, it is 
urrlerstarrlable that Locke excluded Roman catholics frcnn any religious 
freedom because they CMe their allegiance to a foreign power, namely the 
Vatican which was thought to pose a threat to British Society. Since the 
Restoration the two kings, Charles and James had both attempted to extend 
the influence of catholics to urrlermine the political power of the 
Anglican clergy. In 1700 an Act Against Popery was passed with the idea 
of preventing the grcMth of papery and to make such an aim to be treason 
against the king and conscience or intellectual freedom but it was 
political an:l related to the extent of civil power over religious 
affairs. In 1659 Locke wrote to Heru:y Stubbe criticizing Stubbe's view 
on allCMing catholics religious freed.am which highlights Locke's concern 
with the safety of the state with regard to catholics: 
'!he only scruple I have is hCM the liberty you grant 
the Papists can consist with the security of the Nation 
(as quoted in van Leyden 1954:21). 
Locke also excluded atheists frcnn toleration. Firstly because a person 
has no right to disbelieve in God since belief in God is the foundation 
of all Morality. Seco:rrlly because they are not obligated to keep their 
word (although Locke does not say why this should be) and will attempt to 
urrlermine religion: 
- 125 -
lastly those are not at all to be tolerated who deny 
the being of God. Promises, covenants arrl oaths, which 
are the bon::ls of human society, can have no hold on an 
atheist. '!he taking away of God, though that by their 
atheism urrlennine, arrl destroy all religion, can have 
no pretence of religion whereupon to c.hallenge the 
privilege of toleration. (A letter concerning 
toleration, page 18). 
Another human right that we can identify in the writings of Locke is that 
of the freedom of the bcxiy. '!his freed.am is an extension to the right to 
life. I base this on the following passage already quoted from Locke 
that states: 
'!hough the earth arrl all inferior be carmnon to all men, 
yet every man has a property in his own person. Nobody 
has the right to but hilnself. (Secom Treatise chap 5 
sec 27). 
I therefore conclude that man not only has a right to life but also to 
his being. Locke also believes that man has a right to happiness 
Nature has put into man a desire for happiness arrl an 
aversion to misery; these are irxieed innate practical 
principles (as quoted in Strauss 1952:226). 
I.eo Strauss in his book "Natural Right arrl Histocy" has restated the 
above quote from Locke as "the desire for happiness arrl pursuit of 
happiness have the character of an absolute right, a natural right" 
(Strauss 1952:226). We can deduce from the fact that Locke saw the 
pursuit of happiness as one of the strongest driving forces in man that 
natural rights have. 'lb be happy, man needs to have certain actions open 
to him. In other words he must have the right to the freed.am of making 
his own choices in his live. He should have the right to marry wham he 
chooses, the freed.am to choose the occupation he desires, freed.am of 
movement, for exan-ple. 
It has already been established that Locke considers all men to be 
equal. As rational creatures created by God, men are equal with one 
another, equal in their entitlements am equal in duties: 
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To un:lerstam political IXJWer aright, arrl derive it 
from its original, we must consider what estate all men 
are naturall in, arrl that is, a state of perfect 
freedom . . . A state also of equality, wherein all the 
IXJWer arrl jurisdiction is reciprocal. No one having 
more power than another, there being nothing more 
evident than that creatures promiscuously born to all 
the same advantages of Nature, arrl the use of the same 
faculties, should also be equal amongst another, 
without subordination or subjection (Secom Treatise 
Clap 2 sec 4). 
It is in this equality of right arrl duty that humans confront each other 
as creatures of Goo. in the State of Nature. '!his can be supported in 
scripture in Job 31:13-15: ''When one of my servants complained against 
Ire, I would listen arrl treat him fairly. If I did not, how could I face 
Goo.? What could I say when Goo. came to judge Ire? 'Ihe same Goo. who 
created Ire created my servants. " Therefore all are created equal. 
From the state of nature Jahn I.ocke builds his version of equal autonomy 
among subjects. The reason why men are equal is their shared position in 
the nonnative order, the order of creation. I have already touched on 
the fact that Jahn I.ocke speaks of his right of every man by the labour 
of his body arrl the work of his harrls to acquire larrl arrl other property 
which are not already owned by another. The reality is that there is a 
division of labour in society arrl that larrl is not equally distributed 
yet it must be possible for every man to receive his due in such a way 
that it provides autonomy for all. This autonomy principle was based on 
irrlividuals as ems in themselves. Every irrli vidual has a duty to be 
selfreliant arrl help others to become so. No man is entitled to property 
if that property infringes upon the rights of others, nor can an 
irrlividual take more than he can use so that others may also obtain it 
through their labour. 
Despite his affinnation to equality, I.ocke quite happily accepts the 
inequalities of his day: 
Master arrl servant are names as old as history, but 
given to those far different corrlition; for a free man 
makes himself a servant to another by selling him for a 
certain time the service he undertakes to do in 
exchange for wages he is to recover; arrl though this 
commonly puts him in to the family of his master, arrl 
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un:ier the ordinary discipline thereof, yet it gives the 
master but a temporacy power over him, and no greater 
than what is contained in the contract between them. 
there is another sort of SeJ:Vant which we by a peculiar 
name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just 
war, are by right of nature, subjected to the absolute 
dominion and arbitracy power of their master. 'Ihese men 
having, as I say, forfeited their lives and, with it, 
their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in 
the state of slavery, not capable of any property, 
cannot in that state be considered as any pert of civil 
society, the chief errl whereof is the preservation of 
property. (ST chap 7 sec 85) 
In the above passage Locke accepts the position of a slave quite happily. 
Today there are few who could morally deferrl the position of a slave. 
Why does Locke corx:ione such action? The answer is that Locke was a man 
of his times. In my opinion Locke did not consider every one to be 
totally equal. He quite clearly states: 
That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed 
to un:ierstarx:i all sorts of equality. Age or virtue may 
give men a just precedency. Excellency of parts and 
merit may place others above common level. Birth may 
subject some, and alliance or benefit others, to pay 
obsel:vance to those to whom nature, gratitude or other 
respects may have made its due... (Secom Treatise 
chap 6 sec 54). 
Therefore despite the fact that within the state of nature, all men are 
created equal, we firx:i that as men can:y out their irx:iividual lives in 
the societies in which they firx:i themselves change and extend in time. As 
this occurs so inequalities appear. 
Freedom of Speech is a true Lockean concept which, like so many other 
twentieth century rights, did not receive actual attention from I.ocke. 
Nowhere do we firx:i any reference to this concept in his writings. 
However toleration would seem to ilrply that nankin:i has the right . to 
express their views and convictions without fear. This, to me, is in 
fact freedom of speech which in today's world would extend into freedom 
of the press and the ability to question the government. However freedom 
of speech and enquicy cannot be without restraint as the privacy of 
irx:iividuals must be respected. 
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I..ocke clearly believed in a freedom of economic pursuit arrl a freedom in 
the use of money : 
In domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in 
matters of bodily heal th, every man is entitled to 
consider what suits his own convenience, arrl follow 
whatever course he judges best. No man complains of 
the bad management of his neighbours affairs. No man is 
angry with another for an error committed in sowing his 
lands or marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a 
sperxithrift for consuming his substance in taverns. I.et 
any man pull down, or build, or incur whatever he 
pleases, nobody murmners, nobody forbids him (Secorrl 
Letter on Toleration page 89 as quoted in Parry 
1978:87). 
Political freedom means the power to take part in the political process. 
Since the times of Mary Tudor the English had been in fear of the Roman 
catholic Church once again reaching a dominant position in Englarrl. 'Ihis 
would have put the country in danger of becoming subject to a foreign 
power. This threat was at its height during the Spanish Annada. Locke 
followed this thought when he claimed that catholics owe their allegiance 
to a foreign ruler who caused monarchs to lose their crown if he chose to 
excarmnunicate them. Although it is an unacceptable view today, it is 
quite understandable that Locke excludes Raman catholics from any 
political office as they owe their allegiance to a foreign power, namely 
the Vatican. 
Today this argument is not valid because al though the Pope is the head of 
an irrleperrlent 'Iheocratic state he does not have political power over 
catholics outside the Vatican. However there have been those who use 
I..ocke' s approach to catholicism to justify the banning of comnrunist 
parties on the basis that carmnunist owe their allegiance to Moscow 
(O'Conner 1967:214). On the same page O'Conner continues "· .here is an 
awkward dilemma which I..ocke does not discuss. If we tolerate a religious 
or political sect which does not itself tolerate opinions at variance 
with its own, we may soon firrl that sect dominant in our society". Yet 
I..ocke does maintain that anything which threatens the stability of the 
state cannot have unlimited freedom. This concept is fourrl where Locke 
is dealing with the toleration of atheists: 
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. . . if they do not tend to establish domination over 
others, or civil impunity to the Church in which they 
are taught, therefore there can be no reason why they 
should be not tolerated ( A letter concerning 
toleration page 18). 
'Iherefore the individual has a right to political freedom provided he 
does not threaten society. 
Political freedom means that the individual has the right to an education 
which enables a person to express points of view and also has the right 
to obtain honest news so that infonned political decisions can be taken. 
In today's societies and especially in third world countries the right to 
erlucation is a predominant right. 
So far it would seem that all rights being claimed in the late twentieth 
centw:y not only have their fourrlation in Locke but that Locke directly 
or indirectly supports each claim. However, this is not the case. In 
today's society, health has became a right claimed by the individual from 
the state. Fram the above it would seem that this is a reasonable right 
to claim. However, if we read his Letter on Toleration, Lcx::ke clearly 
shows that he considers the heal th of the individual to be outside the 
concern of the State: 
'Ihe care, therefore, of every man's soul belongs to 
himself, and is to be left to him. You will say: What 
if he neglects his soul? I will answer: What if he 
neglect the care of his heal th or his estate, things 
which more nearly concern the government or the 
magistrate? Shall the magistrate provide by an express 
law against such man becoming poor or sick? laws 
en::leavour, as far as possible, to protect the goods and 
the health of subjects from violence of others, or from 
fraud, not from negligence or prodigality of the owners 
themselves. No man against his will can be forced to 
be heal thy or rich ( A Second Letter concerning 
Toleration page 91 as Quoted in Parry 1978:87) 
Parry takes the above passage to mean that Locke would be against a 
national health scheme or a national pension furrl. But if Locke is a man 
of his times, as we seem to think then I do not think that he would 
oppose such schemes in today's society. 
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The list of human rights claimed today are endless but in this section I 
have attempted to address the most important human rights which have some 
origination in I.ockes writings. Today human rights start, as they did 
with Locke, with the recognition of human life. However, this goes 
further than Locke in recognising the whole an:l total human person. I 
includes their physical an:l emotional needs, health, personal dignity, 
freedom to live their lives to the full an:l so that they can make a 
contribution to society. 
4. 7 OPREITICN 'ID CDVERNMENl' 
Power is entrusted to a govenunent by the people so that it could be used. 
to protect their property. When the govenunent abuses this trust the 
people are entitled to take action. When considering what action is open 
to the people in terms of Locke's writings, we can follow a progressive 
move in earnestness an:l detennination. Firstly the in:lividual can 
re,qister a protest through the action of leaving the countcy an:l starting 
a new life elsewhere. Should a person be unable to emigrate or choose 
not to do so, he may protest by embarking on a disobedience cairpaign. 
This involves breaking unjust laws by ignoring them, but excludes 
violence. Finally the m:,st serious protest is through violence which 
leads to revolution am the overthrow of the rulers. Al though this 
applies to the people as a whole it applies equally to the in:lividual. I 
believe that the in:li vidual oppressed by the government has a right to 
disobey their cammarrls, break their laws, rebel an:l replace the leader. 
Locke considered emigration as a necessary corrlition of legitimate power 
as it gives each citizen the choice of rulers. 
Except for God, Locke regards the legislature as supreme although it is 
obliged to rule in accordance with the law of nature. The authority to 
make laws was delegated by the people. The legislature therefore cannot 
han:i over this authority to others. If the government tries to pass on 
the power of making laws to others, the people have a right to act 
against the government as it has then iooved beyorxi its powers. 
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The authority of the legislature is but a trust to be used for the 
presei:vation of the civil society. If this aim is neglected or opposed, 
the people then have the supreme power to dismiss or change the 
legislature. Therefore the supreme power to remove or alter the 
legislature remains with the people, when they firrl the legislature has 
acted contrary to the trust placed in it. If there is a conflict then it 
is up to the people to reinstate the legislature even if this means 
using force. Rebellion against a tyranny is no offence. It must not be 
construed, however that the supreme power of the people means that the 
people have legal sovereignty. 'Ihis overriding power is do:nnant arrl can 
only be activated when the goverrnnent is dissolved. 
A goverrnnent is not free to do as it pleases, the law of nature is for 
all people. It is up to the people to ensure that this law is preserved. 
'!he irrlividual needs to be protected against interference in his liberty 
arrl property by the goverrnnent. If it is broken then the people have the 
right to rebel. If a goverrnnent acts tyrannically, it is the government 
which is guilty of rebellion arrl not the subjects who resist it (Yelton 
1969: 54) . '!here is no justification needed for the revolution. It is not 
the people who have rebelled but the goverrnnent: 
And whosoever in Authority exceeds the power given to 
him by the raw, arrl makes use of that force he has 
urrler his connnand, to compass that upon the subject, 
which law allows, not, ceases in that to be a 
magistrate, and acting without authority, may be 
opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the 
right of another (ST chap 18 sec 202). 
I..ocke continues in the next chapter: 
The reason why men enter into society is the 
preservation of their property ... whenever the 
legislatures endeavour to take away arrl destroy the 
property of the people, or reduce them to slavery under 
art:>itrary power, they put themselves into a state of 
war with the people, who are thereupon absolute from 
any farther obedience, arrl are left for all men against 
force arrl violence. (ST chap 19 sec 222). 
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When the goverrnnent is charged with tyranny, neither Parliament nor any 
court is entitled to settle the dispute. (Franklin 1978:95). '!he 
people, however, are entitled to protect what is rightfully theirs. That 
is, their rights as under the state of nature. Urxier the law of nature 
Locke has stated that one must preserve one's own life am in order to do 
that it is important to respect the rights of others to do likewise. 
Locke goes further, however, to point out that it is the duty of the 
individual to come to the assistance of others who have their 
preservation threatened. '!he only restraining factor is that the person 
going to assist does not put his life at risk. 'lhis means of course that 
where a member of society is being oppressed or his inalienable rights 
are threatened then others in society must assist even when this results 
in the overthrow of the rulers. 'lhis action can be only by the majority 
othexwise society will fall to ruin. A minority has a right to persuasion 
only. Monarchs, rulers or leaders are as sinful as the next person and 
sooner or later the power conferred upon them will be abused. '!his 
leads to revolution. 
NrJ breach of trust by the ruling power gives the people the right to 
revolt arxi to change the fonn of the goverrnnent itself if necessary. 
'!his does not mean, however, that every little fault perceived in the 
goverrnnent should give rise to rebellion: 
revolutions happen not upon every little 
mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the 
ruling party, many wrongs arxi inconvenient laws, am 
all the slips of htnnan frailty will be borne by the 
people without mutiny or murmur. . . . ( ST chap 19 
sec 225) 
But where people are confronted with a calculated design to subvert its 
constitution arxi reduce it to a state of seJ:Vitude, revolution is 
appropriate 
But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, am 
artifices, all ten::ling the same way, make the design 
visible to the people, am they cannot but feel what 
they lie under, am see wither they are going, it is 
not to be 'WOn:iered that they should rouse themselves, 
arxi en:ieavour to put the rule into such harrls which may 
secure to them such ems for which goverrnnent was art 
first erected ••• (ST chap 19 sec 225) 
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Urrler any of the above con:litions, the consequence is a state of war 
between the government arrl the canununity. In the aftermath, the conununity 
can choose whatever fonn of government best suits it's needs arrl is 
released from all obligation to the fonner government 
When the goverrnnent is dissolved, the people are at 
liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new 
legislative differing from the other by the change of 
persons, or fonn, or both, as they shall firrl it most 
for their own safety arrl good. (ST chap 19 sec 220) 
At no stage, however, did Locke ever suggest that dissolution would ever 
result in a reversion to a state of nature. In fact he in:licated just 
the opposite 
'Ihe power that eve:cy in:li vidual gave the society when 
he entered into it can never revert to the in:lividual 
again, as long as society lasts, but will always remain 
in canununity •• (ST chap 19 sec 243) 
The right of people to judge whether they have a just cause to make their 
appeal to heaven (ie. to launch a revolution) belongs to them by a law 
antecedent arrl paramount to all positive laws of men ( Gough 1969:21). 
However, there are those who will · attempt to rebel whether they have a 
just cause or not arrl they, according to Locke, are the most guilty 
Whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about 
to invade the rights of either prince or people, arrl 
lays the fourrlation for overtunring the constitution 
arrl frame of any just government, he is guilty of the 
greatest crime I think man is capable of. (ST chap 19 
sec 231) 
If we followed Hobbes' theo:cy on a single contract for the establishment 
of a political society arrl government, then the overthrow of the 
government means the dissolution of the political society in question. 
Locke's two contract theories, however, mean that the overthrow of the 
government leaves the political society intact arrl a new goverrnnent can 
be set up. Obviously if the society is dissolved, then the ruler ceases 
to rule. 
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. . . distinguish between the dissolution of the society 
and the dissolution of government... Whenever the 
society is dissolved it is certain the government of 
that society cannot remain. (ST chap 19 sec 211). 
Locke also concluded that when people are forced to submit to the 
government of their conquerors, their descen:lants have a right to 
overthrow the alien government to regain their property. Here Locke 
comes un:ler criticism for not differentiating between the right of the 
in:ii vidual to his property and the claim of the goverrnnent to establish 
political power on conquest. (Gough 1969:89) 
Locke's theory of dissolution was rejected by his contemporaries, 
nevertheless Locke held fast to his concepts. He knew that he had found 
the only solution to the problem of resistance in a mixed constitution. 
Locke had anticipated this ... -ejection and had sought to reassure them that 
people did not change easily and therefore would return to a similar fonn 
of constitution: 
"'Ihis slowness and aversion in the people to quit their 
old constitutions has, in the many revolutions which 
have been seen in the Kingdom, ... still brought us back 
again to our old legislative of Kirg, Lords and 
Cc::mtm::>ns: Arx:i whatever provocations have made the Crown 
to be taken from same of our Princes heads, they never 
carried the People so far,as to place it in another 
line" (ST chap 19 sec 223). 
Locke was also aware that his thesis was dangerous and therefore he 
concealed his authorship even from his closest frierrls. 
It is true that the Whigs of Locke's day wanted major institutional 
changes. '!hey were fearful that the Kirg would subvert parliament. '!his 
was another motive for Locke's persistence in his view of dissolution. He 
was not afraid in 1689 to have a national convention to assert 
constituent authority. He was in favour of one to enact constitutional 
refonns that he considered in:iispensable as guarantees to public liberty. 
(Franklin 1978:117) In a letter to Edward Clark, Locke wrote 
"An opportunity offered to firrl remedies and set up a 
constitution that may be lasting, for the security of 
the civil right, and the liberty and property of all 
the subjects of the nation. 'Ihese are thoughts worthy 
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such a convention as this, which, if ( as men suspect 
here) they think of themselves in parliament, arrl put 
themselves into the slow Irethod of proceeding therein 
... they will let slip an opportunity". 
Despite the use of I.ocke' s theories to justify violent revolution, Locke 
did not support violence to retain rights: 
All the rights arrl franchises that belong to him as a 
man, or as a denizen, are inviolably to be presaved by 
him. No violence nor injury is to be offered to him 
{LT page 6). 
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5. THEOPOLITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
5.1 SINCE 1945 
Liberalism has been slowly losing groun:i since its heyday of the late 
19th Century arrl early 20th Century. It has became fragmented arrl is 
often merely a defence for the status quo. 'Ihe resurgence of Marxism in 
the 1970 arrl 1980' s has not been helpful to liberalism. It is also 
attacked from the right as being weak arrl ineffective. Conservative 
World Leaders such as Ronald Reagan have done nothing to enhance the 
stature of Liberalism. Even Mrs. 'Ihatcher who has been identified as 
part of the New Right which sprung from Classic Liberalism, has tried to 
dismantle many citizenship rights arrl reintroduce social discipline. But 
both these approaches have gone too far. I believe that Marxist 
countries will have to firrl a way to reintroduce civil liberties arrl the 
Conservative powers will have to firrl a way to introduce limited 
ownership. 'Ihese two m::wes would bring both factions closer to what John 
I.ocke was hying to teach. 
over the past few decades there has been a shift from liberalism to 
socialism both within the democratic framework as well as without. While 
it is tru.e that John I.ocke can be seen as the father of Liberalism, this 
ideology is only one aspect of his 'Iheopolity. So while liberalism as a 
whole has declined, I.ocke's 'Iheopolity with its cornerstone of Rights has 
gradually, since 1945, been in the ascent. 'Iheopolity thus transcends 
ideologies. '!his modern renewal of 'Iheopolity has had a new tendency 
toward a non-Marxist, democratic socialism. 
Arguably the New Right has been the dominant Political Ideology of the 
1980's. While the New left of the 1960's arrl early ?O's attacked the 
principles of liberalism, the New Rights has actually adopted the values 
of Classic Liberalism. '!he New left opposed the liberal tendency towards 
materialism and it's defence of property. It also accused the 
individualism of Liberalism of setting irrli vidual against irrli vidual 
which in effect divided society thus making the irrlividual open to 
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nanipulation am control by the State. With respect to consent which is a 
hall.lllark of Locke's 'Iheopolity, the New Left maintains that this is given 
by the people only because they have been socialised am irrlootrinated in 
the values of the liberal industrial society. 
'Ihe New Right on the other harrl has modified the principles of 20th 
Centucy Liberalism in two ways which I believe brings it closer to 
wcke's 'Iheopolity with it's emphasis on freedom am irrlividualism. 
Firstly it has taken equal opportunity to become relative equal 
opportunity. In his Second Treatise chap 6 sec 54, Locke accepted that, 
despite the fact that within the state of nature all irrlividuals are 
created equal, inequalities appear as mankind carries out their 
irrlividual lives. '!hey then use their relative powers to obtain what 
they want, need or desire. Because of their inequality nCM, they only 
have cc:nrparative equality of opportunity. 
Secondly the New Right claims that while irrlividuals have a right to the • 
protection of their property and while each irrlividual must have 
responsibility to their neighbour, this does not mean that the irrlividual 
is responsible for their neighbour's well being. For instance, one person 
should not be taxed to subsidise another. I consider this to be in line 
with Locke's thoughts, as nowhere that I could discover, did IDcke 
actually suggest that one person's possessions could be taken to be given 
to another, even if the second person was in need. Locke did teach, 
hCMever that one should not appropriate possessions at the expense of 
another. But even while this may have been relevant in Locke's day, the 
impact is lost in the Twentieth Centucy economy. 
It is on these grounds that I maintain that John Locke is as relevant for 
today as he ever was am that the IOOVement in the area of irrlividual 
rights throughout the world am the emergence of the New Right in 
Britain, is a virrlication of the practical nature of Locke's 'Iheopolity. 
While it may or may not be tru.e that liberalism has nCM reached its 
nadir, the new interest in Locke generated by Nozick am others again 
sh.CMS that Locke's political theories are not merely liberal ideology. In 
reality I believe that Locke's 'Iheopolity does not rest on what ideology 
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a government has as it's official policy but is interested in ensuring 
that Basic Rights are upheld. To this extent we need to see the relevance 
of Locke's theories for today by examining the world response to Human 
Rights. 
'!he centrality of HLnnan Rights in politics has, since Locke, continued to 
play a key role in the political history of countries. '!he first was 
possibly the Declaration of Independence in America dated 1776. While 
Locke's natural rights were life, liberty am property, the Declaration 
listed rights as being life, liberty am the pursuit of happiness thus 
omitting Locke's most controversial right, property. '!he Declaration so 
followed Locke in acknowledging that these rights had been endowed upon 
man by God. In 1789 the French national Assembly endorsed the 
Declaration of Rights of man am of citizens which listed basic rights as 
liberty, property, security am resistance of oppression. '!his was 
further from Locke but not without Lockean influence. It also moved away 
from Locke in its origin of these rights. It claims (as quoted in Melden 
1979:185) "in the presence of the SUpreme Being' that there are certain 
"sacred rights of men am citizens". 
'!his early appreciation of human rights in the 18th Century has been seen 
as the first generation of human rights am dubbed Civil Liberties by the 
French Jurist Karel Vasak. Taking its cue from Locke, these rights terrled 
to be negative. In other words they dealt with freedom from the 
interference of others. '!his covered equality in law am government by 
consent. '!he second generation of rights find their origin in the social 
traditions am Marxian socialism of the next century. Based on equality, 
they refer to economic, social am cultural rights. 'Ihese include the 
rights to housing, employment, medical care am welfare. '!hey are m::>re 
positive than the first generation but less practical. Since 1945 rights 
have moved into a m::>re nebulous am controversial area of rights which 
cover the environment, peace, for example. These are known as 
Solidarity Rights. '!his third generation of rights has included, 
however, the practical rights for workers, women am minorities. 
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'!he forerunner of the conterrporai:y trern. towards Rights and Human rights 
was perllaps President Rooseveldt's Four Freedoms proclaimed to the United 
States Congress in 1941. '!he freedom which he advcx::ated was a freedom of 
expression and speech, freedom to worship God, freedom from want and a 
freedom from fear. '!his freedom is not far from the freedom that I..ocke 
espoused. In fact Bertram Russell wrote in 1946 "Ever since his time, 
those who considered themselves refonners have been divided into two 
groups, those who followed him (Rousseau) and those who followed I..ocke. 
Saootimes they co-operated, and many inlividuals saw no incompatibility. 
But gradually the incompatibility has becaire increasirqly evident. At 
the present time, Hitler is the outcome of Rousseau; Rooseveldt and 
Churchill, of I.ocke" (as quoted in Wright 1978:161). 
The holocaust in Nazi Gennany and the secorrl World War with it's 
destnlction of 6 million Jews and other minorities, led to the formation 
of the United Nations. After it's establishment, Churchill remarked that 
its sirqle most ilnportant task was to enthrone Human Rights. The 
euphoria generated by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948 and the gradual de-colonisation of the still colonised countries 
gave rise to renewed thinking related to Natural raw (Crowe 1977:251). 
'Ibis Declaration, from which South Africa and Saudi Arabia abstained, 
was somewhat generous in its inclusions. '!he classic small list of 
essential rights had grown into a large burrlle of rights. Besides 
economic rights, human rights expanded to include the right to leisure, 
rest holidays with pay, for example. Many of these rights, as I have 
already pointed out, relate to institutional matters and not to human 
beirqs. '!he Declaration failed to identify the origin of these rights. 
However the major author of the Declaration, Rene cassi.m, lcx::ates it's 
ideological roots in the Ten Conunandments of the Old Testament. 
(Montgomery 1986:30). 
In Europe there arose a parallel reaction to the inhumanities of the 
Second World War. In 1950 European states ratified the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This has led to possibly the m::>St effective 
implementation of Human Rights as it has a tribunal which is able to make 
legal resolutions and judgement. It has been stated that this system is 
the best yet established in our imperfect world. Part of it's success 
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nn.ist be due to the shared values of the European States, all of them 
deriving their legal systems from biblically based carmnon law and moral 
orientated. from scripture. (Montgomecy 1986:44) 
However, the inunense physical and moral destruction wrought by the Secom 
Wolrd War not only resulted. in renewed interest in Htnnan Rights, but it 
also refuted. many of the political illuusions held by both the right and 
left wing revolutionaries. For instance Europe showed a turn about 
towards more realistic urxierstarrling of political freedom and human 
dignity as well as the moral values of derrocracy. '!his upsurge of 
basically Lockean thought was boosted. by an unprecedented. economic 
resw::gence of the Western European economy. 
Europe was not the only continent effecte-::i by the War and from 1945 
onwards, I.ocekean thought once again became a focal point in world 
politics. cyril Connolly wrote, ''While we re-live the horrors of the 
O:rrk Ages, of absolute states and ideological wars, the old platitudes of 
liberalism loam up in all their glory, familiar streets as we reel home 
furious in the dawn" but this new liberalism was "a betrayal perpetrated 
and erxiorsed by people who claimed to be liberals inheriting and i.nvokirq 
the traditions of I.ocke ••• " (Al:blaster 1984:310). However this 
negative and conservative revival of liberalism and I.ockean thought in 
the 1950's and 60's has given way to a different type of revival since 
the late 60's. 
Since the late 60 's, in:li vidual rights have been exterxied to national and 
gra.Jp rights. In 975 the General Assembly of the United. Nations adopted 
a resolution which referred to inalienable national rights in respect of 
the Palestinian people. 
Another milestone in the history of Htnnan Rights was also written in 1975 
when Romania signed the Helsinki Agreement. '!his agreement was a 
Declaration on security and co-operation and part of it read "'Ihe 
participating states will respect human rights and furxiamental freedoms 
of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, l~ge or religion". Yet Romania has continued to 
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close church buildings and suspend ministers and made i.ndi viduals sear 
loyalty to the internal policies of the conmrunist party. All this 
despite the un:iertakings in the Helsinki Document. (Scott 1983:2). 
'Iherefore pieces of paper with guarantees of rights are meaningless 
unless the govennnent of the day actively follows its un:iertakings. '!he 
plethora of conferences and treaties has still not resolved the practical 
boun:iaries of Human Rights and how to ensure that govennnents adhere to 
their guarantees of rights. Often these C01.mtries treat those who claim 
human rights as being subversive resulting in punishment and sometimes 
death. It seems that since 1945 the violation of Human Rights has 
increased both geographically and ideologically. 
Not all countries ignore their un:iertakings. The United states of 
America reached its zenith in tems of Human Rights with the presidency 
of Ji.nutty carter. Not only did carter deman:l human rights in his own 
COl.ll1tl:y, but also attenpted to "encourage" other C01.mtries to follow. 
The three criteria that Cyrus Vance deman:led in his foreign Policy was 
firstly the right to be free frarn govennnental violation of the integrity 
of the person. Secon:ily there is the right to the fulfillment of such 
vital needs as fcx:xi, shelter, health care and education. Finally he 
deman:led the right to enjoy civil and political liberties. However, 
reality fell far short of the aspiration. 
America was not alone in its quest for global respect for Human Rights. 
In the same year that Cyrus Vance outlined American foreign Policy, David 
CMen did the same for Britain. He maintained that Britain would take a 
stand for human rights for there could be no peace or stability without 
human rights being honoured. 
Arguably the m:,st i.Irportant development in the post 1945 era was the 
inclusion of economic issue in Human Rights. Same 12 years after 
Roosevelts's four freed.ams, Lin Sao-<ll.'i, a Chinese politician, gave his 
own four freed.ams which resulted in his expulsion from his political 
party by Mao Tsi 'I\lng. '!his tbne freedom meant a freed.am to rent and sell 
land, freedom to hire labour, freedom to ergage in sideline economic 
pursuits and freedom to lerrl money at interest. 
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Besides being a right to economic freedom, the freedoms advocated by Lin 
Sao-<ll' i, amounted to the right of private property, a concept which 
Locke had advocated over 250 years earlier. 
In 1971 Jahn Rawls published his "A 'Iheory of Justice" which was critical 
to the revival of the social contract theory. One of his critics Robert 
Nozick made an equally significant contribution in his book 'Anarchy, 
state arrl Utopia' . 'Ihe Human Rights is central to Nozick' s theory which 
is based on Locke's concept of minimal govennnent. Nozick also succeeded 
in reviving Locke's concept of freedom. 'Ihese two American Fhilosophers 
both atte:rrpt to discover a just social order. 'Ihe dispute between these 
two authors over the nature of a just social order, seems to have the 
starrling of the conflict between Hobbes arrl Locke. 
In 1932 the 300th Anniversary of the birth of Locke was celebrated. At 
that time Locke was not considered to be a political thinker who 
attracted much notice for originality or who had created new or radical 
ideas. In fact in that same year the celebration of the birth of Spinoza 
attracted much Il'Ore attention (Petzall 1937:5). "As a political th.inker 
Locke has got today many disciples or admirers, arrl he does not even earn 
the kin:i of sniggering admiration often bestowed on Hobbes. (As a 
straight philosopher, of course, the fourrler of Il'Odern empiricist school, 
Locke is still widely acclaimed)" (Berki 1977:148). Berki also writes 
"'Ihere is a certain amount of notoriety attaching to Locke's views, 
partly on accotmt of his notion of private property arrl partly on account 
of his obfuscations in his descriptions of civil obligation" (Berki 
1977: 146) . In writing this Berki urrl.erestimated the recent revival in 
Lockean Fhilosophy. 
The revival is largely attributable to Robert Nozick, the American 
philosopher who in 197 4 published "Anarchy, State arrl Utopia". D.mn 
claims that it is only in the last few decades that aspects of Locke are 
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being un:lerstood due to the works of Richard Aaron, Hans Aarsleff, Fhilip 
Abrams, Richard Ashcraft, M. Ayers, Peter laslett, Rayrnorrl Polin, James 
Tully, C.A. Viano, John Yelton and in particular W. von Leyden (D.mn 
1979:192) To D..mn's list I would add C.B. Macpherson as well as D.mn 
himself. In 1977 Sir Frederick Pollock could write "(I.ocke's Two 
Treatises) are probably the most ilrportant contribution ever made to 
English Constitutional I.aw by an author who was not a lawyer by 
profession" (crowe 1977:241). 
Bertram Russell (1872-1970), the English philosopher and atheist, wrote 
in 1945 "'!he only philosophy that affords a theoretical justification of 
derrocracy in its temper of mind, is empiricism. I.ocke, who may be 
regarded, so far as the modern world is concerned, as the founder of 
~iricism, makes it clear how closely this is connected with his views 
on liberty and toleration . . . he opposed a piecemeal and patchwork 
political doctrine, to be tested at each point by its success in 
practice. (Quoted in Ebenstein 1957:17). Russell queried whether, as 
Rawls did two decades later, the state of nature is not just an 
illustrative hypothesis rather than a historical fact. Russell then 
points out that I.ocke' s theory is nothing but a repetition of medieval 
scholastic doctrine. Russell quotes 'Ihamas Aquinas "Eve:ry law framed by 
mankin:i bears the character of a law exactly to that extent to which is 
derived from the law of nature." (Quoted in Ebenstein 1957:308). Russell 
sees I.ocke as a clear writer although he was not clear about why I.ocke 
wrote it. Russell queried I.ocke's theory outside the influence of 
theology. I.ocke saw that the moral rules had been laid down by God and 
are to be found in the Biblical Text. As an atheist, Russell disagrees. 
Sir Karl Popper has made an extensive study of the scientific method and 
applied it to Political 'Iheory. Among those he attacked in his book "'!he 
Open society and its enemies" (1945) were Plato, Hegel and Marx. I.ocke 
advocated minimal goverrnnent with its main function to being the negative 
duty of protecting life, liberty and possessions based on the fact that 
men have natural rights. '!he right to the greatest possible freedom is 
secorrl only to the right to life. In his book, Popper states " What do 
we demarrl from the state? What do we propose to consider as the 
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legitimate aim of the state? Why do we prefer to live in a well ordered. 
state to living without a state, i.e. in anarchy? . . . I am perfectly 
ready to see my own freedom of action somewhat curtailed by the state, 
provided I can obtain protection from that freedom which remains" (Quoted. 
in De Crespigny 1975: 162) • Popper agrees with Locke that niankind is 
willing to forfeit same of his freedom to the state in order that the 
state can then protect the freedom that he still has. Protection of 
Locke's other two fundamental rights, namely, Life and Possessions is 
just as much a part of the deal according to Popper. 
Hans Aarsleff complains that scholarship on Locke has been severely 
hampered by the deplorable state of Lockean texts. (Yelton 1969:270). A 
major recent step in this regard has been brought about by the 1960 
edition of Locke's 'Iwo Treatise of Government by Peter Iaslett. Also 
there have been a mnnber of previously unpublished manuscripts from the 
Lovelace collection which were rediscovered in 1935. The ITK:>St important 
publication, in terns of this thesis, has beeri · the publishing of a 
manuscript dealing with the law of nature. This was translated and 
published by W. von Leyden of D.rrh.am urrler the title of Essays on the raw 
of nature in 1954. 
A year earlier, in 1953 I.eo Strauss wrote "Natural Rights and History". 
In this work he argued that Hobbes and Locke were both teaching the same 
doctrines. Strauss claimed that we need to break the Hobbesian code in 
Locke's works to overcame the illogicalities of Locke's position. This 
was later rejected by Raymond Polin in his book "Ia Politique Morale de 
John Locke" (1960) and ITK:>St .scholars since 1955 have rejected it (Bluhm 
1980:414). Strauss' more radical proposal was that Locke cannot have 
recognised the law of nature in the proper use of the tenn. This theme 
was continued same seven years later, in Richard Cox's book "Locke on war 
and peace". Strauss also states that the language of traditional natural 
law must be cleared to reveal an inti vidualistic theory of natural 
rights. Here Strauss agrees with the Marxist interpretation of Locke by 
Professor C.B. Macpherson. (Parry 1978:12). 
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I.ocke had ai:gued that God had given all the fruits of the earth to all 
humankind and there was originally no private property. I..ocke' s 
irrlividualistic theory claimed that right to property came from man's 
labour. Fram this stems the labour theory of value. Certainly it is 
quite urrlerstarrlable that Harold Iaski arrl C.B. Macpherson interpret 
I.ocke in a socialist mold. I.ocke has, more than any other theorist, had 
Marxist assunptions read into his work. 'Ibis is because his 'Iheopolity 
has all the oourgeois freedoms such as consent, rights, moral supremacy 
of the irrlividual, for example (Koerner 1985:59). C.B. Macpherson, a 
canadian Political Scientist, has published a mnnber of influential books 
including "'!he political theory of Possessive Irrlividualism : Hobbes to 
I.ocke" written in 1962 which Dmn called "racy arrl trenchant . . . (an:i) 
• . • the most noteworthy attelrpt to explain the irrlividualistic character 
of I.ocke's political theory (Dmn 1979:22). 
Macpherson maintains that Locke supports a dictatorship of the 
oourgeoise. He further postulates that I.ocke claimed that the propertied 
and the nonproductive persons differed even to the extent of 
rationality. While I.ocke did have a low opinion of the poor arrl ignorant 
masses we cannot automatically assume that I.ocke did not want to extend 
the franchise to all. Macpherson also believes that I.ocke restricts his 
conception of people to Bourgeoise capitalists who of course would 
preserve those rights which are a necessity to maintaining their economic 
system. In other words it was only certain classes of people who had 
inalienable rights. (Spitz 1984:115) Macpherson claims that I..ocke 
justifies even unlimited appropriation. Macpherson' s interpretation of 
I.ocke has been put urrler the microscope by a number of critics such as 
Berlin in "Hobbes, I.ocke arrl Professor Macpherson", Viner in "Possessive 
Irrlividualisms as original sin", Ryan in "I.ocke arrl the Dictatorship of 
the Bourgeoise", Tully arrl others. 
Richard Aaron points out that it was up to Dr. Seliger,a political 
professor from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, to differ with 
Macpherson. In his book "'!he liberal politics of John I.ocke" (1968), 
Seliger outlines his dissatisfaction with Macpherson' s argument on the 
basis that he (Macpherson) neglects many of John I.ocke' s assurrptions in 
his argument. Aaron, himself, disagrees with Macpherson' s contention 
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that I.ocke is the father of bourgeois capitalist philosophy and I.ocke' s 
main aim was to justify a capitalist's unlimited appropriation of 
property. He also rejects the claim that I.ocke tried to show that the 
capitalist property owner is rational and moral in his behaviour. (Aaron 
1971:362). Dr. Seliger continued to show that I.ocke considered mankirrl 
to know what an ideal society should be like but the true face of society 
is shown not by mankirrl' s acceptance of govemment but also by the 
possible rejection of government and dissolution of society itself. 
Seliger also maintains that I.ocke did not believe in a universal 
franchise, although he believed in universal dissent. In my opinion, 
Aaron has overlooked an earlier critic, Jacob Viner of Princeton, who was 
much harsher in his views which were published in 1963. Viner wrote in a 
review article and in a follow up counter rej oirxier that Macpherson 
ignored I.ocke's use of the word property which he used in a wide sense to 
cover life, liberty and estate and that the right to property always 
carried with it an obligation to help those in need. In the words of 
David Miller from Nuffield College in Oxford "I.ocke's outlook, therefore, 
rather than confonning in its entirety to the IOC>del of possessive 
irxiividualism, displays some traditionalist features and other - his 
concern for the rights of mankirrl in general - that appear to foreshadow 
m:xien1 liberalism" (Miller 1982:124). Sir Isaiah Berlin was possibly the 
most harsh critic of Macpherson when he stated "He (Macpherson) accuses 
I.ocke of reading back characteristics of civilised society into natural 
society; but pei:h.aps it is Professor Macpherson who is reading back 
nineteenth -century conflicts into the seventeenth century" (Berlin 
1964:468). 
The American philosopher, John Rawls (1921) wrote his fairous "Theory of 
Justice" in 1971 in which he attercpted to settle the differences between 
political obligation and the redistribution conception of social 
justice. Rawls is a perfect example of a philosopher building on I.ocke' s 
theories. Rawls himself declares that his theory of justice is an 
attempt to carry to a higher level of abstraction the theory of a social 
contract as found in I.ocke, for example. Although Rawls resurrects the 
social contract of Hobbes, I.ocke and Rousseau, he differs from I.ocke on 
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the question of the actual fourrlation of the Social contract. While 
Locke gives it as a matter of fact, Rawls states that it is hypothetical. 
'lb detennine the justice of a situation, Rawls claims, it must be asked 
what the outcome would be if the contract was made um.er certain 
corrlitions. He also agrees with Locke that :mankirrl was originally in a 
state of equality. Rawls then continued to postulate that mankin::l would 
construct a society based on the first principal of equality in basic 
rights and duties and the secorrl principal of social and econanic 
inequality. 
Although Rawls is a key figure on the twentieth century philosophers 
stage, it has been stated that Robert Nozick (1938-) represents the 
twentieth century equivalent of John Locke, although his objective, 
unlike Locke, was to refute the dominant notions of distributive justice 
and replace it with thoughts of his own. (Paul 1982:5). While sarre see 
his book as a restatement of Locke's theories of state, justice, and 
private property (Scruton 1982: 329) , Nozick does not present a pure 
Lockean conception. His theories have obviously been influenced by 
writers since Locke. For instance while Locke puts a limit on the 
resources that a person can extract from nature, Nozick sees this in 
te.nns of an admonition against taking from nature that which degrades the 
circumstances of those to below an acceptable level because they are 
stripped of resources which they could previously use. 
'!hat Nozick is an admirer of Locke is evident throughout his writings. He 
supports much of Locke's basic philosophy. He agrees with Locke that 
people in the state of nature behave morally m::>st of the time. However, 
where Locke's critics have pointed out obvious flaws, Nozick appears to 
either ignore them or attempts to deferrl them. One such exanple is the 
state-of-nature theory. "There is a sin'ple and obvious complaint against 
Locke that men never were in any such state of nature and that, even if 
they had been, no state ever did in fact arise by the process he 
describes (namely contract). Whether this sinks Locke, Nozick apparently 
avoids because, he argues, his hypothetical history of the transition 
from the state of nature to civil society need not be describing the real 
origins of existing institutions or the process that produced them . . . It 
seems that Nozick thinks that if we can show how a given set of 
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institutions could, in theo:cy, arise legitimately, then this gives us a 
reason for preferring them to, or valuing them more highly than, those 
which could only arise via illegitimate processes" (Brown 1986:97). 
In Nozick seems to fim I.Dcke's state-of-nature useful sees this theo:cy 
as a possible hypothesis. Nevertheless Nozick considers it is unlikely 
that a social contract ever happened. Nozick' s state of nature thus has 
a different ontological status from 1Dcke' s which held that is was a 
corrlition that existed arrl to which mankirrl can return. While Nozick 
disagrees with the state of nature, his view of mankirrl also differs from 
I.Dcke. In 1Dcke mankirrl is a possession of God. Not so for Nozick. 
'!here are those instances where Nozick simply contradicts I.Dcke. Nozick 
talks of positive rights while Nozick denies these positive rights. 
Nozick is also silent on the question of limited goverrnnent arrl the 
separation of powers which 1Dcke considered essential to legitimate 
goverrnnent. On the contra:cy Nozick claims that for a state to go beyond 
protection is illegitimate. so while 1Dcke talks of limited goverrnnent, 
Nozick talks of minimal goverrnnent which is the least powerful political 
arrangement compatible with the protection of rights. Nozick concludes 
that any political order can only be justified if it is shown to uphold 
irrli vidual rights. 'Ihis conclusion is close to 1Dcke who in effect said 
that a government is legitimate only while it does not impinge upon the 
natural rights of the citizens. 
Not eve:cyone agrees with Nozick's reliance on 1Dckean theories. For 
instance cavid Lyons argues that Nozick' s treatise is lacking because of 
his adoption of Locke's stipulation of constraint on an unlimited 
extraction from nature. (Paul 1982:21). Nozick's rights are grounded,as 
are I.Dcke's,in the idea of free action. Possibly the biggest difference 
between Nozick arrl 1Dcke in terms of this thesis is that Nozick ignores 
scripture references while I.Dcke's whole philosophy hinges on them. 
Ronald Dworkin, one of the most prominent legal philosophers published 
his influential book "Taking Rights Seriously" in 1977. In his emphases 
on the valid claim of rights, IMorkin stands with Nozick arrl Rawls. He 
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claims that everyone has the equal right to concern and respect. In 
!Mor kin's view the property right nrust give way to social welfare 
required by this equal right to concern and respect But like so many 
egalitarians he ends up favouring equality of co:rxlition rather than the 
equality of rights affinned in the Declaration of Irrleperrlence. (Illcash 
xx:162). His views on rights and the state are quite contrary to those of 
ux:ke. While 1'x:ke saw rights as something that we automatically have 
from God and build the state to protect these rights, !Morkin suggests 
that the state is something we automatically inherit and we nrust then 
develop a theory of moral rights against the state. 
John Dunn, a Cambridge historian, identifies a strong traditional 
influence in ux:ke's works. He published his "Political thoughts of John 
ux:ke" in 1969 which clearly shows that in his younger days Locke was 
conscious of his religious beliefs and the resulting belief in an eternal 
order which gave rise to values and morality. Dunn felt that many of the 
apparent contradictions in 1'x:ke could be explained by the fact that men 
often neglected to see 1'x:ke' s un:ierlying assunptions. Here we see a 
retum to Seliger's contention. Possibly Dunn's greatest contribution 
was to errphasis 1'x:ke' s religious convictions and their relationship to 
ux:ke's political philosophy. Dunn points out that 1'x:ke had a dogn,atist 
Calvinistic upbringing although he chose Anglicanism mainly due to his 
dislike for authoritarianism. When in exile in Holland in a Calvinist 
society he joined with refonned Calvinists. In Dunn's mirx:i there is no 
doubt that the protestant tradition from I.lither onwards deeply influenced 
ux:ke. In a nutshell Dunn concluded that the Calvinistic doctrine which 
marked the teaching in 1'x:ke' s early years terrled to guide his thought 
and action throughout his life. (.Aaron 1971:360) 
According to Gennino, 1'x:ke is not without his faults. One such problem 
is his reluctance to define the tenn majority. Along with interpreters 
of 1'x:ke such as Alopheus T Mason and Willowrrore Kerrlall he sees the 
danger of majority tyranny inherent in ux:ke's political principles 
(Germino 1972: 187). Although according to Strauss, 1'x:ke seems to 
consider the majority a less threat than a monarch or oligarchic ruler. 
Locke considered the power of the majority as a check on bad 
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government. (Strauss 1955:233/4). It brings to mind the 'WOrds of lord 
Acton who said "Power terrls to conupt and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely". While this can be directed at absolutism it can also be 
directed at the people who in Locke's theo:ry have, in the errl, absolute 
power. 
Gennino continues to point out that Locke tells us that Government rests 
on consent but fails to show how consent can be manipulated. Eric 
Voeglin in his book New Science of Politics published in 1952, talks of 
Locke's swin:lle of consent, meaning that the principle of consent could 
be just another 'WOrd for coercion. (ibid : 144) Another aspect of consent 
which is taken up by Plamenatz in his book "Concern, Freedom am 
Political Obligation", is that consent is the sole basis of the duty of 
the governed to obey their ruler or else • . • there exists in eve:ry state, 
however democratic, a lru:ge number of persons urrler no obligation to obey 
its laws" (Pate.man 1979:81), although this is refuted by saying that all 
citizens do or can be said to, consent. 
Willowrrore Kendall in his writings in 1941, agrees with Locke's faith in 
the moral capacity of the people and believed that they will always do 
that which is right. While this may be acceptable to Kendall it is a 
major problem to Genni.no who sees a problem when Locke assumes that the 
majority's judgement will be uncornipted. Nevertheless, Kendall clailns 
that Locke is not really a propagator of limited government but because 
I.ocke failed to limit specific powers of society he is in fact a 
propagator of majority-rule democracy. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
Kendall claims that I.ocke will always override the rights of the 
irxlividual in favour of the camrnon good. Locke therefore does not have 
the irrlividual as the centre of his defence but in fact has many 
collectivism elements in his philosophy. In the secom essay in G.W. 
Gough's book "John Locke's political philosophy" written in 1972, Gough 
agrees with Kendall but suggests that Kendall overerrphasizes the 
collectivist aspects and is wrong to present the general decision as the 
core of Locke's theo:ry. 
Ani so the debate continues. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In concluding whether I.ocke successfully dealt with the problem of 
reconciling religion an:i rights, it will be helpful to recapitulate the 
account of I.ocke' s theo:cy for which I have been arguing. It is worth 
sununarising the relevance today of I.ocke' s political theo:cy in a 
post-irrlustrial society as Marxist an:i other theorists contend that 
I.ocke' s theo:cy is insufficient to guarantee justice for all. 
I.ocke was a bold an:i innovative writer who explored the relationship 
between his religious belief in God an:i the rights of the irrli vidual. I 
have shown that I.ocke drew on three sources to create a Christian 
Political Theory which I have called 'Iheopolity. I have used 
'Iheopolity as a conceptual model on which to map out I.ocke's political 
doctrine that ensures that :mankin:l is able to enjoy the rights which God 
endowed him with. Theopolity gives normative principles for the 
organization of society. It presei:ves irrli vidual rights which are held 
collectively by society an:i addresses the balance between freedom an:i 
equality in society. 
To urrlerstan:i I.ocke's Political 'Iheo:cy it is necessary to have a grasp of 
the three sources, namely epistem::>logy, theology an:i liberal politics. 
Epistem::>logy, being the study of knowledge an:i the justification of 
belief, is the first source of 'Iheopolity. I.ocke' s epistem::>logy was 
built on the concepts of reasoning an:i experience. While his doctrines 
had a disturbing effect upon the traditional 100ral an:i religious beliefs 
of his day, today I.ocke's concept of tabula rasa, is widely rejected 
as there is no doubt that an infant's min:i is not a blank slate. If it 
were a blank slate at birth, then a relativity in 100rals will result. If 
we rely entirely on our experience to know what is right or wrong then 
there can be no yardstick for :mankin:l to live by in the state of 
nature. 
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D.A. Rustow asserts that thinkers from Locke to Tocqueville and A.D. 
Lindsay have shown that mankin::i has an innate capacity for self 
goverrnnent as found in the Christian ethical tradition (Lewis 1978:52). 
'Iheology fonns the secorrl source of 'Iheopolity. '!he interaction between 
Goo. and mankin::i gives rise to theology. Locke's trust was in Goo. who 
worked out the purpose of mankin::i wham he created. Locke used the 
arguments of experience and concluded that Goo. exists. OUr awareness of 
ourselves is a simple but sure element in experience and from this Locke 
deduces that there is a Goo.. '!he New Testament is proven by the way Old 
Testament prophecies were realised by Christ and his miracles which were 
his credentials. If we accept the huth of his miracles, we can accept 
the huth of his teaching about Goo.. Locke concluded that Christianity 
was basically reasonable and scripture confinned not contradicted reason. 
He believed that because of Adam's sin physical death not spiritual death 
resulted. While I disagreed with this conclusion, what is more important 
is his rejection of Original Sin. Locke's theory of being born with a 
clean slate (tabula rasa) means that mankin::i, at birth, has no concept of 
Goo. and no conscience. I had a problem reconciling Locke's concept of 
tabula rasa with the Biblical concept of original sin. I disagree that 
the natural law is not stamped on each person's mind. I believe that 
mankin::i is born with the law of Goo., ie. the law of nature, written on 
their heart. '!his innate knowledge is, however, molded or suppressed by 
the envirornnent in which the person is raised. To support my argument I 
quoted from Romans Chapter 2 verses 14 and 15. 
However, I agree with Locke that the law of nature is birrli.ng because 
it's origin is in Goo.. It's purpose is so that we may live in an orderly 
manner just as the universe follows its pattern of behaviour. Since the 
fall, mankin::i has inherited the bias of sin yet it is Goo.'s desire that 
we should live in accordance with Goo.'s law. Goo. can desire this because 
he is all-wise and has created everything in the universe. 
Locke held liberal political views because of his Anglican Christian 
beliefs. '!he third source of 'Iheopolity is the political theory of 
liberalism. Locke was the first philosopher to consolidate the main 
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concepts of liberalism with its basis of m::>rality arx:i in::lividualism. He 
made a major contribution to the acceptance of the doctrines of 
constitutional government, religious toleration, representative 
institutions arx:i the freedom of the in::lividual. It was the ideas of John 
Locke that gave rise to the doctrine of classical liberalism, a doctrine 
that has been revived by the New Right in Britain an:i the United States 
of America in the 1980 1s. 
'!he starting point of John Locke's 'Iheopolity is a state of nature which 
was instituted by the creator. Mankin:i is naturally in this state of 
nature which is civil society minus govenmient. Locke's standpoint on 
the corrlition of mankin::l in the state of nature had a hunanistic thread. 
It was a contradiction of Hobbes' claim that antagonism was the supreme 
force between people although it should not be assumed that Locke 
considered people to be inherently good. Locke considered mankin:i to 
have a bias toward self love. 
Here I returned to my problem with Locke's rejection of the concept of 
original sin.. Despite his rejection of the fall of mankin::l as a reason 
for punishment, he admits mankin::l has an inherent bias to follow their 
own desires irrespective of the consequence to others. Locke then 
accepts that people are capable of setting rules upon themselves which 
means that mankin::l is able to govern himself in the state of nature. 
Locke does not conceive the Social Contract as a contract between ruler 
arx:i ruled but rather he sees it as a contract with in:li viduals giving 
either express or tacit consent to becoming a member of a political 
cxmnunity. A political conununity comes into existence when every person 
has given up their power in the State of Nature for protection of self 
arx:i property. Because it is humankirxi' s desire to ch.anJe from a State of 
nature to Civil Society this ch.anJe takes place by consent. 'Ihe 
in:lividual does so because in the state of Nature their liberty is seldom 
assured. '!hey take the liberty of the in:lividual arx:i place it in the 
care of the majority. Once civil society has been established its first 
act is to fonn a legislative power, but to prevent it from becoming a 
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menace it is separated from the executive. I.ocke detailed the 
limitations on legislative power and claimed that Govermnent is placed in 
a position of trust leaving the people as both trustee and beneficiary. 
The concept of trustee is to be within the parameter set by the law of 
God and nature on which the contract stands. 
Community always has supreme power. 'Ihe conmrunity is the public will of 
society which members obey. But the power of collective right of law 
enforcement is not regained by the political society while civil 
govermnent acts within the trust placed in it. Similarly this power 
cannot revert to the individual while there is a political society. 
The greatest problem is the historical evidence which shows that human 
beings never lived in a State of Nature. Fram a practical point of view 
the original contract sinply did not exist. My own theory is that the 
social contract evolved over a period of time and sooner or later the 
individuals in the conmrunity came to realise that they were subjecting 
certain liberties for protection. At this stage of realisation the 
individual decided that he/she would accept the situation they founi 
themselves in thereby tacitly sealing the contract between person and 
person. This is supported by I.ocke' s view that political authority is as 
a result of consent of the individual not the drawing up of a communal 
contract. 
The value of the Social Theory is that it offers a means to produce a 
rational reconciliation between laws and liberty. There are many 
theories which litter philosophy books but few are without anomalies or 
fault. Generally, I.ocke' s doctrine is weak. Yet his concept of 
trusteeship is a logical explanation of political obligation. Even if 
there was no contract men seem to behave as though there was one. 
I.ocke' s theory clearly supports the view that govermnent by consent is 
the basis for legitimate govermnent and is a constitutional type of 
govermnent. While some writers claim that I.ocke's failure to give a 
clear account of what constitutes express consent and others claim that 
I.ocke is not clear on how express consent is registered, it has been 
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claimed that express consent is verbal declaration of mankind's consent 
to make hinlself subject to the laws of the goverrnnent. This express 
consent is not dependent on the individual being a landowner. 
Locke premises his account of political obligation with the principle 
that mankind needs only to obey a goverrnnent whose authority the 
individual has given personal consent and ignores any difference between 
strict individual consent and the vague consent of the majority. Locke's 
treatment of majority is a weak link in his Secom Treatise. He claims 
that in consenting to become a member of society the individual 
automatically is bound by the majority. 'Ihere is the danger of 
majoritarian tyranny inherent in Locke's theory as there is no protection 
for minority rights. 
'Ihe law of nature applies to everyone and it is up to the people to 
ensure that this law is presei:ved. Power is entrusted to a govennnent by 
the people to enable the goverrnnent to protect their property. A 
goverrnnent is not free to do as it pleases. When it abuses its trust the 
people are enti tied to take action. 'Ihe individual needs to be protected 
against interference in their liberty and property by the goverrnnent. If 
it is broken then the people have the right to rebel. If a goverrnnent 
acts tyrannically it is the goverrnnent which is guilty of rebellion an:i 
not it's subjects who resist him. Locke believed that there is no 
justification needed for the revolution. 
Natural law in the state of nature leads to natural rights in the state 
of nature. Locke put fonrcu:d a theoretical design of the idea of human 
rights. He identified the basic rights of manki.nd in the State of Nature 
as being the right to life, liberty and property. Natural rights are 
granted by God so that mankind can fulfil God's requirements. Mankin:i is 
estranged from God yet God allows us to have rights. 
It is very clear that there is a special relationship between God an:i 
manki.nd. B..lt this relationship is based on the fact that mankind is 
dependent on God for life and for continued existence. Arising from 
relationship we firrl mankind's right to preserve life. Presel:ving the 
life of the individual, is in fact preserving mankind and society. 
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A right arises from an act. God's right in mankind. arises from God's act 
of creation. A person has two rights arising from acts. '!he first is 
merely by existing arrl the second. is labour or actions. While rnankin:i 
did not create the world, the ind.ividual does create the actions of 
hisjher body arrl therefore has the niaker's right over them. So while God 
has proprietary over the ind.i vidual 's body arrl li.mbs, the ind.i vidual has 
proprietary over the use of body arrl limbs. Whatever mankind. creates or 
makes, it becomes the ind.ividual's property just as mankind. became God ~s 
property. Locke stresses that nobody has the right over their own life 
arrl therefore the right to life cannot alienated from the ind.ividual to 
the state. 
Same writers claim that the right to life stems from the right to total 
human fulfillment, physical and emotional needs, health, personal 
dignity, freed.am to live their lives to the full arrl to contribute 
towards the development of society. Locke on the other hand. sees that 
natural rights are the incorporation of the circumstances required to 
protect arrl preserve our lives und.er natural laws given by God. 
'!he secom of Locke's rights is that of freed.am. Mankind. is naturally 
free. '!his freed.am originated at creation. '!he perfect freedom that 
mankind. is born into cannot be taken away without the ind.i vidual' s 
consent. Mankind. is subject to an earthly power only by their own 
consent. Freed.am is also the power to organise the ind.i vidual 's thoughts 
arrl rrovements in whatever manner the ind.ividual prefers. But not only is 
freed.am a decision of the mind. but it is being able to choose arrl once 
that choice has been made it ItUJSt be put into action. Locke also 
believed that there could be no freed.am without reason. '!he ability to 
reason is required if a rational choice is to take place. '!he exercising 
of this choice, however, ItUJSt not interfere with the right of liberty of 
another. 'Iherefore in society, mankind. is obliged to forfeit same of 
their freed.am for the good of society. It is the laws of society that 
limit freed.am. 
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Property is the third of Locke's rights. Labour constitutes the primary 
title to private property. Locke identifies three limitations on the 
appropriation of goods and land. '!he first of these limitations is that 
mankin:i nrust mix their labour with whatever they appropriate. '!he second 
limitation on appropriation is set by one's needs. '!his means that an 
individual cannot amass property to the detrilnent of others. '!he third 
limitation is the fact that nothing nrust be allowed to spoil or be 
destroyed, alt.hough Locke does qualify this by allowing appropriation of 
m::>re goods than can be used provided the excess is used to exchange for 
other property which can be used. 
Unlike natural rights which were given to mankin:i by God, human rights 
are those rights which are derived from law and are an extension to the 
basic rights. In fact civil laws are made with the sole pw:pose of 
expan:ling mankin:i' s basic freedom. Free development of the individual 
.inplies rights to the resources which allow the individual to develop. 
'!here has been a trend to raise the .inportance of rights as legitimate 
claiJns on the govennnent. I divided these rights into three categories. 
Firstly the Social Rights of economy, education, living wages. etc. '!he 
secorxi category is Civil Rights encarrpassing freedom of association, 
movement, expression, etc. and finally Political Rights with the right to 
vote and the right to be able to starxi for election. 
'Ihe elaboration of rights often stems from those who feel they have been 
denied certain "rights" which they are entitled to. Often these include 
minorities such as homosexuals. It follows that some so-called rights 
are not really rights at all but rights which pertain particular 
arrangements within a society. Exan'ples I gave were paid holidays, 
participation in the scientific affairs of ones canmrunity, etc. 
Coming back to Locke's prime source document, it is not possible to hunt 
through the scriptures to firxi sections which erxiorse certain rights. 
Nevertheless Locke fourxi that rights are an un::leniable .inplication of 
Biblical teaching as a whole. Similarly we need to take Locke's 
teachings as a whole to see what rights his writings support other than 
the three basic rights of Life, freedom and property. 
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Religious tolerance was the forerunner of a wider application of Freedom. 
Locke believerl in tolerance, firstly because no one is able to accept 
responsibility for the beliefs of another arxi government has no right to 
interfere with the church. Secondly Locke claims that the state has no 
objective religious yardstick am cannot judge. This does not mean that 
there is no right or wrong but it means that there is no one on earth 
that can judge. Thirdly Locke believerl that the self appointerl guardians 
of orthodoxy terx:l to be m::)re interesterl in power than truth am the 
saving of souls. Fourthly Locke points out that the state has no further 
jurisdiction than protecting the .in:lividual arxi their possessions. 
Fifthly, 'Whenever there are religious differences arxi the state atterrpts 
to bring about unity, it results in unrest am war. 
Locke considers all people to be equal. It is in this equality of r~ght 
arxi duty that humans confront each other as creatures of God in the State 
of Nature. Yet despite his affinnation to equality, Locke quite happily 
accepted the inequalities of his day with slavery as the m::)St glaring 
exanple. 
Freerlan of Speech is a true Lockean concept which, like so many other 
twentieth century rights, did not receive actual attention from I.ocke. 
Another exanple is Locke's clear but unwritten belief in a freerlom of 
econanic pursuit arxi a freerlan in the use of m::)ney. We can continue 
with exanples such as political freerlan which means the power to take 
part in the political process. Yet Locke does maintain that anything 
which threatens the stability of the state cannot have unlimiterl freerlom. 
Therefore the .in:lividual has a right to political freerlan provided they 
do not threaten society. 
It is accepted that Jahn Locke is one of the greatest names in English 
Fhilosophy even though his thoughts are less original than other writers 
such as Hobbes. Yet his influence has been as great as that of Hobbes, if 
not greater. If we look at Rousseau's Social Contract we can see that he 
had read Locke as well as Hobbes although it was Locke's theories that 
were taken to their limits. The writings of Rousseau lerl to the first 
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gran:1 failure of revolutionary idealism with terrible results in its 
brief triumph. Nevertheless Rousseau's theories an::l the sovereignty of 
the people have influenced all the major nations of the world. Even the 
German Ehilosopher, Inunanuel Kant (1724-1804) in 1796 declared that 
Goverrnnent by the general will would be the doctrine of the future. 'Ihe 
basis of all this can be traced back to I.ocke. 
'Ihe centrality of Human Rights in politics has, since I.ocke, continued to 
play a key role in the political history of countries. 
'Ihe holocaust of the second World War led to the fonnation of the United 
Nations. 'Ihe United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was 
somewhat generous in its inclusions in its large bundle of rights. over 
the past few decades there has been a shift from liberalism to socialism 
both within the democratic framework as well as without. While 
liberalism as a whole has declined, I.ocke' s Theopolity with its 
cornerstone of Rights has gradually, since 1945, been in the ascendant. 
'Ihe New Right has m:xlified the principles of 20th Century Liberalism in 
two ways which I believe brings it closer to I.ocke's 'Iheopolity with it's 
emphasis on freedom an:l individualism. Firstly it has taken equal 
opportunity to became relative equal opportunity. I.ocke accepted that 
inequalities appear so humankind carried out their individual lives. 
Secondly the New Right claims that an individuals right to the protection 
of their property results in responsibility to their neighbour, this does 
not mean that the individual is responsible for their neighbour's well 
being. 
It is on these grourrls that I maintain that Jahn I.ocke is as relevant for 
today as he ever was an:l that the m::wement in the area of individual 
rights throughout the world an:l the errergence of the New Right in 
Britain, is a vindication of the practical nature of I.ocke's 'Iheopolity. 
As we have seen I.ocke was not merely a political pcmphleteer, but a man 
with many facets, not least a political philosopher. His political 
philosophy was the fruit of his many years of wide reading an:l 
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reflection, an:i the material out of which his system was built can be 
paralleled in the writings of numerous predecessors an:i contemporaries. 
He expressed hilnself in a clear, unpretentious manner which was frierrlly, 
a little doctrinaire an::i even careless an:i mean:iering. It was this 
readable style which resulted in his success an::i his influence on 
political thought. He holds a great reputation as a person who helped 
free the human mirrl with the Scottish Ihilosopher, David Hume (1711-1776) 
claiming that he steered science in a new direction, Bertrand Russell 
describing him as the foun:ier of empiricism an:i Trevor-Roper calling him 
the greatest of all liberal philosophers (Arblaster 1984: 137) . 
Descriptions with which I agree 
Despite my :fun:lamental difference with Locke's episterrology of tabula 
rasa an::i the resultant rejection of the doctrine of original sin, an:i 
despite the logical fiction of the state of nature, I conclude that his 
Theopolity is the .only political doctrine that can be adopted by rational 
people who share a strong sense of justice an:i morality in a Dem:>cratic 
Christian Society. Locke's view on the creation of mankind gives rise to 
the cornerstone of his Theopolity namely, natural an::i human rights which, 
when violated by Govennnent, legitimately gives rise to revolution. 
The emphasis running through this thesis has been Religion an:i Rights. I 
have shown that Locke attempted to reconcile God with Rights an::i was 
successful in his endeavour. Locke's pursuit of truth led to his basic, 
carmoon-sense politics which was the embodiment of the true state of 
mankind in a society where the individual's God-given rights are 
respected. His Christian faith an::i his reliance on the Bible were the 
ultimate sources of his philosophy. 
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APPENDICES 
1. ':mE LIFE AND TIMES OF LOCKE 
Locke was bom at Wrington, Somerset on 29 August 1632. His parents had 
earlier m:,ved from Somerset to Beluton in Dorsetshire and at the time of 
his birth his mother was visiting family in Wrington. Locke was born 
into a divided England. Socially, England was divided between town and 
country. '!his was intensified by the economic shift from land to 
in:iustry and commerce creating a non-conformist middle class as opposed 
to the Anglican Gentry. Politically it was also divided. Charles the 
first was on the throne and believed that it was his divine right to rule 
without consulting the people. The King called and dissolved parliament 
at will and at one stage ruled alone for eleven years. '!his was resented 
by the people who were especially against his taxes. '!his had led to 
resistance by Parliament and finally, in 1641, it presented the King with 
details of their grievances. 
All during this time Locke was carefully schooled by his father. B..lt in 
1642 when Locke was 10 years old civil war broke out with Oliver Cron'Mell 
leading his forces against the Kings forces. For the last 4 years his 
father was involved with the Parliamenta:cy anny against the King. For 
the next six years from 1646 onwards, he atterrled Westminister School 
which he did not enjoy. The school was at the headquarters of the 
Revolution (Fraser 1890:7). Within three years the war was over and 
Cramwell ruled. At first Cromwell was an unofficial dictator but later 
was made I..ord Protector. 
In 1652, at the age of 21, Locke became an undergraduate in the position 
of Junior Studentship, at Christ Church, Oxford. '!his had been the 
headquarters of King's army until 1646 when they surrendered to 
Cromwell. He first graduated as a Bachelor of the Arts in 1656 and then 
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later as a Master of Arts. In 1659 he was elected to a Senior 
Studentship which was tenable for life an:i the followin;;J year he took up 
a lectureship in Greek to be followed in 1662 as a lecturer in Rhetoric. 
By this time his political thinking was that of a strict right wing 
m:>narchist an:i was clearly influenced by the writin;;Js of Hobbes as can be 
seen from his panphlet on religious toleration written in 1661. The 
Royalist traditions was once again becoming dominant at Christ Church an:i 
the restoration of the m:>narchy led to liberalism bein;;J discouraged at 
Oxford. The followin;;J year Cromwell died an:i the time was ripe for 
Charles the secorrl to ascerrl the throne. Although Cromwell had done well 
to oppose the King, he had failed as ruler of Englan:i. The people that 
had welcarred the Puritans as deliverers now felt that the yoke of rigid 
puritanism was too much. 
Locke also held the position of censorship of m:>ral philosophy for three 
years from 1661 to 1663. By this time Locke's parents an:i two brothers 
had died leavin;;J him without family at the age of 31. He briefly left 
the academic world in 1665 to become secretary to Sir Walter Vane in a 
mission to the Elector of Brandenburg. In 1666 he began studyin;;J medicine 
but although he studied intensively an:i gained a bachelors in 1674, he 
was not awarded his doctorate despite two attenpts. D..lrin;;J his studies 
in medicine Locke starte::i readin;;J the writin;;Js of Descartes. He did not 
agree with the Aristotelian tradition at Oxford. 
It was durin;;J the summer of 1666 that he met Ashley Cooper who was later 
to became Baron Ashley an:i in 1672, the first Earl of Shaftesbury. He was 
the foun:ier of the Whigs in Englan:i. Lord Ashley, as he was then known, 
was an outstan:ilng politician in the court. of Charles the Secom. At the 
age of 34 Locke went to live in the Shaftesbury household in Exeter as 
Ashley's personal physician. D.Jrin;;J his time with Shaftesbury he became 
part of the inner circle. cranston is convinced that his friendship 
brought about a change in Locke to a liberal (Ashcraft 1980:433). Locke 
was m:>re than a physician to Ashley. He educate::i Ashley's 15 year old 
son an:i later negotiate::i the son's marriage. Ashley's grandson was also 
taught by Locke from age 3 to 12. 
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Same twelve years later Locke was appointed Secretary of Presentations 
an:1 one year later in 1673, became Secretary to the Council of Trade and 
Foreign plantations. After 23 years he was appointed Conunissioner of the 
Council of Trade. When Shaftesbul:y was dismissed from his position as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer due to a quarrel with the court in 1675, 
Locke was forced to resign his positions. 
At this stage of Locke's career, consurrption had already begun to attack 
his body with periodic asthma attacks an:1 continued to ail him for the 
rest of his life. This coupled with losing office, was :rrotivation for 
Locke to sperrl the three years up to an:1 including 1678 in France. There 
is much speculation that at this time Locke wrote A letter from a person 
of quality to his frierrl in the countl:y which was publicly burned by the 
hangman an:1 a canunittee set up to discover its author. It is at this 
point that Locke left hastily for France. D.lring this time in France, 
Shaftesbury was ilnprisoned for a time in the Tower for his opposition to 
the King. The King however realised that there was a threat from France 
an:1 Rome an:1 so turned to the popular party headed by Shaftesbucy for 
help, resulting in Shaftesbury becoming President of the Privy Council in 
1679. A few days later Locke returned to England to stay at 
Shaftesbury's new home in Aldersgate. While in France he managed to 
retain his studentship with Christ Church, Oxford. 
Shaftesbury continued to be heavily involved in intrigue against the 
King. His attitude to certain bills brought him into conflict with the 
King an:1 in 1679 he was again dismissed by the King. The infarrous Rye 
House Plot to assassinate the King was tmcovered. This led to 
Shaftesbury being tried an:1 acquitted on the count of treason in 1681. 
This did not deter Shaftesbury who continued to plot against the King in 
support of the Duke of Monmouth who was the illegitimate son of 
Charles 11. On Mormouth' s arrest in 1682, Shaftesbury fled to Amsterdam 
an:1 died there a year later in 1683. Locke had in the mean time left 
I.orrlon when Shaftesbury was arrested for the first time in 1681 an:1 went 
to live with James Tyrell in oakshot where he made preparations to leave 
the countl:y. He did not return to I.orrlon tmtil after the revolution. 
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Finally I.ocke was forced to flee to Amsterdam in 1682 when Nathaniel 
Wade named I.ocke as a financier of Monmouth's rebellion. 
'IWo years after he went into exile, I.ocke was expelled from Oxford in 
abstentia on order from the King. The loss of his academic appoin'bnent 
nade him more reliant on the pension that Lord Shaftesbury had left him 
and income from land left to him by his father. The following year, 
1685, King Ol.arles died. D..lring his reign he had successfully broken the 
power of the Puritans and had started to show terrlencies toward Divine 
Rule. His younger brother, James became King and continued in his 
brothers ways. In that year the Monmouth's rebellion finally failed, 
resulting in 300 executions and 800 banishments. 
In 1685 I.ocke was listed as one of the 84 most dangerous Englishmen in 
Holland which resulted in James the secorrl unsuccessfully b:ying to have 
him extradited. D..lring this time I.ocke went und.er the name of Dr. van 
der Linde (Fraser 1890:76). later King James pardoned him. Despite this 
pardon, I.ocke refused to retunl to England on the basis that he could not 
be pardoned for something he did not do. King James, who was a catholic, 
had attenpted to interfere with the Church and the people feared some 
sort of catholic plot. He also attenpted to replace Tories and High 
Churchmen in government with catholics. Civil war was once again on the 
horizon but averted by William of Orange ascerxiing the throne by 
invitation fran both Whigs and Tories. William of Orange landed in 
Britain in November 1688 and allowed King James to flee to France . 
.. 
I.ocke did eventually retunl to I.orrlon in 1689 in the canpany of Princess 
Mary (later Queen Mary). Here he was offered ambassadorship to Fredrick 
111 in Brarxienberg but refused because of health reasons. Instead he was 
nade Commissioner of Appeals. In 1696 he became the Commissioner for the 
new Board of Trade until he retired in 1700. 
Although he finally retired from public life in 1700, he had already gone 
into semi-retirement same ten years before to Essex in the company of 
Isaac Newton and other close frierrls. He stayed with his old frierrls 
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lady Masham an:i Sir Francis Masham, a Member of Parliament at their 
house, oates. His heal th deteriorated. Not only did his asthma continue 
but he also suffered from swelling of his legs an:i deafness. 
John Locke died at Essex in October 28, 1704 at the age of 72. He had 
lived through turbulent times and had experienced acceptance and 
rejection. As Jeffreys states " Locke was a prophet of reasonableness in 
a world that could hardly have been more unreasonable" (Jeffreys 1967: 7) • 
2 . '1HE WRITIN:;S OF IDCKE 
Locke was nearly sixty before his first book was published. Most of his 
works were published between 1690 an:i 1693. Although IrOSt of his books 
were drafted long before, his views were unacceptable until much later. 
'!his delay in publication seemed to help enhance his works. We fin:i that 
his writings show a man inordinately interested in life an:i they are full 
of character. Yet Hans Aarsleff echoes the words of many students when 
he claims Locke's writings to be difficult. However, Aarsleff goes on to 
state that he does not in any way consider Locke to be a confused 
writer. (Yelton 1969:99) Possibly part of the problem was Locke's novel 
manner of defen:ling old beliefs but in so doing he attenpted to dispense 
with concepts an:i arguments which rested on tradition but were untested 
an:i in error. (Parry 1978:2) 
Locke never wrote a book that systematically interrelated psychology, 
religion, epistenology an:i politics. While he did write on all these 
topics, he dealt with them at different times. His writings were not 
restricted to these themes as he also wrote on education, economics, and 
biblical criticism. 
Locke's concern with philosophical questions dates back to 1650, although 
his first major work, 'lwo Tracts ai GaYenlment, was written in the 
years of 1660 to 1661. These two treatises, the fonner in English and the 
latter in French, remained unpublished until this centw:y. '!his work is 
not to be confused with his later work, 'lwo treatises of GcNeniment. 
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I..ocke's secorx:i najor work was a set of Iatin lectures written during 1661 
to 1664 called EBsays ai the raws of Nature. 'Ihis work, like his 
first, remained unpublished until this centucy. 
'lhe starting point in I..ocke' s writings of note is widely considered to be 
his unfinished and unpublished work called Essay concerning 
'l'bleratiai. 'Ihis particular work showed a narked m::,ve toward a liberal 
approach. 'lhe year was 1667. 
In 1668 I..ocke wrote a lengthy manuscript on the futility of Governmental 
efforts to regulate the rate of interest. In the sane year he conunenced 
the draft of the scheme called Fundamental. Constituticns for the 
GovenDnent of ca:rolina. which was completed on 21 June 1669. 
Arising out of discussions with some frierx:is in 1671, I..ocke conunenced 
writing his famous Essay ~ lh1man Umerst:armnj al though this 
was not published until 1690 with further editions in 1694,1695, 1699 an::l 
1706. 'lhis work had a mixed reception, with Trinity COlle:Je in DJblin 
recarmnen:iing the work to students while Oxford rejected the work for 
students. It was only in 1696 that cambridge University began to 
acknowledge it's worth. D..lring the · years after 1671 there appears to be 
little evidence of any writings by I..ocke, possibly due to his duties in 
the Shaftesbury household. However at some stage he continued the 
thoughts of "Essay" in his CO:oouct of Urx:ierstanding which was only 
published after his death. 
D..lring his stay in France from 1675 to 1679 he translated some of 
Jansenist Pierre Nicole's essays. 'lhe year after his return to I.Drx:ion, 
he worked on a manuscript with his frierx:i, James Tyrrell, deferx:iing the 
principle of toleration. 
It appears that at this stage he connnenced his highly dangerous 
(politically-speaking) Two Treatises of GaYe?Dnent. 'lhe first of these 
two treatise derives a single nonnative conclusion from the theological 
axiom that there exists a God who sets rules arx:i directions for 
irx:iividuals throughout their lives (D.mn 1969:11). 
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It was generally accepted that the second Treatise of GoYemment was 
written merely to justify the 1688 Revolution. But if, as has been 
suggested by Peter Iaslett, Locke commenced it in 1673 and wrote the bulk 
of the work in Amsterdam with the major revision in 1680, then this view 
is obviously incorrect. It has also been suggested that he wrote it to 
destroy the current Anglican theory of politics (Yelton 1969:58). 
However, in a recent article by Richard Ashcraft, he convincingly shows 
that John Locke and his Two Treatises were part of the conspiracy 
known as the Rye House Plot and which found its final expression in the 
abortive Mornrouth Rebellion in 1685. 
After much rewriting this work was finally published in London 
anonyrrously in late 1688. It is claimed that over half of what IDcke 
wrote or designed for the second of the Two Treatises was lost. At 
some stage between 1683 and 1689 a middle section of the Two Treatises, 
which in the preface Locke says was as lol"lg' as the rest put together, was 
destroyed. The first of the Two Treatises breaks off in mid-sentence, 
Locke not having bothered to complete it when he published the full work 
(Parry 1978:8). Peter Iaslett has also claimed that the Second Treatise 
was in fact written first. 
Locke went to extraordinary lel"lg'ths to deny authorship of his '1'«> 
Treatises of Government. It was only on his death-bed that he actually 
acknowledged authorship. Yet it was originally received without much 
fuss as it merely detailed principles established in 1688. In fact there 
was no critical replies until 1703. 
By the time Locke went into exile in 1683 he had not actually published 
any work of major in'portance even though he was 50 years of age. 
r::uring his exile in Amsterdam, he wrote a Travel Janna! but IDcke' s 
lack of sense of beauty and history makes the journal dismal reading. 
Locke also finalised his Fssays cxn::iemi.n:J m.nnan Umerst:aminJ am 
wrote his letter of Tolera.tiai. The latter was published anonymously in 
Iatin in Holland after his return to London. Six months later it was 
published in English, also anonymously, in London. 
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In December of 1688 the Essay Conce.nrln:J Hllman ~ was 
published in Jahn Locke's name although a French version had been 
published anonymously in Hollan:i during February of the same year in Le 
Clerc's Biblioteque Universelle. 
D.lring his final years he wrote arrong others, Sane 'IhcuJhts carre.nrin;J 
FH:tx::aticn in 1693. This work originated out of letters written to a 
friend, E:dward Clarke. He also published two works on coinage in 1691. 
It is claimed by S.Alexarrler an:i others that it is arguable that Locke's 
greatest work, published in secret in 1695, was the Reasalableness of 
Cbristianity. This work was attacked by Jahn E:dwards which resulted in 
Locke replying in two anonynous virrlications of his work in 1695 arrl 
1697. A further attack on his work resulted in Locke writing three 
further works in 1697 defending his original work. Nevertheless the 
Reasalableness of Christianity became the central theme of theology for 
over a century (Bowley 1977:490). 
D.lring the last two years of his life he wrote a carmnental:y on the New 
Testament an:i a Discourse on Miracles. '!he latter was published after 
his death. Accenting to Jeffreys, these studies show Locke to be the 
forerunner of modem critical approach to Biblical Study (Jeffreys 
1967:24) 
In this rrhesis Irrf primary source will be '!\lo Treatises of Gavemment 
although Essays en the Laws of natm:e an:i his Essay ~ Human 
ume.rstamin:J are also sources of references. It is inportant for us 
to remember that the basis of Jahn Locke's political writings seems to be 
in the first instance a blend between iooral an:i religious principles 
especially with regard to the state of nature which occupies a central 
:position in Locke's political philosophy. In fact D.mn points out that 
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